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Abstract 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to assess the view that the formal properties of 
sentences of natural languages encode truth-conditions. The question I pursue is whether 
truth-conditional semantic theories are capable of accounting for the various ways in 
which contextual factors contribute to the determination of the truth-conditional content 
of sentences. The thesis will assess and evaluate three different approaches standard 
contemporary truth-conditional semanticists have set forth in response to what I shall 
refer to as the challenge from pervasive context sensitivity, which is essentially the 
claim that context plays a more extensive role in the determination of content than that 
of fixing the semantic values of standard indexical expressions. I shall aim to show that 
each of the approaches mentioned fails to provide an adequate account of how the 
phenomenon of context sensitivity can be explained on the basis of our linguistic 
competence alone, and shall then explore some of the consequences of this. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to examine a certain conception of the connection 
between linguistic meaning and truth that has become dominant in contemporary 
semantics. The view can be stated as follows: to understand what a declarative sentence 
means is to be in a position to know what conditions must obtain in order for that 
sentence to be true at any context of utterance. On this view, the meaning of a 
declarative sentence S, determined exclusively on the basis of the formal properties of S, 
encodes enough information to enable speakers at contexts to assign complete sets of 
truth-conditions to utterances of S. Consequently, the role of a semantic theory is to 
provide a systematic method for interpreting the truth-conditions of sentences relative to 
contexts.  
Standard truth-conditional approaches to semantics are thus predicated on the claim that 
notions of linguistic meaning and truth stand in a particularly close relation to one 
another. Foundational arguments for the claim will be examined in the opening chapter. 
The rest of the thesis, however, will be devoted to evaluating the force of certain 
problems that arise regarding the viability of the truth-conditional semantic framework. 
In particular, the thesis will critically evaluate how well truth-conditional semantic 
theories hold up against recent arguments to the effect that contextual factors play a 
much more pervasive role in the determination of content than was traditionally 
supposed.  
Early advocates of truth-conditional semantic theories (e.g. Davidson, Lewis) typically 
assumed that there is only a very limited extent to which truth-conditional content is 
contextually determined, and so only a limited range of contextual factors a semantic 
theory would need to take into account. What is more, they argued that the effects 
context does have on content can be explained in terms of the stable, context-invariant 
semantic properties that standard semantic theories will be able to associate with the 
formal, lexico-syntactic properties of their target languages. In recent years, however, a 
great deal of effort has been devoted to examining the various ways in which speakers 
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exploit their knowledge of context in order to determine the content expressed by 
utterances of sentences. As a result, many now argue that the phenomenon of context 
sensitivity is much more pervasive in natural language than was initially assumed. This 
has presented a host of new challenges for standard semantic theorists. 
The argumentative contribution of the thesis will be to assess and evaluate three 
different approaches standard semantic theorists have set forth of late in response to 
what I shall refer to as the challenge from the phenomenon of pervasive context 
sensitivity, which comes in the form of the claim that context plays a more extensive 
role in the determination of content than that of fixing the semantic values of overt 
context sensitive expressions; i.e. standard indexical expressions. 
The three approaches I will be interested in here are the following: semantic 
minimalism, the aphonic approach, and the unarticulated constituent analysis (UCA). 
Semantic minimalists maintain that the arguments that have been set forth in defence of 
pervasive context sensitivity are ill-founded, and that all genuine contextual effects on 
content are triggered by occurrences of standard indexical expressions situated in overt 
sentential structure. Aphonic theorists maintain that arguments for pervasive context 
sensitivity are well-founded, and seek to respond to such arguments by showing that all 
contextual effects on content are triggered by aphonic elements in sentential structure. 
UCA theorists, who also find arguments for pervasive context sensitivity persuasive, 
argue that all contextual effects on content are triggered by the intrinsic semantic 
properties of lexical items. 
All three approaches thus adopt the view that the challenge from pervasive context 
sensitivity can be met without abandoning the crucial assumption that the lexico-
syntactic properties of any given declarative sentence in a natural language encode a 
determinate set of truth-conditions. Each approach, however, adopts a very different 
conception of the way in which form and context interact in the determination of truth-
conditional content. The question that motivates the thesis is whether any of these 
approaches provides an adequate account of that interaction.  
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Ultimately, the conclusions I will reach will be largely negative. That is, I shall show 
that each of the approaches mentioned fails to provide an adequate account of how the 
phenomenon of context sensitivity can be explained on the basis of our linguistic 
competence alone. My more positive agenda, however, will be to show that even if we 
reject the view that the purely formal features of sentences encode truth-conditions, 
there is still much to be gained from investigating how such features systematically 
guide and constrain the process of linguistic interpretation.  
The thesis will proceed as follows. In chapter 1, I provide a detailed exposition of the 
theoretical foundations of the truth-conditional semantic framework. I then show how 
such theories might be constructed so as to provide a systematic method of 
interpretation for a natural language, and how they are able to accommodate a variety of 
important facts about the ways speakers of natural languages understand the meanings 
of sentences in those languages.  
In chapter 2, I devote my attention to the problems the challenge from pervasive context 
sensitivity raises for truth-conditional semantics. I look at the arguments that have been 
set forth to motivate the claim that context sensitivity is a pervasive feature of natural 
language, and draw out the consequences these arguments have for our conception of 
what constitutes a semantic theory. After that, I give an overview of three different 
responses to arguments for pervasive context sensitivity, the aim of this being to show 
what position the approaches that will take centre stage throughout the remainder of the 
thesis occupy in the relevant theoretical landscape.  
In chapter 3, I turn to two versions of semantic minimalism set forth by C&L (2005), 
and Borg 2004, 2012). I begin by situating semantic minimalism within a variety of 
different responses to the challenges raised by arguments for pervasive context 
sensitivity. I then provide a detailed exposition of the kinds of arguments advocates of 
two competing versions of semantic minimalism set forth in defence of the approach. 
Finally, I raise various questions about the viability of semantic minimalism. These 
question focus in part on certain theory internal issues each version of the approach 
faces, but will also point to various problems for the claim that to acknowledge the 
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challenge from context sensitivity is effectively to abandon the prospects of providing 
any kind of systematic account of semantic competence. 
In chapter 4, I assess the aphonic approach defended by Stanley (2007). My main focus 
here will be to assess and evaluate the arguments Stanley deploys in order to defend the 
claim that all genuine contextual effects on content can be traced back to aphonic 
elements situated in the logical forms of sentences. In evaluating the approach, I show 
that various counterexamples can be provided for those arguments, and seek to offer an 
alternative analysis of some of the examples upon which the arguments rely. I then go 
on to raise some potential problems for the very claim that context sensitive expressions 
are always accompanied by aphonic elements in sentential structure.  
In chapter 5, I go on to assess the UCA approach advocated by Perry (e.g. 1986, 1998, 
2011). I provide a thorough overview of the approach, arguing that it does not, as has 
sometimes been suggested, reject the claim that the kinds of processes speakers 
implement in order to incorporate contextual information into the determination of truth-
conditional content are subject to lexico-syntactic constraints. Indeed, the UCA theorist 
takes it that all contextual effects on content are triggered and constrained by certain 
subsyntactic semantic properties of lexical items. Moving on, I then raise some 
significant problems for Perry’s version of UCA, and go on to assess a modified version 
of his approach – viz. parametric minimalism – set forth by Taylor (e.g. 2001, 2007). 
The concern I have with Taylor’s approach is that it does not overcome the kinds of 
problems that he himself raises for Perry’s earlier version of UCA.   
Finally, in conclusion, I draw together the outcomes of each chapter, with the aim of 
exploring some of the consequences of the arguments I set forth in each chapter. 
Ultimately, I shall argue that the conclusions reached in each chapter should lead us to 
question whether we need to commit to the kinds of core assumptions embodied in the 
framework of truth-conditional semantics.  
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CHAPTER 1 
A STANDARD SEMANTIC THEORY 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the truth-conditional semantic 
framework. I begin by setting forth a detailed exposition of the theoretical foundations 
for truth-conditional semantic theories as developed in the work of Davidson. I then 
show how construction of such a theory might proceed, before setting out the key 
demands that a truth-conditional semantic theory will have to satisfy if it is to be 
considered adequate. This largely exegetical undertaking will provide a technical and 
conceptual framework for the more detailed analysis of contemporary semantic 
approaches aimed at defending the truth-conditional semantic framework that follows in 
subsequent chapters.  
1. Theoretical foundations 
This section gives an overview of the theoretical foundations for standard truth-
conditional approaches in semantics. The aim is to chart how the development of a 
truth-conditional semantic theory proceeds through the work of Davidson. Emphasis is 
placed on explaining: (i) what the role of a truth-conditional semantic theory is; (ii) what 
form such theories might take; (iii) why appealing to the notion of truth helps elucidate 
the notion of linguistic meaning; (iv) what kind of evidence we might call on to evaluate 
a semantic theory; and (v) what part such theories play in communication. 
1.1. The role and form of a semantic theory 
Davidson (e.g. 1967, 1973) suggested that the role of a semantic theory is to provide an 
explicit account of what one would need to know in order to understand a language.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Davidson insisted that the kind of semantic theory he advanced need not be a theory 
speakers know or even believe. That is, such a theory is not conceived of as a theory of 
whatever mechanism speakers actually implement to acquire linguistic competence. 
Rather, the purpose of laying out a semantic theory, in Davidson’s sense, is to articulate 
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What we will require from a semantic theory, on this view, is that it state information 
about its object language L in a way that would enable anyone who knew the theory to 
understand speakers of L. This imposes conditions on the form such a theory will take. 
First, in order for finite beings such as ourselves to be able to employ a semantic theory 
so as to come to understand the meanings of all the expressions in a language, the theory 
would have to be finitely specifiable; i.e. it would consist of a finite set of statements 
knowledge of which would imbue one with the practical ability to speak a language.
2
 
Second, to account for the systematicity and productivity of linguistic understanding, the 
theory must give a structurally revealing account of how the meanings of sentences are 
determined by the meanings of their constituent expressions, which is to say that a 
semantic theory will be compositional:
3
 
When we can regard the meaning of each sentence as a function of a finite 
number of features of the sentence, we have an insight not only into what there is 
to be learned; we also understand how an infinite aptitude can be encompassed 
by finite accomplishments. (Davidson 1965, pp.8-9) 
In order to show how the meanings of an unbounded number of sentences can be 
generated from the meanings of a finite stock of primitive expressions, it seems 
plausible to suppose that construction of a semantic theory will begin with the 
assignment of meanings to primitive expressions. One way to do this would be to 
identify the meanings of expressions with different entities – e.g. individuals, properties, 
                                                                                                                                               
a theory knowledge of which would enable one to speak and understand a language were 
one to possess knowledge of it (see Davidson 1973, p.125).  
2
 The finiteness requirement is closely related to the claim that a language must be, in 
principle, learnable; see Davidson 1965. 
3
 A language counts as systematic if the ability to understand one of its sentences (e.g. of 
the form aRb) implies an ability to understand various related sentences (e.g. of the form 
bRa). A language counts as productive if its speakers are able to produce and understand 
an unbounded number of novel sentences. 
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relations, etc. – to which the expressions refer. Davidson, however, rejects this 
approach. On his view, it is not obvious that identifying meanings with entities will play 
any useful role in the construction of a semantic theory. First, assigning entities to 
expressions as their meanings does not, in and of itself, help explain how new meanings 
are generated when the meanings of expressions combine. Assigning a relation (say, an 
instantiation relation) to the syntactic operation of concatenation is of no help here, as it 
simply introduces another entity whose contribution to the generation of a new meaning 
itself stands in need of explanation.
4
 Second, as Davidson points out, all we are really 
looking for when we come to the task of assigning meanings to primitive expressions is 
a way of specifying the effect each such expression has on the meanings of sentences in 
which it occurs; but once the semantic contribution of an expression has been specified, 
further appeal to an entity whose role in the theory is to do duty as the expression’s 
meaning is superfluous (Davidson 1967, p.20). Davidson thus opts to dispense with talk 
                                                 
4
 To clarify, let us say we want to explain why combining the meaning of ‘Mary’ (call 
this m) with the meaning of ‘fell’ (call this F) gives us the meaning of ‘Mary fell’ (call 
this Fm) as outcome. Simply listing the meanings of the expressions {m, F} does not 
help explain why the sentence itself has the unified meaning it has. To add that there is 
an instantiation relation that obtains between m and F is just to add another element (call 
it R) to the list, giving us {m, R, F}. As a result: we enter into a vicious regress, as more 
and more entities are posited in the hopes of cementing the elements of the list together 
to form a unified meaning. As Davidson notes, Frege attempted to avoid the regress by 
treating the entities assigned to, say, predicates as unsaturated; i.e. as open functions in 
need of arguments. The combination of a name and a predicate is thus taken to result in 
saturation (thus Frege gave us the idea of characterizing the generation of the meanings 
of complex expressions as proceeding by way of function application between their 
primitive parts). Davidson, however, claims that Frege’s talk of saturation merely labels 
the problem as opposed to solving it (Davidson 1967, p.17). (The problem of Bradley’s 
regress, and the associated problem of the unity of the proposition have received a great 
deal of renewed attention of late: see Linsky 1992; Speaks 2008; Gaskin 2009; Collins 
2012.) 
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of meanings as entities to which primitive expressions refer, replacing it instead with 
talk of the systematic contributions expressions make to the meanings of their host 
sentences. 
Having eliminated the appeal to discrete entities to serve as meanings of primitive 
expressions, Davidson then turns his attention to the meanings of sentences. Let us 
adopt Davidson’s suggestion that we can give the meaning of each expression in terms 
of the contribution it makes to the meanings of the sentences in which it occurs. We will 
then still want the theory to imply, for every sentence in the object language, an instance 
of the following schema: 
 (M) S means m 
where S is replaced by a (structural description of a) sentence in the object language and 
m is replaced by a singular term that refers to the meaning of S.
5
 Instances of (M) thus 
pair sentences in the object language with their meanings, where the latter are construed 
as entities to which the former refer. Issues arise, though, when we come to consider 
what kind of expression might be used to replace m in any given instance of the schema. 
The problem is that simply replacing m with a singular term – e.g. ‘the meaning of S’ – 
that refers to the meaning of the object language sentence will give vacuous instances of 
(M) – e.g. ‘Snow is white’ means ‘the meaning of snow is white’.6 To remedy this, 
                                                 
5
 It is important to bear in mind that S is replaced by a structural description of a 
sentence in the object language. In order to properly capture the relevant structure of a 
sentence, the pertinent descriptions will sometimes be quite complex, but for ease of 
exposition, it is useful to use quotation mark names for sentences to replace S. Indeed, to 
ease exposition further still, I sometimes speak of S as being replaced by a sentence in 
the object language. 
6
 Davidson (1967, p.20) describes the problem as follows: ‘Ask for example for the 
meaning of ‘Theaetetus flies’. A Fregean answer might go something like this: given the 
meanings of ‘Theaetetus’ as argument, the meaning of ‘flies’ yields the meaning of 
‘Theaetetus flies’ as value. The vacuity of the answer is obvious. We wanted to know 
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Davidson (1967, p.22) suggests that rather than making use of a singular term that picks 
out a meaning, we can instead replace m with a use of a sentence in the metalanguage 
(the language we use to state the theory) that in some way gives the meaning of, or 
translates, the sentence in the object language. To make this explicit, we substitute (M*) 
for (M): 
 (M*) S means that p 
where S is once again replaced by (a structural description of) a sentence in the object 
language and p is replaced by a sentence in the metalanguage that gives its meaning. 
This is a significant modification to the previous schema, as here we begin to see how a 
semantic theory might do its work by relating sentences in a (potentially unfamiliar) 
object language not to meanings as such, but to (familiar) sentences in the metalanguage 
whose meanings have already been grasped. A semantic theory thus comes to take the 
form of a theory of interpretation for an unknown language couched in a known one 
(Davidson 1973, p.130). The problem with (M*), however, is that making sense of the 
‘means that’ relation the schema employs involves explaining what constitutes 
synonymy between sentences; but the notion of synonymy raises ‘problems as hard as, 
or at least identical with, the problems our theory is out to solve’ (Davidson 1967, p.22). 
The difficulty we arrive at is that we seem to want a semantic theory that gives the 
meanings of sentences without appealing to the notion of meaning.   
1.2. Meaning and truth  
Davidson’s ‘radical’ response to the difficulties caused by appealing to meanings as is to 
employ a different technique for ensuring that sentences in the object language get 
paired with sentences that give their meanings, or say the same thing, in the 
metalanguage. The strategy he adopts is to replace the non-extensional ‘means that’ as 
                                                                                                                                               
what the meaning of ‘Theaetetus flies’ is; it is no progress to be told that it is the 
meaning of ‘Theaetetus flies’. This much we knew before any theory was in sight.’ 
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filler for the gap between the sentences with an extensional counterpart ‘is true iff’.7 The 
resulting schema eliminates the appeal to the essentially intensional notion of meaning 
by replacing it with the purely extensional notion of truth: 
 (T) S is true iff p 
What we end up with is Tarski’s T-schema, which he employed in his attempt to provide 
a definition of the truth-predicate for formal languages. Tarski (1986) showed that in 
order to give such a definition, what we require is a theory that would generate, for 
every sentence S in an object language L, a statement of the conditions that must obtain 
for S to be true; i.e. for S to fall under the extension of the predicate ‘is true’. According 
to Tarski’s Convention T, such a definition would be materially adequate if for each 
sentence S in L the theory entailed an instance of (T) – i.e. a T-sentence – in which, as 
has already been implied, S is replaced by a structural description of a sentence in the 
object language and p is replaced by a sentence in the metalanguage that translates the 
sentence described by S – e.g. ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white.  
Significantly, the only semantically loaded notions the theory needs to appeal to in order 
to do this are the extensional notions of reference and satisfaction relative to infinite 
sequences of objects. The axioms of the theory state the satisfaction conditions of 
complex sentences by showing how those conditions derive from the satisfaction 
conditions of simple open sentences, and state the satisfaction conditions for open 
sentences relative to sequences.
8
 Truth is then defined as a special case of satisfaction: a 
                                                 
7
 Davidson describes the relevant shift as follows: ‘…let us try treating the position 
occupied by p extensionally: to implement this, sweep away the obscure ‘means that’, 
provide the sentence that replaces p with a proper sentential connective, and supply the 
description that replaces ‘s’ with its own predicate’ (Davidson 1967, p.23).  
8
 For example, the satisfaction conditions for the open sentence ‘x swims’ are given by 
assigning an index i to the variable x that relates it to a particular position in any given 
sequence of objects. A sequence then satisfies the open sentence iff its i’th member 
swims. The relevant axiom might thus read as follows: SAT[Σ, xi swims] iff σi swims, 
  
11 
true sentence is one satisfied by all sequences; a false sentence one satisfied by none. 
Davidson’s insight was that since giving the truth-conditions of a sentence is one way of 
giving its meaning, a Tarski-style truth theory that issued in a T-sentence statement of 
the truth-conditions for every sentence in the object language would, under certain 
constraints, do duty as a semantic theory.
9
 All reference to entities (e.g. facts) that serve 
as the meanings of sentences thus drops out, which means meanings have been 
altogether eliminated from the theory.  
1.3. Constraining the truth theory 
I mentioned that in order for a truth theory to serve as a semantic theory, it must 
conform to certain constraints. Why would we be required to impose constraints on a 
truth-theory? What constraints need to be imposed? To answer these questions, let us 
begin by reminding ourselves that Tarski’s aim is to define truth, not to gain purchase on 
                                                                                                                                               
where σi is the i’th member of the sequence, Σ. Satisfaction conditions can also be 
assigned to referring expressions (e.g. names), but we will tend to speak of axioms for 
referring expressions as stating reference conditions, which simply state what individual 
a referring expression refers to; e.g. ‘Bill’ refers to Bill. In the case of satisfaction 
conditions for sentences, we say that a sequence satisfies, say, ‘Bill swims’ iff the 
member of the sequence referred to by ‘Bill’ swims. Of course, if a sentence is satisfied 
by one sequence then it is satisfied by all; which means the sentence is true; which 
means truth is a special case of satisfaction.  
9
 The idea of specifying the meaning of a sentence in terms of its truth-conditions goes 
back at least as far as Frege. Davidson’s approach can be regarded as a way of 
implementing Frege’s insights regarding the relation between meaning and truth in such 
a way as to construct a workable semantic theory. Other truth-conditional approaches – 
such as that developed by Lewis (1970) whose work builds on the work of Montague 
(e.g. 1973) – do the same thing in a different way. In particular, theories in the 
Motogovian tradition tend to be less wary of specifying the meanings of expressions by 
way of an appeal to meanings as intensional entities.  
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the concept of meaning. Consequently, in stating his Convention T, Tarski gets to help 
himself to the assumption that the sentence on the right-hand side of the biconditional in 
any given T-sentence will be a translation of, or mean the same as, the sentence 
described on the left-hand side. Let us refer to any such T-sentence as an interpretive T-
sentence. The problem Davidson faces that that since his aim is to gain purchase on the 
concept of meaning, he is not able to help himself to the pertinent assumption; i.e. he is 
not able to treat meaning as primitive.
10
  
What is required, then, is that the truth theory be constrained in such a way as to ensure, 
without any appeal to semantically loaded notions (such as that of synonymy), that the 
T-sentences the theory generates are interpretive. To achieve this, Davidson (e.g. 1967) 
begins by arguing that the totality of T-sentences generated by the theory must be true. 
In and of itself, however, this is not enough of a constraint to ensure that the T-sentences 
will be interpretive (Davidson 1973, p.134). We must thus place a further constraint on 
the theory by demanding that its T-sentences accurately reflect attitudes speakers of the 
object language have as to when sentences of the object language would hold true.  
To show how the constraint operates, we start by adopting the principle of charity, 
which is to say we assume that speakers of the object language have accurate beliefs 
about their environment, and that they take the sentences they utter to hold true relative 
to those beliefs. Accordingly, when a T-sentence generated by our theory tells us that a 
sentence in the object language is true iff, say, there is snow on the ground, it follows 
                                                 
10
 The assumption is fine as long as the object language is contained in the 
metalanguage. In such a case, the interpretive character of the T-sentences generated by 
the theory is guaranteed by the fact that the very same sentence described on the left is 
used to replace the sentence on the right. Davidson, however, wants a theory that relates 
sentences in a potentially unknown object language to interpretations of those sentences 
in the known metalanguage. That is, he wants the theory to be one that might be of use 
to the radical interpreter whose only evidence for testing the consistency of his theory, 
as we shall see, is evidence about when speakers of the object language hold their 
sentences true (Davidson 1973).  
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that, ceteris paribus, there will be snow on the ground when a speaker of the object 
language utters that sentence. If things are not that way, then given the assumptions 
embodied in the principle of charity, we have evidence that the theory has assigned the 
wrong truth-conditions to the pertinent sentence. Of course, in many cases, identifying 
the relevant evidence will be more difficult. The point, though, is that when situations 
such as the one just described arise, the theorist, conceived of as someone engaged in 
the project of radical interpretation, will be required to revise the axioms of the theory in 
such a way as to ensure that its T-sentences fit with evidence regarding the holding-true 
attitudes of speakers of the object language (whatever form such evidence takes).  
To sum up, we have seen: (i) how a Tarski-style truth theory provides us with the 
machinery for generating T-sentences; and (ii) what constraints we might impose on 
such a theory in order to ensure that the T-sentences it generates are interpretive. 
Bringing all this together, what we obtain is a theory that answers to a set of formal and 
empirical requirements, which, taken together, conspire to ensure that its theorems 
provide us with interpretations of, and so a means of understanding, the endlessly many 
sentences in the object language to which the theory is applied. That is, we end up with 
an outline of a semantic theory whose construction recovers ‘the structure of a very 
complicated ability – the ability to speak and understand a language’ (Davidson 1967, 
p.25). 
1.4. Reference, satisfaction, and (absolute) truth 
At this point, it will be useful to consider in more detail what role is played by the 
extensional notions of reference, satisfaction, and truth in the construction of a semantic 
theory.
11
 With regards truth, it is vital to keep in mind that when we come to speak of 
the truth-conditions of sentences, we are employing an absolute notion of truth; i.e. we 
are speaking of sentences as true relative to the world, rather than some model, 
interpretation, or set of possible worlds (Davidson 1977, p.216). That Davidson himself 
                                                 
11
 This description of the notions of reference, satisfaction, and truth as the ‘genuinely 
semantic notions’ echoes Lewis 1970, p.19. 
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adheres to an absolute notion of truth is evident from the above remarks on his position, 
where it was made clear that he intends the adequacy of the theory to be tested on the 
basis of evidence regarding whether the T-sentences it generates succeed in relating 
sentences in the object language to beliefs speakers of the object language have about 
the way the world must be for those sentences to hold true. The adequacy of the theory 
as a whole thus hangs on the question of whether its T-sentences accurately reflect the 
way speakers put their sentences to use when they come to talk about the world, to 
communicate their beliefs with one another, and so on.  
Now, just as T-sentences must relate sentences to the world in the right sort of way, 
lexical axioms that state reference and satisfaction conditions for primitive expressions 
must also, in some sense, relate those expressions to the world in the right sort of way. 
That said, though, it is crucial to observe that Davidson never intended that the axioms 
of the theory should be thought of as answerable to direct evidence regarding what kind 
of things speakers actually talk about when they come to put their expressions to use. 
Rather, the adequacy of the axioms is to be evaluated only indirectly, relative to the 
adequacy of T-sentences they serve to generate. This leads Davidson to think of the 
notions of reference and satisfaction as playing a purely instrumental role within the 
context of the theory as whole; i.e., to treat the relevant notions as ‘theoretical constructs 
whose function is exhausted in stating the truth conditions for sentences’ (Davidson 
1977, p. 223). Consequently, when we talk of words as referring to individuals, or as 
satisfied by sequences, we are not describing relations that actually obtain between 
words and entities in the world. Rather, the motivation for such talk is purely theoretical, 
to be dispensed with once truth-conditions have been assigned to sentences in the object 
language.  
1.5. The context-invariance of the axioms 
Keeping the points made in the previous subsection in mind, note that even if we treat 
the contributions axioms make to the theory as purely instrumental, there are still things 
to be said about the way those axioms operate. Perhaps the most important feature of the 
axioms of a semantic theory is that they must provide us with context-invariant 
specifications of the contributions expressions make to the truth-conditions of sentences 
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in which they occur as well as the semantic effects of combining those expressions. 
Such context-invariance can be thought of in two ways, depending on the sense in which 
we use the word ‘context’. First, there is linguistic (or sentential) context, which consists 
of the linguistic environment in which an expression occurs.
12
 Second, there is extra-
linguistic (or utterance) context, which consists of a set of pragmatic factors that are in 
play when a sentence is uttered. A lexical axiom can be regarded as context-invariant in 
the first sense just if it specifies, in univocal terms, the semantic contribution an 
expression makes across all linguistic contexts, and in the second sense just if it 
specifies, in univocal terms, the semantic contribution an expression makes across all 
extra-linguistic contexts of utterance. In order for the axioms to serve their purpose in a 
semantic theory of the kind described, they must be context-invariant in both senses.
13
 
The reason for this is that an essential feature of the kind of semantic theory described 
so far is that its axioms must form a finite base from which T-sentence statements of the 
truth-conditions of sentences in the language can be recursively derived. But there is an 
unbounded number of novel linguistic contexts in which any given expression might 
occur, and an unbounded number of novel extra-linguistic contexts in which sentences 
containing the given expression might be put to use. So if we attempted to specify the 
semantic contribution of each expression relative to each particular context in which the 
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 So for example, in the following sentences, ‘break’ appears in different linguistic 
contexts: (a) Bill broke the vase; (b) The vase broke; (c) Mary broke her arm; (d) The 
break was quite bad; (d) The broken vase had been priceless; (e) There goes another 
broken heart. In some of the cases listed the linguistic context varies only to the extent 
that the verb ‘break’ combines with different subjects and objects. In others, the 
linguistic context has an effect on the expression’s syntactic role: i.e. in a, b, and c, it 
appears as a verb; in d it appears as a noun phrase; in e and f it appears as an adjective.   
13
 I focus here specifically on lexical axioms because they will be of the kinds of axioms 
that interest us most in what follows. Compositional axioms are also context-invariant, 
but stating what invariance amounts to relative to such axioms is somewhat different 
from stating what it amounts to for lexical axioms.  
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expression is apt to occur, our ‘theory’ would no longer be one that had the form of a 
Tarski-style truth theory.  
The point can be further illustrated by thinking about the task of the radical interpreter. 
As we saw, the radical interpreter is engaged in the ongoing task of testing the adequacy 
of her T-sentences in light of evidence gleaned from particular occasions on which 
speakers of the object language put their sentences to use. When a T-sentence is shown 
not to reflect the holding-true attitudes of speakers relative to some such occasion, the 
theorist then modifies some of the axioms so as to come up with a more fitting theory. In 
effect, her task is to form generalisations about the contributions expressions make that 
will enable her to predict the truth-conditions of sentences on subsequent occasions of 
their use. But if the radical interpreter were to assume that each expression makes a 
different semantic contribution at each novel linguistic or extra-linguistic context, she 
would not be able to form the relevant generalisations. It is thus hard to imagine how 
she would ever advance her understanding of the language.  
A workable truth-conditional semantic theory, then, is one that operates with a fixed, 
finite set of context-invariant axioms, which specify the semantic contributions 
expressions make across all contexts. A theory that did not avail itself of a finite set of 
context-invariant axioms would not have the form of a truth theory. It would not be of 
use to the radical interpreter whose aim is to ensure that its T-sentences conform to the 
evidence. And it would not account for the systematic and productive manner in which 
speakers are able to pair sentences with truth-conditions.
14
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 This may look like an exceedingly obvious point, not worthy of nearly so much 
labour. However, given that much of the following thesis will be concerned with the 
question of the extent to which extra-linguistic context contributes to the determination 
of truth-conditional content, it is worthwhile dwelling on such issues. For the time 
being, I shall hold off saying anything about how the axioms of a truth-conditional 
semantic theory might accommodate extra-linguistic contextual effects on content 
without giving up the invariance of its axioms. We will come back to this.  
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1.6. Interpreting, understanding, and communicating 
We have so far been taking it that a semantic theory is something a theorist employs in 
order to interpret an object language. Looking at things in this way, we take it that for 
each object language, there is a semantic theory that explicitly articulates the linguistic 
competence of all speakers of that language. Put another way, we can say that all 
speakers of an object language are equipped with the same semantic theory for their 
language.
15
  
The view makes a great deal of sense, especially when we come to think about how 
speakers are able to routinely engage in successful communication with each other. 
Assuming that speakers who share the same language enter into communicative 
exchanges equipped with the same semantic theory for interpreting the sentences uttered 
in such exchanges, it is no surprise that they routinely succeed in the task of 
understanding each other. The theory they employ can thus be thought of as the 
semantic theory for the object language they share.  
That said, though, on the basis of observations regarding ways in which speakers are 
able to break with normal linguistic conventions during communication, Davidson 
(1983) came to question whether successful communication would require that all 
speakers enter into communicative exchanges equipped with the same semantic theory. 
He suggested that whilst a speaker may well be equipped with a prior theory that 
provides her with a ‘systematic method’ for interpreting the sentences uttered by her 
interlocutors, she will sometimes be required modify that theory to accommodate (what 
are from their perspective) unusual uses of expressions. Such modifications yield a 
passing theory that is geared toward producing accurate interpretations of sentences 
uttered by her interlocutors on that occasion. On this view, then, successful 
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 Talking like this is fine as long as we keep in mind that speakers are only ‘equipped 
with the theory’ in the sense that they are equipped with a competence that is explicitly 
articulated by the theory. Remember: the theory merely expresses the structure of the 
linguistic competence of speakers – it is not necessarily something speakers know. 
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interpretation requires convergence, not of prior, but of passing theories. In some cases, 
for various reasons, modifications made to a prior theory in order to produce an 
effective passing theory on a given occasion might end up being incorporated into a 
speaker’s prior theory. In others, the modifications made are taken to serving a purpose 
only relative to a particular occasion, and are thus dispensed with once the relevant 
exchange terminates.  
The important point here is that once we allow that success in interpreting the utterances 
of other speakers need only depend on convergence of passing theories, the idea that 
speakers who are able to communicate must all enter into acts of communication 
equipped with the same semantic theory drops out. Davidson’s later work thus marks a 
significant shift from his earlier views. The very idea that there are object languages, 
conceived of as publically available languages governed by a fixed semantic theory, is 
no longer essential. Interpretation does not target object languages, but the idiolects of 
individual speakers. Indeed, each communicative exchange we enter into comes to be 
thought of as involving radical interpretation of an idiolect. In fact, Davidson (1983, 
p.265) goes so far as to say that there are no such things as shared, publically available, 
object languages.
16
 
1.7. A systematic method of interpretation 
Now that we pieced together a description of how a truth-conditional semantic theory of 
the kind set forth by Davidson operates, we come to the view that the role of such a 
theory is to provide a systematic method of interpretation.
17
 Threading together the 
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 The idea that speakers share a language, English say, can now be thought of in terms 
of speakers having idiolects that overlap with each other to a considerable extent. Their 
prior theories will thus be very close, and communication will, in a significant number 
of cases, proceed without the need for modification of those theories.  
17
 As has already been mentioned (see p.6, n.3), systematicity is that feature of linguistic 
understanding that ensures that being in a position to understand one occurrence of an 
expression will ensure the ability to understand other occurrences of that expression. If 
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various elements of the theory, we end up with the following overview of the way the 
method of interpretation delivered by a semantic theory works:  
(i) The objects of interpretation for a semantic theory are sentences belonging to 
the idiolects of speakers.  
(ii) To yield interpretations of such sentences, we employ a Tarski-style truth 
theory that generates T-sentence statements of the meanings of sentences 
exclusively in terms of their compositionally determined truth-conditions.  
(iii) The context-invariant axioms of the theory are open to continual revision 
based on evidence regarding whether T-sentences generated by the theory 
adequately reflect the holding-true attitudes of the speaker whose idiolect the 
theory targets.  
(iv) The adequacy of the theory in its capacity as a method of interpretation for a 
target idiolect is open to empirical investigation, to be evaluated in terms of 
how well the T-sentences generated by the theory have thus far conformed to 
the relevant evidence.  
A crucial assumption that underlies the truth-conditional conception of what constitutes 
a semantic theory is that such a theory can assign truth-conditions to sentences purely on 
the basis of their formal features. That is, to derive a T-sentence statement of the truth-
conditions of a sentence S, we need only look to the lexical axioms for expressions in S 
and the compositional axioms relevant to the syntactic arrangement of S. No other 
factors need enter into interpretation in order for a complete set of truth-conditions to be 
assigned to any given sentence uttered. The formal features of sentences, in short, 
encode truth-conditions.  
                                                                                                                                               
there were not some stable, systematic relation between diverse occurrences of 
expressions, it would be hard to explain how anyone could understand a language. A 
semantic theory, conceived of as a method of interpretation, is thus systematic if it 
establishes stable relations between different occurrences of expressions. The theory we 
have described thus far inherits this feature on the basis of its having a fixed, finite set of 
context-invariant lexical axioms.    
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That said, though, a significant problem that looms on the horizon for out truth-
conditional semantic theory is that there are cases where extra-linguistic contextual 
factors seem to play an indispensable role in determining the truth-conditions of 
sentences. But if this is so, it appears that sentences themselves do not encode complete 
sets of truth-conditions after all. We are thus left questioning whether a semantic theory 
of the kind described thus far will be able to account for the ways in which extra-
linguistic contextual factors seem apt to contribute to the determination of truth-
conditional content. This is the question that will motivate much of the following thesis.  
However, before we go on to pursue matters of context any further, the next section will 
be devoted to giving a more concrete account of how we might go about the task of 
constructing a semantic theory for a language, focussing in particular on the formal 
methods that might be adopted in order to achieve this.  
2. Constructing a semantic theory 
Having gone to some lengths to describe the theoretical foundations for truth-
conditional approaches in semantics, I now want to deal with the practical question of 
how we might go about the task of constructing a truth-conditional semantic theory. In 
doing so, I shall take it that the object of interpretation for the theory is a natural 
language (setting aside the question of whether natural languages are to be characterised 
in terms of public languages, or the idiolects of speakers). That said, there are three 
kinds of information a semantic theory must provide us with in order to fulfil its role as 
a systematic method of interpretation for sentences: (i) information about the 
semantically relevant structure of each sentence in the target language; (ii) information 
about what contribution each expression makes to the truth-conditions of sentences in 
which it occurs; and (iii) information about the kinds of semantic effects that result from 
combining expressions as per each sentence’s syntactic arrangement. 
2.1. Structural descriptions 
The meaning of a sentence is partly determined by its structure. That said, in order to 
give an account of what each sentence means, one of the things we need to get clear on 
is how the constituent expressions of sentences are structurally related to one another. 
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To that end, we need to adopt some method of describing the underlying syntactic 
arrangement of the strings of signs or sounds that constitute the surface forms of 
sentences. For example, consider (1): 
(1) Bill loves Mary 
The following (somewhat simplified) phrase marker provides a structural description 
(SD) of the way the constituent expressions of (1) are combined with one another:
18
 
SD(1) 
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 Phrase markers, given here in the form of a tree diagram, represent relations of 
dominance and precedence over sets of labelled nodes. Since we shall be using phrase 
markers of this kind to give structural descriptions of sentences, it will be useful to set 
out some terminology for describing the diagram: (a) each node in a tree diagram 
dominates all nodes below it that can be traced back to it by connecting branches; (b) the 
root node is the node that dominates all others, but is not dominated; (c) if node A 
dominates node B, and no node intervenes between them, then A immediately dominates 
B, and B is A’s daughter node; (d) two nodes immediately dominated by the same node 
are sister nodes; (e) a node that dominates no other is a terminal node; (f) nodes with 
two daughter nodes are branching nodes, and nodes with just one daughter are non-
branching nodes; (g) precedence is a left-to-right relation between nodes that do not 
stand in the dominance relation to each other. For more on the properties of trees and 
their applications in semantics, see Higginbotham 1985; Partee et. al. 1990; Larson and 
Segal 1995; Heim and Kratzer 1998. 
N 
   Mary 
    Bill 
 loves   N 
 V  NP 
 NP 
 S  
  VP 
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We shall adopt the somewhat standard assumption that phrase markers such as SD(1) are 
the outputs of syntactic derivations that yield well-formed sentences, and are the inputs 
to semantic derivations that yield truth-conditions (Heim and Kratzer 1998, p.45; Larson 
and Segal, p.104). That said, it will be useful to give an outline (albeit a very general 
one for now) of the layout of phrase markers and some of the principles that govern their 
organisation.  
An important idea to begin with is that the expressions, which we shall often refer to as 
lexical items, which occupy the terminal nodes in the phrase marker, project certain 
features, such as their syntactic category, onto their dominating nodes. (We shall say 
that each lexical item has a corresponding lexical entry, which specifies syntactically 
and semantically relevant information about that item.) This is captured in SD(1) in that 
the node immediately dominating each lexical item is labelled according to the item’s 
syntactic category; i.e. N stands for ‘noun’; V for ‘verb’. Lexical items also project 
information regarding what kinds of sentential constituents they need to combine with in 
order to form phrases. For instance, part of the information encoded in a lexical entry 
specifies what internal arguments it selects for (if any) in order to form phrases, where 
the selecting item is referred to as the head of the resulting phrase, and the constituents 
that serve to fill its argument positions are its complements.
19
 Simplifying somewhat, the 
transitive verb ‘loves’ takes a noun phrase (NP) complement to form a verb phrase (VP), 
whereas the nouns ‘Bill’ and ‘Mary’ (whose entries list no mandatory arguments) form 
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 Lexical items that fill internal argument positions are sometimes realised as subjects 
at surface form. This occurs in unaccusative constructions, where a deep-structure object 
moves to an unoccupied subject position (e.g. ‘The water froze’), and passive 
constructions, where the external argument is suppressed, again causing the deep-
structure object to move so as to ensure that the sentence has a subject at surface form 
(e.g. ‘The bank was robbed’). According to GB-theory (Chomsky 1981), movement of 
complements occurs between D-structure and S-structure (two level of linguistic 
representation) occurs between complements of the relevant verbs undergo movement 
from object positions at D-structure to the subject position at S-structure.  
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NPs without taking complements. Verbs like ‘love’ also select an external argument that 
combines with the VP formed by the item and its internal argument.
20
 So, in SD(1), the 
VP ‘loves Mary’ combines with the NP ‘Bill’ to satisfy the requirement for an external 
argument projected by the verbal head. What we end up with, then, is a representation of 
the syntactic arrangement of (1) that reveals the order in which its constituent 
expressions combine to form phrases, which then combine to form a complete sentence. 
One other important point to note about structural descriptions is that they are taken to 
reflect a particular level of linguistic representation. It should already be obvious that 
phrase markers encode various kinds of information that are not apparent from the 
surface forms of sentences; e.g. they represent boundaries between the phrasal 
constituents of sentences and the hierarchical organisation of sentences in a way that 
linearly ordered surface forms do not. Thus, there seem to be good reasons for 
differentiating between the surface forms of sentences, which constitute one level of 
linguistic representation, and the structural descriptions of sentences, which represent 
another. Following Chomsky (2005), we can think of the computational procedures via 
which sentences are syntactically generated as issuing in pairings of sounds and 
meanings. That is, we take each sentence as a <PF, LF> pair, where PFs are 
representations that encode information pertaining to the sentence’s phonological or 
phonetic features, and LFs are representations that encode information pertaining to the 
sentence’s semantic features. I shall therefore treat PFs as linearly ordered strings of 
signs or sounds that constitute the surface forms of sentences, and LFs as linguistic 
representations that encode all grammatical information that is relevant for semantic 
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 Chomsky (1965) refers to that component of a lexical entry that specifies the number 
of internal arguments an item takes as the item’s subcategorization frame. The notion of 
argument structure is more general in that it also specifies arguments that appear outside 
the phrase an item forms via combination with its complements. 
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interpretation. Accordingly, we will presume that structural descriptions mirror the LFs 
of sentences.
21
  
2.2. Lexical axioms 
The next step in showing how a semantic theory determines the truth-conditions of (1) is 
to supplement our theory with semantic axioms that specify the meanings of the simple 
expressions of (1) and the semantic effects of combining those expressions. Each lexical 
axiom, which constitutes the semantic component of a lexical entry, specifies the 
meaning of an expression in terms of the contribution the expression makes to the truth-
conditions of all sentences in which it occurs. We shall refer to the semantic 
contributions expressions make to the truth-conditions of sentences as their semantic 
values. 
Following Heim and Kratzer (1998), I give the semantic value of each simple expression 
(or lexical item) in terms of its extension: i.e. the semantic values assigned to the proper 
names ‘Bill’ and ‘Mary’ are the individuals to which they refer, and the semantic value 
assigned to the transitive verb ‘loves’ is the function from individuals to a function from 
individuals to truth-values that that expression denotes. This can be represented as 
follows (where ‘║…║’ is the interpretation function that assigns semantic values to the 
enclosed expressions): 
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 For introductions to the relevant notions see Radford (1988), Haegeman (1994), and 
Hornstein, et al. (2005). It is important to emphasise that whilst LFs encode certain 
semantically relevant pieces of information about sentences, and are thus named for 
their affinity with the logical forms attributed to sentences by semanticists, the linguist’s 
LF representations need not necessarily encode all the information encoded in the 
semanticist’s logical forms. As Haegeman writes: ‘The LF representation is not identical 
to the semantic representations introduced by semanticists and formal logicians; LF is an 
intermediate step that mediates between S-structure and the semantic representations’ 
(Haegeman 1994, p.492). The issue of just how close a connection there is between a 
sentence’s LF and its logical form will emerge later chapters.  
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(i) ║‘Bill’║ = Bill 
(ii) ║‘Mary’║ = Mary 
(iii) ║‘loves’║ = λx. λy. y loves x22 
Our truth-conditional semantic theory will thus make use of lexical axioms that 
explicitly state the semantic values of expressions by stating what entities (i.e., 
individuals and functions) lexical items denote. This might appear to put our theory 
somewhat at odds with the kind of Davidson-style semantic theory described in the 
previous section. That said, though, the decision to represent the semantic values of 
lexical items in the above way is motivated by nothing other than the fact that such 
representations specify the contributions lexical items make to truth-conditional content 
in a particularly perspicuous manner. All reference to entities as the denotations of 
expressions should thus be thought of as purely instrumental. So when we talk of a 
predicate as denoting a function from individuals to truth-values, we are not thereby 
committing ourselves to the claim that there is some entity, i.e. the function itself, which 
is the meaning of that predicate. Rather, we are merely employing a useful method for 
stating what kind of contribution the expression makes to the truth-conditions of 
sentences in which it occurs.
23
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 The lambda operator λ forms expressions that refer to functions by abstracting over 
variables in open sentences. So, applying λ-abstraction to the open sentence ‘x smokes’ 
(where x ranges over the domain of individuals (De)) yields the expression ‘λx  De. x 
smokes’, which refers to a function that maps every individual x to true iff x smokes. 
When the function is applied to an argument of the appropriate type, λ-reduction 
applies, and the argument replaces the bound variable. See Dowty et al. (1981) and 
Gamut (1991) for more on the kind of type-theoretic apparatus employed in natural 
language semantics. 
23
 It should be noted that the chosen method for specifying semantic values follows the 
format more commonly employed in model-theoretic approaches to semantics, which 
stem from the work of Montague (1973). Nevertheless, there is no reason to think that 
the decision to specify semantic values in this way bars us from treating lexical entries 
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2.3. Compositional axioms 
Having provided those lexical axioms that we will make use of in determining the truth-
conditions of (1), we now need to show how the semantic values assigned to the tree’s 
terminal nodes project to its higher nodes. In the case of non-terminal, non-branching 
nodes (such as ‘V’ in SD(1)) we can give a simple semantic rule (NN) that states that 
such nodes inherit their semantic values directly from their daughter nodes:  
 (NN)  
 
In order to assign values to branching nodes, a compositional axiom is required that 
states the semantic effect of syntactically combining the daughter nodes. Given the path 
we have taken so far, it makes sense to construe the semantic counterpart of syntactic 
concatenation as functional application (FA). The following thus serves as a general 
compositional axiom:  
(FA) 
 
This says that for any pair of sister nodes α and β, if the semantic value of α is in the 
argument domain of the (functional) semantic value of β, the value of the immediately 
                                                                                                                                               
as specifying absolute statements of the reference/satisfaction/truth-conditions of 
expressions. Indeed, (i) and (ii) should be read as stating that the expressions ‘Bill’ and 
‘Mary’ refer to Bill and Mary, respectively. Similarly, (iii) can be read as the statement 
that ‘loves’ is true of any pair of individuals in the world whose first member loves the 
second member; or is that predicate that is satisfied by any such pair. None of this puts 
us at odds with Davidson. Indeed, theorists working toward the development of a 
workable Davidson-style semantic theory have adopted different ways of specifying the 
semantic values of expressions: see Larson and Segal 1995; Lepore and Ludwig 2007. 
β α 
= ║β║ (║α║) 
γ 
= ║α║ 
β 
α 
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dominating node γ is the value of the function assigned to β for the value of α as 
argument.
24
  
Finally then, having assigned lexical axioms to all the constituent expressions of (1), and 
with a compositional axiom that states the semantic effects of syntactic concatenation, 
we can now derive the truth-conditions for (1) as follows (where a flattened out version 
of SD(1) is used for sake of clarity):  
║[S [NP [N Bill]] [VP [V loves] [NP [N Mary]]]]║ 
= ║[VP [V loves] [NP [N Mary]]]║ (║[NP [N Bill]]║)  by FA  
= ║[V loves]║ (║[NP [N Mary]]║) (║[NP [N Bill]]║)  by FA  
= ║‘loves’║ (║‘Mary’║) (║‘Bill’║)    by NN  
= [λx. λy. y loves x] (Mary) (Bill)    by (i), (ii), (iii) 
= [λy. y loves Mary] (Bill)     by λ-reduction 
= true iff Bill loves Mary     by λ-reduction 
The derivation yields a proof of the following statement: ‘Bill loves Mary’ is true iff Bill 
loves Mary. Such disquotational statements of the truth-conditions of sentences reveal 
what is (at the very least) an important part of what speakers know in understanding 
what those sentences mean. As Higginbotham writes: 
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 Functional application does not always work. For example, neither of the functions 
assigned to constituents of the phrase ‘wild animal’ can be applied to the other. We must 
thus use a different compositional rule to compute a value for the phrase; viz., predicate 
modification. On this rule: ‘Bill is a wild animal’ is true iff Bill belongs to the 
intersection of the set of wild things and the set of animals. See Higginbotham 1985, 
Heim and Kratzer 1998, Pietroski 2006. 
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...disquotational statements of truth-conditions are significant for their 
combination of depth and obviousness: the whole lot of them are among the 
things one knows when one knows a language, and they remain a touchstone of 
adequacy even whilst the theory is elaborated. (Higginbotham 1988, p.31) 
As we saw in the previous section, such statements effectively serve to connect 
sentences in the language targeted by the theory with the things in the world speakers of 
the language use those sentences to talk about. What the derivation ultimately reveals, 
then, is how the truth-conditional semantic content of (1) is composed ‘by a finite 
number of applications of some of a finite number of devices that suffice for the 
language as a whole, out of elements drawn from a finite stock (the vocabulary) that 
suffices for the language as a whole’ (Davidson 1968, p.94).  
Having thus demonstrated how knowledge of a fragment of a semantic theory would 
enable us to determine the truth-conditions of one sentence, we can think of the task of a 
complete truth-conditional semantic theory for a natural language as that of compiling 
an inventory of lexical and compositional axioms from which we would be able to 
derive equally adequate statements of the truth-conditions of all other sentences in that 
language.  
3. Semantic facts 
We have seen that a truth-conditional semantic theory is a theory whose purpose is to 
account for a range of facts pertaining to the ways in which speakers interpret the 
meanings of expressions. We have so far seen that one of the kinds of facts we can 
deduce from a truth-conditional semantic theory are what Higginbotham (1988) refers to 
as disquotational facts; e.g. the fact that ‘Bill loves Mary’ is true iff Bill loves Mary; 
that ‘Mary’ refers to Mary; that ‘loves’ is true of an ordered pair of individuals x and y 
iff x loves y, and so on. We now turn to a variety of other facts about the ways speakers 
understand expressions that a semantic theory must be able to explain. 
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3.1. Ambiguity 
Ambiguity occurs when speakers are able to associate more than one set of truth-
conditions with a given sentence. The following examples serve to demonstrate different 
ways in which ambiguity arises: 
(2) a.   Bill went to the bank  
b. Bill called John from London 
c. Every boy loves some girl 
d. The duck is ready to eat 
Adopting the approach outlined in the previous section, we can take it that ambiguity 
arises when two expressions (simple or complex) have distinct meanings even though 
they are associated with the same sign or sound, or with the same string of signs/sounds. 
That is, cases of lexical ambiguity arise when we have two expressions that mean 
different things even though they are both associated with the same sign. The truth-
conditions of (2a) thus vary depending on whether the sign ‘bank’ is understood to stand 
for an expression that denotes a financial institution, or an expression that denotes a 
place by a river. Standard truth-conditional semantic theories have accommodated this 
fact by providing two distinct lexical axioms for ‘bank’: i.e., ║‘bank’1║ = λx. x is a 
financial bank; ║‘bank’2║ = λx. x is a river bank.  
The other sentences of (2) involve some form of structural ambiguity, which occurs 
when two sentences have distinct LFs even though they share the same surface form, or 
PF.
25
 So, speakers can either interpret (2b) as meaning that Bill called John, and John is 
from London, or that Bill called John, and the call was made from London. The 
difference is entirely structural, as it hangs on whether the prepositional phrase (PP) 
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 Since we made the decision (in section 1.2.) to individuate sentences as pairings of 
sounds and meanings, i.e. as <PF, LF> pairs, it would seem to make little sense to speak 
of sentences as structurally ambiguous. That said, we can take it that when we speak of 
ambiguous sentences we are simply individuating sentences, somewhat loosely, in terms 
of their surface forms.  
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‘from London’ is understood as modifying the NP ‘John’, or as modifying the VP 
‘called John’. Accordingly, our semantic theory will assign two different structural 
descriptions to (2b): 
SD1(2b)      SD2(2b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of (2c), the truth-conditions speakers are able to associate with this particular 
string of signs vary depending on which of the quantifier phrases takes widest scope at 
LF. If the quantifier denoted by the determiner phrase (DP) ‘some girl’ is taken to have 
wide scope, then (2c) is true iff there is some particular girl that every boy loves. 
Alternatively, if the quantifier ‘every boy’ takes wide scope, then we interpret (2c) as 
being true iff for every boy, there is some girl or other he loves.
26
  
As indicated, differences in scope relations are represented at LF. Hence, (2c) can be 
assigned the following structural descriptions:  
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 This is precisely the kind of case that led Frege and Russell to argue that we should be 
distrustful of the idea that the superficial surface forms of sentences provide a good 
indication of their underlying logical forms. The predicate calculus their work gave rise 
to thus provides us with a means of disambiguating (2c):  
(i) (∀x) (∃y) (boy x → (girl y ∧ loves (x, y))  
(ii) (∃x) (∀y) (girl x ∧ (boy y → loves (y, x)) 
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 SD1(2c) [S [DP Every boy]i [DP some girl]j [ti loves tj]] 
 SD2(2c) [S [DP Some girl]j [DP every boy]i [ti loves tj]] 
The structural descriptions given here serve to distinguish the different scope relations 
that can hold between the two quantifier phrases, but they both deviate significantly 
from the surface form of (2c). In each case, the DPs that occupy the external and internal 
argument positions of ‘love’ both undergo movement (via quantifier raising) to higher 
nodes, leaving behind a pair of trace elements, ti and tj, that are marked by indices that 
serve to link the raised DPs with their initial argument positions. Depending on the order 
in which quantifier raising occurs, we thus get two different structural descriptions for 
(2c).  
Both of the cases of ambiguity considered thus far provide striking examples of how 
semantic theories can and must be responsive to features of the underlying syntactic 
arrangements of sentences, which are not at all apparent at surface form.
27
 
Finally, we turn to (2d). On one interpretation of (2d), the duck is ready to eat 
something, whereas on the other, the duck is ready to be eaten by someone. According 
to the first interpretation, the DP ‘the duck’ seems to be somehow linked with the 
subject position of the infinitive verb ‘to eat’, whereas on the second, the same DP is 
linked with the lower verb’s object position: 
SD1(2d) [The duck [is ready [ ___ to eat ___ ]]] 
 
 SD2(2d) [The duck [is ready [ ___ to eat ___ ]]] 
 
The example raises interesting questions regarding the kinds of semantically relevant 
relations that will be encoded in the LF representations of sentences. For present 
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 For a detailed account of how a truth-conditional semantic theory would go about 
assigning semantic values to structural descriptions containing raised quantifiers and 
their corresponding trace elements, I refer the reader to Heim and Kratzer 1998. 
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purposes, given the obvious ambiguity of (2d), we shall take it that our LF 
representations for (2d) will represent the kinds of structural links that obtain between 
elements that occupy the different positions in syntactic structure.  
3.2. Negative facts 
Whilst instances of ambiguity are interesting in the sense that they show that more than 
one set of truth-conditions can be associated with the same sentence (where we are using 
the term ‘sentence’ somewhat loosely here to pick out a particular surface form), some 
of the examples discussed also raise important questions about why the range of 
interpretations we are able to assign to sentences are sometimes limited in certain non-
obvious ways. For example, in relation to (2b), one might well wonder why it is that 
speakers of English are not able to understand the sentence as having a possible 
interpretation according to which Bill called John, and Bill is from London. The fact that 
speakers are not able to understand the sentence in this way appears to indicate that 
although the PP ‘from London’ can either be understood as combining with the VP or 
with its complement NP, there seems to be a constraint that bars it from combining with, 
and so modifying, the NP subject of the sentence. Such negative facts are semantically 
relevant, as they serve to show that the underlying syntactic relations that hold between 
the constituent expressions of sentences play a role in determining not only which 
interpretations speakers are able to associate with those sentences, but also which 
interpretations are not available.  
Similar observations arise in connection with the sentences of (3): 
(3) a. The duck is easy to eat 
b. The duck is eager to eat 
As we saw, if we were to substitute ‘ready’ for ‘easy’ or ‘eager’ in these sentences, the 
resulting sentence would be ambiguous. As things stand, though, neither (3a) nor (3b) is 
ambiguous. That is, (3a) can only mean that it is easy for someone to eat the duck, and 
(3b) can only mean that the duck is eager for it, the duck, to eat something. Hence, we 
get the following limitations on the range of structural descriptions available for these 
sentences: 
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SD1(3a)   [The duck [is easy [ ___ to eat ___ ]]] 
 
 SD2(3a)  [The duck [is easy [ ___ to eat ___]]] 
 
SD1(3b)  [The duck [is eager [ ___ to eat ___]]] 
 
SD2(3b)  [The duck [is eager [ ___ to eat ___]]] 
 
Such cases show how different lexical items, e.g. ‘ready’, ‘easy’, and ‘eager’, impose 
different kinds of idiosyncratic constraints on the ways in which other expressions they 
combine with in sentences can be understood to relate to one another. Again, such 
interactions between the lexical and syntactic features of sentences are something we 
should expect a complete semantic theory to be able to account for.  
Finally, to mention one last case that has not yet been discussed, consider (4): 
(4) The men told the women to vote for each other 
This sentence means, and so is true iff, the men told each of the women to vote for 
another woman. This indicates that the determiner phrase ‘the women’ stands in a 
certain syntactic relation (an antecedent binding relation) with the reciprocal expression 
‘each other’. The question to ask though is why this relation can only obtain between 
these particular parts of the sentence and no others. That is, when we come to explaining 
how speakers interpret the sentence, we want to be able to say why it is that the sentence 
cannot mean that the men told each of the women to vote for another man, or that the 
men told the women that they (the men) would vote for another man (Higginbotham 
1985, p.549). Once again, this example serves to emphasise the semantic relevance of 
negative facts.  
To sum up, then, I take it that there are good reasons for endorsing Higginbotham’s 
claim that ‘the data of semantics should be seen in both their positive and their negative 
aspects: for any given expression, that it does mean X, or can mean X, and that it does 
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not mean Y, or cannot mean Y, are facts to be deduced in semantic theory’ (1985, 
p.548).
28
 
3.3. Semantic entailment 
One other range of semantic facts we need to consider are those pertaining to certain 
kinds of truth-involving connections that speakers recognise as holding between 
sentences. To start with a simple example, all speakers of English know that if the 
sentence ‘Bill is a bachelor’ is true, then so too is the sentence ‘Bill is an unmarried 
man’. Knowledge of which expressions are synonymous with each other in this way 
forms a somewhat obvious, but nevertheless important, part of linguistic understanding. 
Also, we know that if (5a) is true, then so is each of the following sentences (not to 
mention others): 
(5) a.  Bill danced and Mary laughed loudly 
b. Bill danced 
c.  Mary laughed loudly 
d.  Someone danced 
e.  Someone laughed loudly 
f. Bill did something 
g.  Something loud happened  
Truth-conditional semantic approaches have proven highly successful when it comes to 
explaining such entailments. That is, by giving the meanings of sentences in terms of 
their formally determined truth-conditions, such approaches have been able to apply 
standard formal analyses to the meanings of sentences that serve to bring out the 
relevant connections. For instance, (5b) and (5c) both follow from (5a), simply by way 
of conjunction elimination. (5d) and (5e) are then entailed by existential introduction, 
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 For detailed discussion on the kinds of syntactic relations that are involved in the 
kinds of cases discussed here, see Radford (1988), Haegeman (1994), and Hornstein et 
al. (2005).  
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which involves generalising over the positions occupied by ‘Bill’ and ‘Mary’ in the 
logical forms of the previous sentences.  
Things are slightly more complicated in the case of (5f)-(5h). To account for such 
entailments, Davidson proposed that the kinds of expressions that refer to activities and 
events should be ‘construed as containing a place, for singular terms or variables, that 
they do not appear to’ (Davidson 1967, p.47). Such variables range over activities and 
events, and (in most cases) remain implicit, undergoing existential closure in logical 
form. Modifying Davidson’s original idea, we thus end up with the following 
representation for the logical form of (5a): 
(6)   (∃e) [AGENT (Bill, e) ∧ DANCING (e)] ∧ (∃e′) [AGENT (Mary, e′) ∧ 
 LAUGHING (e′) ∧ LOUD (e′)] 
Such representations of the semantic logical forms of sentences introduce an array of 
new concepts that have not yet been discussed. Perhaps most strikingly, we now come to 
understand the arguments of verbs such as ‘dance’ and ‘laugh’ in terms of the kinds of 
participation relations that obtain between the activities those verbs denote and the 
individuals referred to by their arguments; e.g. in (6), Bill is explicitly marked as the 
AGENT of the dancing activity. Such facts can be taken to be linguistically encoded. 
That is, linguists have long argued that verbs assign θ-roles (e.g. AGENT, THEME, 
GOAL) to their arguments (see Haegeman 1994, chapter 3 for an introduction to θ-
roles). More fully, the external argument of a verbal head is assigned the θ-role 
AGENT, whereas its internal argument is typically assigned the θ-role THEME. Hence, 
there is good reason to think that the kinds of relations that are encoded in (6) are 
linguistically determined, and so will be part of the information encoded in an LF 
representation for (5a) (for further discussion of these matters, which we shall return to 
later, see Parsons 1990, Pietroski 2005). 
The important point for now is that, in taking (6) to be an accurate representation of the 
truth-conditional semantic content of (5a), it then becomes possible to explain the 
entailment relations that hold between that sentence and (5f)-(5h). In the case of (5f), 
having already isolated the left most conjunct of (5a) to get (5b), we then eliminate the 
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second conjunct in the logical form of (5b) to get (5f), as indicated in (7) (see Lepore 
and Ludwig 2007, p.179): 
(7) a.   (∃e) [AGENT (Bill, e) ∧ DANCING (e)] 
b.  (∃e) [AGENT (Bill, e)] 
(7b) says that there is some event such that Bill was the agent of that event, which is as 
good a paraphrase as any for ‘Bill did something’. A similar approach applies in the case 
of (5g), as indicated in (8): 
(8) a. (∃e) [AGENT (Mary, e) ∧ LAUGHING (e) ∧ LOUD (e)] 
b. (∃e) [LOUD (e)] 
A further range of connections that obtain between sentences are those that involve 
lexical entailment. For instance, consider the following sentences: 
(9)  a. Bill broke the vase 
b. The vase broke 
c. Bill hit the wall 
d. *The wall hit 
e. The men loaded the truck with hay 
f. The hay was loaded on the truck 
(9a) entails (9b), but (9c) does not entail the anomalous (9d). (9e) entails (9f), but not 
vice versa, as (9e) implies that the truck was loaded with hay till full, which would not 
necessarily be the case if the men loaded just one bale of hay onto the truck
29
. These 
kinds of semantic facts all seem to have something to do with the way speakers 
understand the meanings of particular lexical items, in that they reveal interesting 
features of how those lexical items, e.g. ‘break’ and ‘load’, combine with their 
arguments (see Fillmore 1968; Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995 for discussion).  
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 Whether the verb ‘loaded’ necessarily implies ‘till full’ is disputed, but we will 
presume here this for the purposes of exposition. 
  
37 
3.4. Context sensitivity 
The kinds of semantic facts we have looked at thus far all have something to do with 
ways in which the purely formal, or lexico-syntactic, features of sentences determine 
and constrain their truth-conditional content. There is a range of semantic facts, 
however, which pertains to various ways in which extra-linguistic factors can contribute 
to linguistic understanding. That is, when it comes to determining the truth-conditional 
content of sentences, speakers are often required to take into account certain pieces of 
information about features of the contexts in which those sentences are used. This is 
known as the phenomenon of context sensitivity, and it is a phenomenon that has a major 
bearing on attempts to explain how speakers understand language.  
The most obvious, most uncontroversial, way in which context contributes to the 
determination of content is by fixing the semantic values of standard indexical 
expressions, where the term standard indexical expression refers to expressions such as 
‘I’, ‘now’, ‘here’, ‘yesterday’, ‘that’, ‘he’, and so on:30  
(10) a. I sang 
b. You laughed 
c. They left 
When speakers of English encounter utterances of the above sentence, they know that in 
order to be able to evaluate those utterances for truth, they are going to have to take into 
account certain features pertaining to the context of utterance. Consequently, attempts to 
specify the truth-conditions of such sentences via the use of T-sentence statements of the 
following form – ‘I sang’ is true iff I sang – will tend to go awry, as there is never any 
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 I shall take the set of standard indexical expressions to be roughly that list of 
expressions set out by Kaplan, which includes ‘the pronouns ‘I’, ‘my’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘his’, 
‘she’, ‘it’, the demonstrative pronouns ‘that’, ‘this’, the adverbs ‘here’, ‘now’, 
‘tomorrow’, ‘yesterday’, the adjectives ‘actual’, ‘present’, and others’ (Kaplan 1977, 
p.489). I shall only tend to differentiate the demonstratives from this set of expressions 
when the discussion demands it.   
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guarantee that the individual referred to by the indexical expression in the sentence 
mentioned will be the same thing referred to by the individual using the statement to 
interpret the sentence.  
Standard indexicals, then, are expressions whose semantic values are fixed by speakers 
relative to contexts of utterance. That said, there is an important distinction to be made 
regarding how speakers go about fixing the semantic values of different kinds of 
indexical expressions. The automatic (or pure) indexicals – e.g. ‘I’, ‘today’, ‘yesterday’ 
– have their semantic values fixed relative to particular features of context independent 
of speakers’ intentions. For instance, on uttering ‘I’ at a context c, a speaker cannot help 
but refer to herself, the person performing the utterance at c. Similarly, a speaker who 
believes it to be Monday might utter ‘yesterday’ on a Tuesday, intending to refer to 
Sunday; but whatever the speaker’s intentions, such an utterance would refer to the day 
before the day of utterance; i.e. Monday (Perry 1977, p.6).  
In contrast, the intentional indexicals (which Kaplan refers to as the true 
demonstratives) – e.g. ‘that’, ‘he’, ‘this’ – have their semantic values fixed partly in 
relation to the referential intentions of speakers who use them (Kaplan 1989, p.582). So, 
when a speaker A utters ‘He is mad’, although there is clearly some constraint on the 
type of entity A could be referring to with ‘he’, in that the referent must be masculine in 
some sense, fixing exactly who or what A refers to by using that expression will involve 
figuring out A’s referential intentions (where an accompanying act of demonstration 
might provide some clue as to those intentions). If one is unable to identify A’s 
referential intentions on the relevant occasion, then one’s interpretation of the truth-
conditional content of the utterance will remain incomplete (Kaplan 1977, pp.490-491). 
It should be noted that the distinction between automatic and intentional indexicals is 
not always clear-cut. For instance, ‘now’ has typically been taken to refer automatically 
to the time of its utterance, and ‘here’ to the location of its utterance. However, the 
duration of time that a speaker intends to refer to with an utterance of ‘now’, or how 
large an area a speaker intends to refer to with an utterance of ‘here’, might vary on 
different uses of such expressions (Perry 1998, p.8). To illustrate, one might utter the 
sentence ‘I like it here’ intending to express one’s liking for the room one is in, or the 
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building, or the city, etc. This seems to suggest that ‘now’ and ‘here’ are part automatic, 
in that the duration or area referred to by uttering either expression must contain the 
instant in time or the location at which the utterance takes place, but are also part 
intentional, in that the exact duration or area referred to is identified relative to speakers’ 
intentions.  
To further complicate things, though, utterances of both expressions can be used to refer 
to times and locations other than those at which their uses take place. For example, 
talking about a long ago battle in a faraway place, one might say ‘The rebels occupying 
the town knew that they must make their stand right here right now’, and in so doing 
refer to the very place and time at which the rebels made their stand. What this example 
seems to indicate is that speakers can shift perspective from an utterance context to 
something like a narrative context when it comes to fixing the values of some indexical 
expressions, interpreting occurrences of such expressions as if from the perspective of 
some narrative context (see Predelli 1998). Acknowledging this need not involve giving 
up on the idea that speakers fix values for, say, ‘here’ and ‘now’ relative to locations and 
times at contexts, but in showing that there can be some question as to which context is 
relevant when doing so, we are led one step further away from the idea that such these 
expressions automatically refer to the times and locations of the contexts of utterance at 
which they are used. 
Let us now consider how a semantic theory might account for this. Setting aside certain 
complications, one thing that seems to be clear is that each occurrence of an indexical 
expression is assigned its semantic value relative to some specific feature of context. On 
the basis of this observation, Davidson proposed that the T-sentences generated by a 
semantic theory would specify the truth-conditions of sentences relative to a fixed set of 
contextual parameters; i.e. speakers and times. The axioms for indexical expressions 
would state that determining the semantic values of indexical expressions would involve 
identifying speakers and times relative to contexts of utterance (Davidson, 1973, p.131) 
The insight was developed in much more detail in the work of Kaplan (1977), who came 
up with a way of providing context-independent specifications of the meanings of all 
indexicals. On Kaplan’s theory of indexicals, the meaning of any expression is specified 
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in terms of its context-invariant character, which is represented as a function from 
contexts to contents. A context, on this view, is characterised in a purely formal manner 
as an ordered set of contextual parameters that minimally include those ‘brute’ features 
that make up any context of utterance, i.e. speaker, time, location. Content is 
characterised as a function from circumstances of evaluation to extensions; e.g. the 
content of a sentence is a (structured) proposition, which, relative to a circumstance of 
evaluation, takes a truth-value as its extension.  
Kaplan’s claim was that whilst most expressions have fixed characters, in that they take 
the same content as value at all contexts, the characters of indexical expressions are 
context sensitive, in that the contents they take as values vary with the values of the 
contextual parameters with which they are associated. For example, the character of ‘I’ 
can be represented as a function from any context of utterance c to the value of the 
speaker parameter at c, which is just to say that an utterance of ‘I’ at a context c has as 
its content the speaker who performed the utterance at c. As for the intentional 
indexicals, for present purposes we can take it that the semantic values of expressions 
such as ‘you’ and ‘that’ are also fixed relative to contextual parameters, say for 
addressees and demonstrata, where the values of those parameters at particular contexts 
of utterance are identified on the basis of accompanying acts of demonstration (Kaplan 
1977), or relative to the directing intentions of speakers (Kaplan 1989).
31
  
The advantage of Kaplan’s theory is that it shows how the context-independent 
meanings of indexical expressions (i.e. their context-invariant characters) determine 
their contents at any context. By incorporating the notion of character into a truth-
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 Following Kaplan, one might take it that there are contextual parameters for sequences 
of addressees or demonstrata, so as to deal with cases where multiple intentional 
indexicals occur in a sentence; e.g. ‘That is smaller than that’, or ‘I’m not talking to you, 
you, or you’. In such cases, the intentional indexical is associated with a syntactically 
generated index that corresponds to a position in the sequence. For critical discussion of 
Kaplan’s account of the characters of the intentional indexicals, which he refers to as 
true demonstratives, see Braun 1996, Salmon 2002. 
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conditional semantic theory, we arrive at a way of specifying truth-conditions for 
sentences relative to contexts via the use of conditionalized T-sentences (Davidson 
1973; Higginbotham 1988). For example, the truth-conditions for (11) at any context are 
given by CTS(11):
32
 
(11) I bought this 
CTS(11) If u is an utterance of ‘I bought this’, and the speaker x of u refers with 
x’s utterance of ‘this’ to y and nothing else, then u is true iff x bought y. 
Here, the antecedent of the conditional states conditions for identifying the objects to 
which the indexical expressions ‘I’ and ‘this’ will refer at any context of utterance in 
terms of the characters of those expressions, whereas the consequent gives a standard 
specification of (11)’s truth-conditions for objects thus identified relative to contexts. 
Crucially, whilst information pertaining to the characters of the indexical expressions 
contained in (11) does not appear anywhere in the specification of the sentence’s truth-
conditions, it is nevertheless represented within the conditionalized T-sentence as part of 
what speakers know about the meanings of such expressions; i.e. as that bit of 
information that enables them to secure the referents of the indexicals at contexts. As a 
result, we have a way of specifying the truth-conditions of (11) at any context of 
utterance without having to spell out of how speakers actually go about identifying the 
referents of the indexical constituents of (11) relative to c.  
A semantic theory represents a context of utterance in a purely formal, abstract manner, 
as an ordered set of objective contextual parameters. The truth-conditions of sentences 
are then specified relative to contexts of utterance so represented. The context-invariant 
meaning (or character) of each indexical expression encodes the contextual parameters 
relative to which values of its token occurrences are fixed. The theory makes the 
relevant information explicit by specifying the truth-conditions of sentences that contain 
indexicals in terms of conditionalized T-sentences. Such T-sentences specify the truth-
conditions of the relevant sentences independently of how the semantic values of the 
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 In chapter 3, we shall look at how Borg (2004) develops this approach. 
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indexical expressions they contain are secured (Higginbotham 2006). In what follows, 
we will have cause to raise further questions about standard indexicals, but generally 
speaking, I shall take it that by adopting the account of standard indexicality sketched 
here, a semantic theory would explain how the meanings of such expressions determine 
the contributions they make to the truth-conditions expressed by utterances of sentences 
in which they occur. 
4. Summary 
In this chapter my aim was to explore a particular conception of what a semantic theory 
for a natural language would look like. To that end, I explored the theoretical 
foundations for truth-conditional semantics as they emerged in the work of Davidson, I 
showed how we might go about the task of constructing a semantic theory that is true to 
the truth-theoretic framework Davidson developed, and I assessed how such a theory 
fares when it comes to the task of accounting for a variety of semantic facts. As a result, 
I hope to have shown that a truth-conditional semantic theory of the kind envisaged by 
Davidson offers a rich and systematic method of interpretation for a natural language. 
Indeed, I hope to have shown why the truth-conditional approach has become the 
standard approach in contemporary semantics.  
That said, though, the rest of the thesis will explore a problem truth-conditional 
semantic theories face; viz. the problem of the phenomenon of pervasive context 
sensitivity. We have seen that a truth-conditional semantics can accommodate instances 
of context sensitivity that arise from occurrences of standard indexical expressions, but 
in the next chapter, we shall look at other ways in which features of extra-linguistic 
context impact on the determination of truth-conditional content. The question to ask is 
whether those further varieties of context sensitivity can be accommodated by a truth-
conditional semantic theory.   
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CHAPTER 2 
PERVASIVE CONTEXT SENSITIVITY 
 
In the previous chapter, we looked at a variety of facts regarding the ways speakers 
interpret the truth-conditional semantic content of natural language sentences, and we 
showed how the truth-conditional semanticist accommodates such facts so as to defend 
the claim that the formal, lexico-syntactic features of sentences, fully articulated at LF, 
determine complete sets of truth-conditions.  
As we saw, though, there are some cases where certain extra-linguistic features of 
context must be taken into account in order to determine a sentence’s truth-conditions. 
In relation to such cases, which arise from occurrences of standard indexical 
expressions, it was shown that we can account for the role context plays in determining 
content by arguing that the meanings of such expressions encode information regarding 
the kinds of contextual factors speakers must take into account in order to determine 
what contributions they make to content. So, although the phenomenon of context 
sensitivity indicates that speakers must look beyond the purely formal features of 
sentences in order to determine their content, and therefore that we determine the 
content of sentences relative to contexts, it seems that a semantic theory can 
nevertheless account for this without having to abandon the assumption that content is 
linguistically determined.  
However, this conclusion may turn out to be premature, and in the following section I 
look in more detail at the phenomenon of context sensitivity, and consider whether there 
are other ways in which extra-linguistic features of context contribute to the 
determination of content.  
1. Beyond standard indexicality 
I now want to show that there are good reasons for thinking that the phenomenon of 
context sensitivity is not restricted to instances of standard indexicality. This outlook has 
been adopted by many contemporary philosophers of language, and there have been 
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various arguments set forth in its defence. I shall refer to such arguments as context 
shifting arguments (CSAs), and in this section I shall show how CSAs have been used to 
provide support for the claim context plays a more pervasive role in determining content 
than that of fixing values for standard indexicals.  
1.1. Context shifting arguments 
CSAs are designed to show that ‘sentences are compatible with different conditions for 
their truth’ (Travis 2008, p.112); i.e. are apt to express different sets of truth-conditions 
when used at different contexts of utterance. Constructing such an argument for a 
sentence involves devising a pair of contexts in which utterances of the sentence would 
differ in truth-value despite being evaluated for truth relative to the same circumstance 
of evaluation. For example, consider (1): 
(1) Bill is ready 
Picture Bill in the library preparing for a test. Under such circumstances, we can 
imagine that an utterance of (1) would count as true in the context of a discussion 
regarding Bill’s chances of passing the test, but false in the context of a discussion about 
whether Bill is dressed for an evening out. This indicates that the conditions that must 
obtain in order for the sentence to count as true are apt to vary across contexts of 
utterance. Hence, although ‘ready’ is not a standard indexical, it appears that it is 
context sensitive, in that the contribution it makes to the content expressed by utterances 
of (1) varies across contexts. The same kind of reasoning can be applied to each of the 
following sentences: 
(2) a. Every student smokes 
b. Bill is tall 
c. Mary’s horse won the steeplechase 
d. It is raining 
The truth-values speakers assign to utterances of these sentences may vary even if those 
utterances are evaluated for truth relative to the same circumstances of evaluation. 
Hence, speakers will assign different truth-values to utterances of (2a) depending on 
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which quantifier domain is contextually salient (‘every student in Bill’s class’/ ‘every 
student in the UK’); to utterances of (2b) depending on which comparison class is 
contextually salient (‘tall for a twelve year old’/‘tall for a basketball player’); to 
utterances of (2c) depending on which possession relation is contextually salient (‘the 
horse Mary owns’/ ‘the horse Mary bet on’); and to utterances of (2d) depending on 
which location is contextually salient (‘raining in Paris’/ ‘raining in Stockholm’). 
Such cases are simple, but they serve to illustrate that there are a variety of expression 
types, e.g. quantifier phrases, comparative adjectives, possessives, weather verbs, etc., 
whose contributions to content can only be properly determined once certain specific 
pieces of contextual information have been taken into account; e.g. information about 
contextually salient domains, comparison classes, possession relations, locations, and so 
on.  
In other putative cases of context sensitivity, it is harder to say with any degree of 
generality precisely what kind of contextual information speakers must look to in order 
to understand the content of the sentence uttered. For instance, Travis (e.g. 1996, 2008) 
has discussed a variety of cases where it is certain peculiar features of particular 
contexts of utterance that bring about the possibility of variation in a sentence’s truth-
conditional content: 
(3) a. The leaves are green  
b. The milk is in the fridge 
c. The ink is blue 
Focusing on (3a) for the time being, Travis presents us with the following CSA: 
A story. Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that green is the 
colour of leaves, she paints them. Returning, she reports, ‘That’s better. The 
leaves are green now.’ She speaks truth. A botanist friend then phones, seeking 
green leaves for a study of green-leaf chemistry. ‘The leaves (on my tree) are 
green,’ Pia says. ‘You can have those.’ But now Pia speaks falsehood. (Travis 
2008, p. 111) 
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What Travis’s examples are meant to illustrate is that the truth-conditional contents of 
sentences vary not only relative to what might be thought of as generally specifiable 
contextual parameters (e.g. domains, locations, comparison classes, etc.), but that the 
diverse practices and interests that engage and motivate speakers when they put 
sentences to use on different occasions can also be shown to have an effect on how we 
understand the truth-conditional contents expressed by utterances of sentences.  
For example, if your purpose is to find some milk for your cereal, then you will take a 
speaker who utters (3b) to say something false if there is only a puddle of milk in the 
fridge. That said, if your purpose is to find out whether the fridge needs cleaning, one 
might then take a speaker to say something true by uttering that sentence in such a set of 
circumstances. Similarly, you might take it that ink that looks black in a bottle counts as 
blue ink if it appears blue when scribbled on paper, but then you might take it not to 
count as blue ink if you are entirely interested in how it looks whilst in the bottle.  
There are various questions to be asked about the extent to which CSAs can be 
convincingly applied. Some have taken CSAs to be convincing only when applied to a 
very narrow range of sentences, whereas others (e.g. Travis) have argued that there is no 
obvious limit on the range of sentences to which CSAs can be applied, and what is 
more, no obvious limits on what kinds of contextual factors might be shown to make a 
difference when it comes to determining the truth-conditions a given sentence might be 
used to express. For now, though, I am merely interested in the possibility that there 
may be certain instances of context sensitivity that are not triggered by occurrences of 
standard indexical expressions. 
Ultimately, I take it that the above examples reveal an interesting range of facts about 
the ways speakers interpret the truth-conditional contents of the sentences discussed thus 
far. That said, there is an important distinction to be made regarding the way these 
examples operate. That is, in the case of ‘Bill is ready’, it appears that context serves to 
provide us with information that is not explicitly specified in the original sentence, but 
which is nevertheless essential for determining whether the sentence is true relative to 
any given context of utterance; i.e. it seems to be necessary to find out what activity Bill 
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is ready to perform or engage in, as it is hard to imagine what kinds of conditions would 
have to obtain in order for it to be true of Bill that he is ready simpliciter.  
In the case of ‘Every student smokes’, though, the appeal to contextual information 
appears to serve the role of making the truth-conditional content of the sentence more 
specific; i.e. at face value, the sentence seems to state that for any individual anywhere, 
if that individual is a student, then he or she smokes, but we take it that when a speaker 
utters the sentence, they intend to say something about a particular domain of students.  
Following Bach (1994), I shall refer to the former kinds of cases as cases of semantic 
incompleteness, and the latter as cases of semantic expansion. I now want to consider 
why the idea that context might make these different kinds of contributions to content 
raises issues for standard truth-conditional semantic theories. 
1.2. Semantic incompleteness 
The idea that the compositionally determined semantic content of a sentence does not 
always determine a complete set of truth-conditions seems to pose a significant 
challenge for truth-conditional semantic theories. From the outset, we have taken it that 
the meanings of sentences can be specified in terms of the conditions that must obtain 
for those sentences to be true, and so that we can analyse the meanings of simple 
expressions by looking at the way they contribute to the truth-conditions of the 
sentences in which they occur. However, although we know what the constituent 
expressions of the sentences listed in (4) mean, and we take it that we can provide 
accurate descriptions of the structural relations that obtain between the expressions 
which those sentences comprise, it would appear that knowing this much is not enough 
to put us in a position to be able to judge whether utterances of the sentences would be 
true or false relative to any given circumstances of evaluation: 
(4) a. Bill is ready 
b. Bill is tall 
c. It is raining 
  
48 
Putting the point somewhat differently, there are certain pieces of information that must 
be taken into account in order to determine the truth-conditions of these sentences that 
are not explicitly specified by any of their constituent expressions. For example, there is 
no constituent of (4c) that takes a location as its semantic value. Hence, it would appear 
that, in and of themselves, the lexico-syntactic features of the sentences of (4) provide 
only partial, or incomplete, representations of the truth-conditional content speakers 
associate with utterances of those sentences. In order to arrive at a complete set of truth-
conditions, then, a speaker must utilise her knowledge of context in order to identify the 
missing pieces of information, and so determine a complete set of truth-conditions.  
The problem that the phenomenon of incompleteness raises for a truth-conditional 
semantic theory is this: if context can play a constitutive role in determining what truth-
conditional content an utterance of a sentence expresses, then there is no reason to think 
that linguistic meaning alone determines those semantic relations that speakers 
recognise as holding between expressions and the world. That is, once we take it that the 
relations that obtain between expressions and the world are, at least to some extent, 
contextually determined, then it seems we must accept that linguistic meaning in and of 
itself does not determine stable, shared relations between sentences and the world.  
Instead, those relations are, at least in part, forged on the basis of some form of 
pragmatic competence.  
The worry that this gives rise to, though, is that there seem to be no obvious constraints 
on what kinds of pragmatic factors, what kinds of features of contexts, speakers might 
take to be relevant when it comes to determining the content of an utterance of a given 
expression. It is hard to imagine how one would go about the task of providing a 
systematic account of the way speakers use language to talk about the world that is 
based on an appeal to pragmatic competence.  
The truth-conditional semantic theorist, motivated by such concerns, will thus attempt to 
provide an account of putative instances of incompleteness that ultimately shows that, 
despite appearances, contextual factors do not play a constitutive role in the 
determination of content. Prominent accounts that aim to accomplish precisely this will 
be analysed in detail in subsequent chapters.   
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1.3. Semantic expansion 
Semantic expansion occurs when speakers take the compositionally determined truth-
conditional content of a sentence to differ from the content intuitively expressed by an 
utterance of that sentence. In such cases, the intuitive truth-conditional content of the 
sentence is an ‘enriched or elaborated version of the [content] explicitly expressed by 
the utterance itself’ (Bach 1994, p.133). Some form of expansion is taken to occur in 
each of the following cases: 
(5) a. Every student smokes 
b. You’re not going to die 
c. Bill has not eaten breakfast 
In each of these cases, it seems clear that a complete truth-conditional content is 
determined by the formal features of each sentence. However, when speakers utter such 
sentences on particular occasions of use, speakers will typically take them to have 
expressed something more specific than the sentence’s compositionally determined 
content. We have already dealt with how this arises in connection with (5a), and 
utterances of (5b) will typically be interpreted as being true just if the addressee is not 
going to die from some contextually salient cause (e.g. ‘You’re not going to die from 
that cut’). Similarly, utterances of (5c) will typically be taken to be true iff Bill has not 
eaten breakfast today. It should be noted that these kinds of interpretive effects are not 
‘one off’ effects brought about at peculiar contexts of utterance, but reflect general facts 
about the way speakers actually interpret utterances of the relevant expressions. 
Now, there is a sense in which instances of expansion are less of a challenge for the 
standard semantic theorist than instances of incompleteness. In cases involving 
incompleteness, there is a sense in which context plays an indispensable, constitutive 
role in the determination of content, whereas in cases of expansion, the kind of 
contribution context makes is merely optional. So, the truth-conditional semanticist 
might simply choose to treat expansion as some kind of optional, post-semantic process 
that does not contribute to the determination of an utterance’s compositionally 
determined content.  
  
50 
That said, though, instances of expansion give rise to important questions regarding 
what it is truth-conditional semantic theories actually aim to account for. If the truth-
conditions speakers associate with utterances of sentences are sometimes sets of truth-
conditions arrived at through some form of expansion, then we have to ask whether a 
semantic theory (which is, after all, a systematic method of interpretation for sentences 
in a language) should account for instances of expansion. The problem is that if we do 
take it that a semantic theory should account for the content speakers intuitively 
associate with utterances of a sentence, then we are once again led to the view that 
context plays a constitutive role in the determination of content, which in turn raises the 
potentially significant challenges for lexico-semantic theorist noted earlier.  
2. Three responses  
It is evident that CSAs raise a significant challenge for the view that the lexico-syntactic 
features of sentences, assessed relative to contexts of utterance, always serve to 
determine determinate sets of truth-conditions. That said, there are two questions that 
need to be asked so as to gauge the kind of response that CSAs merit. The first is 
whether intuitions elicited by such arguments should be accounted for by semantic 
theories for natural languages, i.e. whether they are semantically relevant. The second is 
whether such intuitions can be accounted for within truth-conditional frameworks for 
constructing such theories. The remainder of the section focuses on distinguishing 
between the following three responses to these questions: (i) the intuitions elicited are 
semantically relevant, and can be accommodated by truth-conditional semantic theories; 
(ii) the intuitions elicited are semantically relevant, but cannot be accommodated by 
such theories; and (iii) the intuitions elicited are not semantically relevant, so the fact 
that such intuitions cannot be accommodated by truth-conditional semantic theories is 
immaterial. Adopting the terminology of C&L – using the term contextualism for any 
approach according to which the phenomena highlighted by arguments for pervasive 
context sensitivity are semantically relevant – we can refer to those who endorse, 
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respectively, (i) as moderate contextualists, (ii) as radical contextualists, and (iii) as 
semantic minimalists.
33
 Let us now look in turn at each of these responses to CSAs.  
2.1.  The moderate response 
Moderate contextualists (e.g. Perry 1986, Bach 1994, Szabo 2001, Stanley 2007) take 
CSAs to be convincing only when applied to a narrow range of sentence types. On this 
view, all genuine instances of context sensitivity are triggered by a select set of sub-
sentential expression types (e.g. quantifier phrases, comparative adjectives, weather 
verbs, etc.) whose occurrences give rise to the apposite effects on interpretation. 
Accordingly, it is argued that to account for those instances of context sensitivity that go 
beyond standard indexicality, we need to inquire into the intrinsic semantic properties of 
the salient expression types. Moreover, moderate contextualists argue that this can be 
done by implementing methods more or less in keeping with the basic assumptions of 
truth-conditional semantics. Such methods can be broadly characterised as follows. Start 
by establishing that a sentence is susceptible to CSAs, being sure to rule out effects 
brought about by standard indexicality, tense, ambiguity, polysemy, or any merely 
seemingly semantic effects. Standard examples include the following: 
(6) a.  Mary is tall  
b. Every student failed 
c. It is raining 
Next, via careful reflection on intuitions elicited by CSAs, identify the expression 
responsible for the context sensitivity of the host sentence and the contextual factor (or 
parameter) relative to which the semantic value of the expression varies. For the 
sentences of (6), this yields the following: in (6a), the semantic value of the comparative 
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 The terminology here is adopted from C&L (2005). Borg (2006) opts out of using 
these terms as they ‘fail to capture the true divide in the contextualist camp’. That said, I 
shall take it that the dialectic between contextualism and minimalism can be properly set 
up using C&L’s terminology, just as long as we are careful to mark important difference 
with the approaches that fall under these rather general headings. 
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adjective ‘tall’ varies depending on what comparison class is salient at each context of 
utterance (e.g. tall for a five year old); in (6b), the value of the quantifier phrase ‘every 
student’ varies depending on the domain to which the quantifier is restricted at each 
context (e.g. every student in Bill’s class); and, in (6c), the value of the weather verb 
‘rain’ varies depending on the contextually salient location of the raining event (e.g. 
raining in Paris). Finally, having identified the context sensitive expression, posit a 
variable-like element that is intrinsically associated with that expression, and whose 
value varies across contexts of utterance relative to the appropriate contextual factor. 
The resulting view is that the propositions expressed by context sensitive sentences vary 
systematically relative to the values the putative variable-like elements take across 
contexts.  
Advocates of different versions of moderate contextualism adopt different outlooks 
regarding how best to characterise the pertinent variable-like elements. Stanley (2000), 
for instance, argues that such elements are aphonic pronominals that are situated in the 
‘real’ logical forms of sentences (i.e. are represented at LF), but which have no 
morphological reflex at surface form (i.e. are not represented at PF). In contrast, Perry 
(e.g. 1986, 2001) argues that such elements can be characterised as argument roles, 
which are not associated with expressions as such, but rather with the relations they 
denote. On this view, the contextually determined elements that saturate argument roles 
are unarticulated constituents; i.e. elements of propositional content that are not 
articulated at any level of linguistic representation. As for others, Bach (1994) 
characterises the salient elements in terms of extra-linguistic conceptual gaps; Taylor 
(2007) in terms of lexically (but not syntactically) represented subsyntactic parameters; 
Rothschild and Segal (2010) in terms of indices on lexical items; and so on. These 
variations on the moderate contextualist outlook are divided, and some are directly 
opposed to others, but generally speaking, they all adopt the same basic procedure for 
accounting for non-standard instances of context sensitivity.  
Moderate contextualists, then, are committed to the claim that the context-independent 
meanings of context sensitive expressions can, in principle, be specified in such a way 
as to fix (more or less precisely) what types of contextual information must be 
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accounted for to determine the contributions such expressions make to the propositions 
expressed by utterances of sentences in which they occur. The resulting view is that 
sentences containing context sensitive expressions do not express complete propositions 
independently of context, but propositional radicals, fragments, or schemas; i.e. 
semantic representations permeated by specifiable types of gaps or slots that must be 
saturated relative to contexts to attain complete propositions.  
2.2.  The radical response 
Radical contextualists (e.g. Searle 1978, Travis 2008, Recanati 2010) adopt a very 
different outlook. On their view, there is no obvious limit on the range of sentence types 
to which CSAs can be applied; so, if we accept the force of such arguments, we will 
ultimately be led to accept that the phenomenon of context sensitivity is not restricted to 
occurrences of any exclusive set of expression types. As a consequence, radical 
contextualists reject the idea that moderate contextualist methods are fit for 
accommodating the full range of intuitions CSAs elicit.  
To explain why, consider the following example. Adopting a moderate contextualist 
stance, let us assume that: 
(7) Bill is ready 
expresses, say, a propositional fragment that must be saturated by activities Bill is ready 
to perform or engage in relative to contexts of utterance. If this is so, then rather than 
uttering (7) at a context c, one might instead utter a more elaborate sentence that 
explicitly specifies the activity salient at c, and so express a complete proposition:
34
 
(8) Bill is ready to eat something 
                                                 
34
 Moderate contextualists tend to be in agreement on the idea that implicit contextually 
determined elements of propositional content can be made explicit so as to produce 
sentences that expresses complete propositions. Coming up with a sentence that 
expresses a complete proposition, or thought, is more or less a matter of being somewhat 
prolix. See Bach 2006. 
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The problem for the moderate contextualist is that even though (8) makes explicit 
reference to the activity Bill is ready to perform at c, it can be shown that the sentence 
does not determine a complete proposition that is the content expressed by all its 
utterances. To illustrate, picture Bill asleep after an operation. Carrying out a test on Bill 
as he sleeps, the doctor utters (8), and so says something true; i.e. the test confirms Bill 
is showing signs of being ready to eat something (low blood-sugar levels, etc.), a finding 
worthy of comment from the doctor’s perspective. The nurse repeats the doctor’s 
utterance to the cook, who promptly takes a meal to Bill’s room, but finding Bill asleep, 
the cook judges the nurse to have said something false; i.e. Bill is not awake yet, and so 
is not ready to eat something. The conditions that must obtain for Bill to count as being 
ready to eat something vary, then, depending on the contextually salient interests that 
motivate the doctor and the cook.
35
  
This raises complications for the view that it is possible to provide context-independent 
specifications of the types of contextual information required in order to determine the 
propositions expressed by utterances of (7), as even when we elaborate (7) to produce 
another sentence, (8), in which the relevant information is made explicit, further 
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 Note that the example does not play on the ambiguity between psychological and 
material readings of ‘ready’. Such an ambiguity is clear in the sentence ‘The duck is 
ready to eat something’. On the psychological reading, the duck is ready to eat in the 
sense of wanting to eat something, whereas on the material reading, it is ready to eat in 
the sense of having properly been cooked (Landau 1999). In the CSA presented above, I 
take it that the material reading is operative in both contexts. What is more, I have 
attempted to construct the CSA in a way that it eludes explanation in terms of some 
form of stage-level/individual-level ambiguity on ‘ready’. The stage-level reading is 
operative in both contexts (the doctor takes Bill to be in the temporary state of being 
ready to eat something, a state that will change once he has eaten his fill, the cook takes 
Bill not to be in such a state). The fact that ‘ready’ admits psychological/material and 
stage-level/individual level ambiguities only goes to show what a complex semantic life 
the adjective leads. 
  
55 
contextual factors can be shown to play a constitutive role in determining the 
propositions expressed by utterances of that sentence.  
One option open to the moderate contextualist to overcome this difficulty is to deny that 
the CSA elicits intuitions for the context sensitivity of (8). However, for this to work, 
the moderate contextualist would have to explain why this CSA is less convincing than 
those upon which her own position relies. Alternatively, the moderate contextualist can 
argue that (8), like (7), harbours a variable-like element whose value varies relative to 
some specific contextual factor. Such a response, however, faces its own difficulties. 
First, radical contextualists will argue that for any contextual factor one might specify, 
‘further possible factors would yield more than one distinguishable thing to be said for 
fixed values of [the specified factor] (Travis 2008, p.115). The following example 
further illustrates the point: 
A story. Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that green is the 
colour of leaves, she paints them. Returning, she reports, ‘That’s better. The 
leaves are green now.’ She speaks truth. A botanist friend then phones, seeking 
green leaves for a study of green-leaf chemistry. ‘The leaves (on my tree) are 
green,’ Pia says. ‘You can have those.’ But now Pia speaks falsehood. (Travis 
2008, p. 111) 
On Travis’s view, here we have two occasions at which different understandings of what 
counts as being green are in play. The difference can be described straightforwardly: on 
one occasion, leaves painted green count as green, whereas on the other, only naturally 
green leaves so count.  
A moderate contextualist might posit a variable-like element in the semantics of ‘green’ 
to account for the difference. Szabo (2001), for instance, argues that ‘green’ is 
associated with a variable that ranges over parts of objects. On the first occasion 
described in the Travis case, the value of the variable is fixed in such a way that the 
predicate applies to the surfaces of the leaves (i.e. the leaves need only be superficially 
green), whereas on the second, it is fixed in such a way that the predicate applies to the 
whole of each leaf (i.e. they must be green through and through). However, Travis 
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argues that there are indefinitely many ways in which understandings of how leaves 
must be to count as being green might vary across further occasions of use: 
Suppose the leaves were not painted (or were painted red), but had a fluorescent 
green mould growing on them. Or suppose they are painted, but in pointillist 
style: from a decent distance they look green, but up close they look mottled. Is 
that a way of painting leaves green? It might sometimes, but only sometimes, so 
count. So there would be two distinct things to be said in the presumed ‘paint 
counts’ sense of ‘is green’. And so on. (Travis 2008, p. 112) 
Ultimately, the idea is that if there is no limit on the range of CSAs one can come up 
with (and the radical contextualist sees no good evidence for imposing such a limit), 
moderate contextualists will be forced to keep positing ever more variable-like elements 
to cope with the full range of intuitions such arguments elicit.  
The second problem is that it is not at all clear whether it is possible to specify with any 
degree of generality what type of contextual factor varies between the utterances of the 
doctor and the cook. Indeed, it is hard to think how one would specify exactly what 
varies without reiterating those details peculiar to the sleeping Bill case.
36
 Hence, it 
seems that the specific features of the contexts at play in the relevant case, rather than 
any generally specifiable features of contexts as such, are what cause the content 
expressed by utterances of the sentence to vary. So, the moderate contextualist method 
of fixing some general contextual factor relative to which the semantic value of some 
expression in (8) varies across all contexts is not applicable here.  
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 The different understandings of ‘ready’ at play might be described as follows: the 
doctor understands ‘ready’ in the sense of being in the right physical condition to 
perform the activity; the cook understands ‘ready’ in the more restricted sense of being 
actively able to perform the activity. Does this identify a particular type of contextual 
factor? Do all uses of ‘ready’ have to take values relative to such a factor; e.g. does that 
factor come into play when deciding if Bill is ready to start his book, to jump off a cliff, 
to meet his maker, for his close up, etc.?  
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The radical contextualist thus claims that there can be contextual effects on the content 
expressed by utterances of a sentence that are ‘not triggered by an expression in the 
sentence but take place for purely pragmatic reasons – in order to make sense of what 
the speaker is saying’ at those contexts. Such effects are ‘free’ in that ‘they are not 
mandated by the linguistic material but respond to wholly pragmatic considerations’ 
(Recanati 2010, p.12). Radical contextualists thus reject the view that the meanings of 
expressions can be specified in such a way as to fix precisely those ways in which the 
semantic contributions of those expressions will be apt to vary across contexts. 
Consequently, since all expressions can in principle be shown to be context sensitive, it 
follows that meaning does not itself determine what semantic contributions expressions 
make on occasions of use: 
It seems to be fairly generally realized nowadays that, if you just take a bunch of 
sentences…impeccably formulated in some language or other, there can be no 
question of sorting them out into those that are true and those that are false; 
for…the question of truth and falsehood does not turn only on what a sentence 
is, nor yet on what it means, but on, speaking very broadly, the circumstances in 
which it is uttered. Sentences are not as such either true or false. (Austin 1962, 
pp.110-111) 
…in general the meaning of a sentence only has application (it only, for 
example, determines a set of truth conditions) against a background of 
assumptions and practices that are not representable as a part of meaning. (Searle 
1980, p. 221) 
What words mean plays a role in fixing when they would be true; but not an 
exhaustive one. Meaning leaves room for variation in truth conditions from one 
speaking to another. (Travis 1996, p. 451) 
Abandoning the idea that contextual effects on content are triggered by the intrinsic 
properties of expressions, radical contextualists appeal to our broader pragmatic 
competence in order to explain how we are able to keep track of the propositions 
expressed by utterances of sentences across contexts. For example, Recanati (2010) 
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argues that simple and complex expressions alike are apt to undergo some or other form 
of modulation when put to use at particular occasions, where ‘modulation’ refers to a 
family of pragmatic processes that operate on the context-independent meanings of 
expressions so as to cause their semantic values to shift. Importantly, modulation is 
never mandated by the intrinsic semantic properties of expressions, but is freely applied 
by speakers in order to figure out what is said; i.e. it is not a mandatory bottom-up 
process (like saturation), but an optional top-down process (Recanati 2010, p.14). 
Similarly, Travis argues that the properties of words as such do not determine what 
contributions speakings of them make to content across contexts. Rather, our parochial 
sensibility to features of occasions of use plays an essential role in arriving at 
appropriate understandings of which such contributions words make (Travis 2006, 
pp.129-139).  
2.3.  The minimalist response 
Semantic minimalists agree with radical contextualists about the consequences of 
acknowledging the force of CSAs. Cappellen and Lepore (C&L), for instance, argue that 
moderate contextualism is ‘not a stable position’, as the kind of evidence moderate 
contextualists rely on to support their views ‘leads directly to radical contextualism’ 
(C&L 2005, p.39). Likewise, Borg insists that if we take the kinds of effects on 
interpretation highlighted by CSAs seriously, then ‘one has no reason to think that any 
context independent specification of propositional content will be free from the 
possibility of running a CSA’ (Borg 2012, p.144). 
Despite this point of agreement, though, minimalists find the radical contextualist 
outlook about the kinds of processes involved in determining the contents of utterances 
implausible. On their view, if it were true that speakers utilise free pragmatic processes 
in order to track what is said by putting sentences to use across diverse contexts, it 
would be impossible to account for the systematic manner in which speakers are able to 
learn and use natural languages. Without any constraints (or, more to the point, without 
any constraints that issue from the linguistic meanings of expressions) on the kinds of 
contextual factors speakers might deem relevant when it comes to interpreting each 
other’s utterances, there would be no way of systematically interpreting what 
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propositions speakers express by putting sentences to use on particular occasions. This 
makes it hard to understand how it is that speakers are able communicate with each 
other without making continual mistakes, continually misunderstanding one another’s 
utterances. C&L propose that there are two ways radical contextualists can choose to 
respond to this concern.  
The first is to argue that we do not manage to communicate as successfully as we might 
imagine. Radical contextualists could simply ‘bite the bullet’ and abandon the notion 
that understanding one another involves grasping the same propositions expressed by 
utterances. For C&L this amounts to the suggestion there is no way to ‘secure successful 
communication across contexts’ (C&L 2005, p.126). Not only is such an outcome 
unappealing, but C&L think it is inconsistent. One problem is that to agree with 
contextualists, one would have to assume that we understand all of the propositions that 
they express as premises for their position. To do this, one would have to assume that 
these propositions are stable and that their truth-values are constant across all potential 
contexts in which they might be encountered. Hence: ‘to interpret the sentences that 
express RC, you have to assume that RC is not true’ (C&L 2005, p.128). Put another 
way, C&L maintain that for the sentence ‘Radical contextualism is true’ to be a general, 
truth evaluable claim about language, its truth-conditions should be fixed across 
contexts; but why should instances of the predicate is true be any less prone to CSAs 
and incompleteness arguments than other expressions? C&L find that contextualists 
provide no adequate response to this. 
The second response is to argue that it is possible to devise a theory that specifies the 
kinds of pragmatic processes speakers utilise in order to engage in linguistic 
communication (this is the approach Recanati (2010) adopts in developing his truth-
conditional pragmatics). The problem is that even if we are able to specify what kinds of 
pragmatic processes speakers implement in order to communicate, there is still no 
systematic way of determining which of these processes (if any) speakers actually utilise 
at given occasions of utterance.
37
 So, radical contextualists who adopt this response still 
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 As Recanati (2010) himself points out, modulation is not a systematic pragmatic process… 
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fail to give a systematic account of how speakers are able to pair particular utterances 
with propositional contents. Ultimately, then, C&L conclude that contextualism 
militates against the prospects of developing constructive accounts of the ways in which 
speakers are able to understand utterances of sentences across diverse contexts of 
utterance. 
The outcome of all this is that if radical contextualism were correct, ‘it would be 
miraculous if people ever succeeded in communicating across diverse context of 
utterance’ (C&L 2005, p. 123). But, as a matter of fact, people do succeed in 
communicating across contexts. So, rather than accepting the force of CSAs, and 
endorsing radical contextualism as a consequence, we must reject the mistaken 
assumption (C&L 2005, p.53), common to all forms of contextualism, that intuitions 
about speech act content, e.g. those elicited by CSAs, are always relevant for 
establishing what constitutes semantic content. Indeed, minimalists argue that separating 
semantic content from speech act content ‘is necessary both in order to do semantics 
properly and in order to do speech act theory properly (C&L 2005, pp.153-154). As 
Borg argues: 
…there are good reasons to think that it is simply a mistake to require a semantic 
theory to be answerable to intuitions about speech act content, for semantic 
content is one kind of thing (a repeatable, codifiable, rule-governed kind of 
thing) while speech act content is another kind of thing altogether (a potentially 
unrepeatable, nebulous, context-governed kind of thing). (Borg 2012 p.15) 
According to semantic minimalists, then, the only way to go about the task of 
constructing systematic semantic theories for natural languages is to cleave to the view 
that the semantic content of any well-formed declarative sentence S is a stable, context-
invariant content expressed by all utterances of S. This is referred to as the minimal 
semantic content semantically expressed by S, and it is argued that it is our ability to 
grasp the minimal semantic contents that utterances of sentences express that underpins 
our ability to engage in linguistic communication across contexts.  
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3. Summary 
The phenomenon of pervasive context sensitivity raises a considerable challenge for the 
claim that the formal, lexico-syntactic properties of sentences encode enough 
information to assign complete sets of truth-conditions relative to contexts of utterance. 
The phenomenon of semantic incompleteness throws into question the idea that 
semantic theories can specify complete sets of truth-conditions for sentences purely on 
the basis of their formal features. The phenomenon of semantic expansion leads us to 
question whether the specifications of truth-conditions a truth-conditional semantic 
theory yields puts us in the position of accurately interpreting the sentences speakers use 
at particular contexts of utterance.  
We have seen that there are three different responses we might adopt in light of the 
evidence for pervasive context sensitivity that emerges from context shifting arguments. 
The difference between these responses turns on the question of how we should respond 
to arguments aimed at adducing evidence for context sensitivity. We have seen that of 
the three responses considered, only two retain any hope of developing a truth-
conditional semantic theory; viz. the moderate and the minimalist response.  
Consequently, given that our aim here is to assess the claim that information derived 
from the purely formal features of sentences put us in a position to determine the truth-
conditions of those sentences relative to contexts of utterance, we need to find out 
whether either of these responses actually succeed in defending a standard truth-
conditional approach to semantics. Accordingly, the next three chapter will be devoted 
to performing a careful examination of those responses to the phenomenon of pervasive 
context sensitivity.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SEMANTIC MINIMALISM 
We have seen that evidence adduced from context shifting arguments presents a very 
real problem for truth-conditional semantic theories. That said, we also saw that there 
have been a number of responses to this challenge. The purpose of this chapter is to 
elaborate on one such response; viz. that provided by semantic minimalism. The chapter 
will begin by giving an overview of semantic minimalism, drawing out the core claims 
endorsed by minimalists. I then go on to examine the specific, and somewhat distinct, 
arguments raised in defence the approach by looking at the two versions of semantic 
minimalism that have arisen to date. I will then finish by raising a number of objections 
against semantic minimalism, addressing each version of the approach in turn before 
summarising the strengths and weaknesses of the position. 
1. The motivation for minimalism 
Two versions of semantic minimalism have been elaborated to date: by Cappelen and 
Lepore (C&L) (2005) and Borg (2004, 2012). Although these versions of the approach 
differ in important respects, the chief motivation in both cases is to defend a standard 
conception of truth-conditional semantics in light of the claim that contextual factors 
make a more pervasive contribution to the determination of content than that of fixing 
values for standard indexicals.  
Semantic minimalists maintain that the arguments in favour of this claim are predicated 
on the assumption that in order to give adequate explanations as to what constitutes the 
truth-conditional semantic content of a sentence S, a semantic theory must fully account 
for the various intuitions speakers have about what constitutes the speech act content 
expressed by S at particular contexts of utterance; i.e. intuitions about what is said, 
claimed, asserted, etc., by utterances of S. It follows that if speakers can be shown to 
have intuitions to the effect that the speech act content expressed by an utterance is in 
part contextually determined, then this must be accounted for when specifying what 
constitutes the semantic content of the sentence uttered.  
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According to semantic minimalists, however, the assumption upon which contextualist 
arguments rely is mistaken (C&L 2004, pp.53-57; Borg 2012, p.103). On their view, the 
very idea that a proper conception of semantic content must be fully answerable to the 
various intuitions speakers have about what constitutes the speech act content of their 
utterances militates against the prospects of developing systematic semantic theories. 
Indeed, they claim that any approach aimed at accommodating such intuitions would 
ultimately have to acknowledge such a pervasive degree of context sensitivity in natural 
language that it would be impossible to explain how speakers are able to routinely 
interpret sentences across diverse contexts of utterance.  
Minimalists thus argue that in order to construct semantic theories capable of explaining 
certain basic facts about linguistic understanding, i.e. its systematicity and productivity, 
it is necessary to adopt a minimal conception of semantic content that abstracts away 
from many intuitions about speech act content. In effect, their position is that any 
informative semantic theory must be careful to distinguish semantic content proper – i.e. 
minimal semantic content – from speech act content (Borg 2007, p.351).  
1.1. The core claims of semantic minimalism 
Semantic minimalism can be understood in part as an attack on contextualism: on 
moderate contextualism because once we fully acknowledge the force of the arguments 
used to motivate the approach, we will ultimately be led to endorse some form of radical 
contextualism; and on radical contextualism because ‘it fails to account for how we 
communicate across contexts’ (C&L 2005, p.x). Having shown why minimalists adopt 
this outlook, let us now take an in-depth look at the core claims of semantic minimalism, 
endorsed by all advocates of the approach.  
First, as has already been mentioned, semantic minimalists hold that semantic content is 
not speech act content. The semantic content of a sentence S is the minimal semantic 
content expressed by all utterances of S, rather than any of the diverse, pragmatically 
enriched contents speakers intuitively associate with particular uses of S. This conflicts 
with the standard assumption, originating in the work of Grice, that the propositions 
expressed by utterances of sentences can be specified in terms of what is said, claimed, 
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or asserted by such utterances. Minimalists argue that what a speaker intuitively says by 
uttering a sentence often goes beyond the minimal semantic content expressed by that 
utterance. So, whilst speakers are no doubt usually interested in figuring out what a 
speaker says by uttering a sentence, just as they are interested in figuring out the 
implicatures of such utterances, their ability to do both of these things involves the 
implementation of extra-linguistic pragmatic processes which are not part of their 
semantic competence per se, and so are beyond the remit of semantic inquiry (Borg 
2004, p.128; C&L 2005, p. 204).  
Second, the minimal semantic content of a sentence is its compositionally determined 
content; i.e. it is the content determined by the context-independent meanings of the 
constituent expressions of the sentence and the context-independent compositional rules 
that specify the semantic effects of combining those expressions as per the sentence’s 
syntactic arrangement. As Borg puts it, semantic minimalism is committed to the claim 
that there is an ‘exclusively lexico-syntactic route to semantic content’ (Borg 2012, 
p.83). Of course, we saw that moderate contextualists also endorse this claim (though in 
somewhat different ways). The difference between moderate contextualism and 
semantic minimalism, however, has to do with the kinds of lexico-syntactic features 
advocates of the approaches attribute to sentences. For reasons discussed, minimalists 
are distrustful of the idea that we can, say, attribute ‘hidden’ lexico-syntactic structure to 
sentences so as to accommodate intuitions elicited by CSAs. Consequently, minimalists 
argue that in order to determine the semantic contents of sentences we need only assign 
values to their surface-level constituents, and apply compositional rules in accordance 
with their surface structure. That is, minimalists tend to argue that in order to determine 
the minimal semantic contents of sentences we need only take into considerations those 
lexico-syntactic features of sentences that are apparent at their surface form.  
Third, following from the previous claim, semantic minimalists take the range of 
genuine contextual effects on semantic content to be severely limited. Indeed, one of the 
main aims of C&L’s semantic minimalism is to present arguments to the effect that all 
genuine instances of context sensitivity are triggered by occurrences of standard 
indexicals whose meanings can be specified in terms of non-constant functions from a 
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limited number of objective contextual parameters to contents. Whilst Borg does not 
think that defending this claim is the primary aim of semantic minimalism, she does take 
it to be a consequence of the approach: ‘context can only come to affect semantic 
content when it is called for by something in the lexico-syntactic form of the sentence 
and the kinds of lexico-syntactic elements which call for contextual input are themselves 
limited’ (Borg 2012, p.5). Importantly, on both versions of minimalism, it is argued that 
in order to resist the implausible consequences of contextualism, one must hold that the 
only kind of semantically relevant context sensitivity is standard indexicality.  
Fourth, modulo sentences that contain standard indexicals, the minimal semantic content 
expressed by utterances of a sentence S is a complete proposition, and is thus 
characterised as the the minimal proposition semantically expressed by all utterances of 
S. This is perhaps the central claim of semantic minimalism. The claim is controversial, 
since as we saw in the previous section, there are various sentences that contain no 
standard indexicals, but which appear not to express anything truth-evaluable until 
features of the contexts in which they are used have been taken into consideration. 
Minimalists insist, however, that contextual information plays no role in determining the 
semantic content expressed by utterances of such sentences. So, for example, the 
sentence ‘Bill is ready’ semantically expresses the same minimal proposition across all 
occasions of use.  
Having laid out the motivation for, and the core claims behind, semantic minimalism, I 
now want to look at the arguments minimalists present for defending them. My aim is to 
focus on how each version of minimalism defends the view that sentences express 
minimal propositions that are often not the propositions we intuitively associate with 
utterances of sentences, that our ability to grasp the minimal propositions 
1.2. C&L’s semantic minimalism 
C&L, qua advocates of semantic minimalism, endorse the claim that speech act content 
is not semantic content. In adopting this stance, however, they do not intend to deny that 
there are interesting, often informative connections between intuitions about speech act 
content and semantic content (C&L 2005, p.57). Rather, they claim that the point is that 
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one has to be very careful when it comes to identifying which intuitions about speech 
act content are semantically relevant. On C&L’s view, the problem with contextualist 
approaches is that, by focusing exclusively on intuitions elicited by CSAs, advocates of 
such approaches fail to take into account a wide range of further intuitions that are of 
considerable relevance to semantic inquiry (C&L 2005, p.151). This leads contextualists 
to misconstrue the relationship between speech act content and semantic content, and so 
endorse ‘empirically inadequate’ accounts of how speakers actually go about 
determining the propositions expressed by sentences across different contexts of 
utterance (C&L 2005, p.87).  
A crucial fact about language use that contextualists apparently consistently fail to 
account for is that speakers can produce accurate disquotational indirect reports of one 
another’s utterances across diverse contexts of utterance. To clarify, what a speaker A 
said by uttering a sentence S at a context c can often (though significantly, not always) 
be accurately and literally reported by a speaker B at a context c* by using a sentence of 
the form ‘A said that S’. This can occur even when the target-context, c, and the report-
context, c*, are radically different, and even when speaker B is unfamiliar with many of 
many details peculiar to c.  
It would seem, then, that we can give purely disquotational specifications of the 
propositions expressed by utterances of sentences across diverse contexts. What is 
interesting about this aspect of linguistic communication is that speakers not only seem 
to have clear intuitions to the effect that indirect reports can succeed as a means of 
conveying what other speakers expressed by uttering sentences at other occasions of 
use, but they also have clear intuitions that the range of expression types whose 
occurrences in sentences block the possibility of producing such reports for utterances of 
those sentences is severely limited. Given this, C&L argue that speakers’ intuitions 
about indirect reportage are highly relevant when it comes to identifying what effects 
context has on content.  
To draw out the pertinent intuitions, C&L devise three distinct disquotational tests. The 
tests not only demarcate what C&L refer to as the basic set of genuinely context 
sensitive expressions, but they also serve the critical end of establishing that any 
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sentence that does not partly comprise context sensitive expressions expresses a minimal 
semantic content that is invariant over contexts of utterance. Let us look at each test in 
turn.  
First, the inter-contextual disquotational indirect report (IDIR) test is aimed at showing 
that ‘an expression is context sensitive only if it typically blocks inter-contextual 
disquotational indirect reports’ (C&L 2005, p.88). To illustrate, take Mary to have 
uttered both (1) and (2) at c: 
(1) Bill is ready 
(2) I am ready 
Since these sentences were uttered by Mary at c, someone at another context c* might 
report on her having done so. Let these reports take the following form: 
IDIR(1) Mary said Bill is ready 
IDIR(2) Mary said I am ready 
IDIR(1) is intuitively true for any target-context/report-context pair one might choose. 
That is, for any c and any c*, an utterance of IDIR(1) at c* will always be an accurate, 
literal report what Mary said by uttering (1) at c. This indicates that there is a context-
invariant content expressed by all utterances of (1) that can be specified 
disquotationally: every utterance of ‘Bill is ready’ expresses the minimal proposition 
that Bill is ready. This belies the contextualist claim that certain features peculiar to 
particular contexts of utterance play a constitutive role in determining the propositions 
expressed by utterances of (1).  
As for IDIR(2), however, the occurrence of the standard indexical ‘I’ brings it about that 
such a report might be false for some choice of c and c*, as we cannot be sure that the 
expression will pick out the same individual at both contexts of utterance. This goes to 
show that sentences that do not express the same minimal proposition across all contexts 
are those that contain standard indexicals (C&L 2005, p.143). 
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The collective description (CD) test shows that ‘context sensitive expressions block 
collective descriptions’ (C&L 2005, p.99). To explain, imagine that (2) and (4) are 
uttered at two distinct contexts: 
(3) Herman is here  
(4) Ernie is here   
One cannot infer from the truth of these utterances that an utterance of the following 
collective description will also be true: 
CD(3&4) Herman and Ernie are here  
The expression ‘here’ is thus identified as context sensitive. Note, however, that if the 
context sensitive predicate were to be replaced by a context insensitive predicate, e.g. ‘is 
male’, one could then validly infer that Herman and Ernie are male.  
Finally, the inter-contextual disquotational (ID) test shows that an utterance S is 
genuinely context sensitive only if there ‘are (or can be) false utterances of ‘S’ even 
though S’ (C&L 2005, p.105). So: 
(5) These are fancy  
(6) Cats chase rats 
If we submit (5) to the ICD test, we get the (potentially) true sentence: 
ICD(5) ‘These are fancy’ is false even though these are fancy 
It is thereby shown that ‘these’ is a context sensitive expression, as it need not pick out 
same set of individuals at each context. If, alternatively, we submit (6) to the test, we 
intuitively end up with a contradiction: 
 ICD(6) ‘Cats chase rats’ is false even though cats chase rats 
So, neither ‘cats’, ‘chase’, nor ‘rats’ belong to the basic set, and (6) expresses the same 
minimal proposition at all contexts of utterance. 
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As we can see, then, C&L’s tests do indeed serve to demarcate a basic set of context 
sensitive expressions, which turns out to be the same set of expressions specified in 
Kaplan’s list of standard indexicals (Kaplan, 1989); but whereas Kaplan never gave any 
definite arguments for why the phenomenon of context sensitivity should be thought to 
be limited to this select set of expressions, C&L deem the tests to enforce a robust limit 
on the extent to which context sensitivity needs to be accounted for in semantics. In fact, 
C&L regard the tests to be so in line with our intuitive grasp of context sensitivity that 
‘[n]o semantic theory should classify as context sensitive any expression that does not 
pass these tests’ (C&L 2005, p.151).  
Most importantly, the tests show that sentences that do not partly comprise standard 
indexicals express the same invariant content over all contexts of utterance. The 
semantic content of any such sentence is a minimal proposition, which is the ‘content 
that can be grasped and reported by someone who is ignorant about the relevant 
characteristics of the context in which an utterance of S took place’ (C&L 2005, p.143). 
Hence, given that minimal propositions can be specified purely by means of 
disquotation, a Tarski-style truth theory, which issues in disquotational specifications of 
truth-conditions for sentences that do not contain standard indexicals, will, as Davidson 
proposed, serve as a theory of meaning.  
Now, of course, minimal propositions are not the only propositions, or even the most 
interesting or relevant propositions, such sentences are used to express. So, C&L argue 
that we should be pluralists about speech act content, and acknowledge that there are a 
number of propositions we can succeed in communicating with our utterances, many of 
which can only be determined by exploiting our knowledge of the contexts at which 
such utterances take place. Of all the propositions that might be communicated by an 
utterance, though, the minimal proposition is that unique proposition that is 
compositionally determined by the meanings of a sentence’s constituent expressions and 
their syntactic arrangement. On C&L’s view, that there is such a proposition 
semantically expressed, which is (almost) completely immune to the various effects 
context can have on the propositions utterances intuitively express, must be presupposed 
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in order to explain how speakers are able to communicate successfully across diverse 
contexts: 
The proposition semantically expressed is that content the speaker can expect the 
audience to grasp (and expect the audience to expect the speaker to expect them to 
grasp) even if they have mistaken or incomplete communication-relevant 
information….the proposition semantically expressed is our minimal defense [sic.] 
against confusion, misunderstanding, mistakes and it is that which guarantees 
communication across contexts of utterance. (C&L 205, p.184-185) 
Ultimately, then, C&L take semantic minimalism paired with a theory of speech act 
pluralism not only to provide good, intuitive evidence for the claim that sentences 
express minimal propositions, but also to provide a plausible explanation of the 
cognitive role of such propositions; i.e. minimal propositions play the role of a kind of 
‘shared fallback content’ (C&L 2005, p.185) that is the content we can reliably grasp 
exclusively on the basis of our semantic competence. 
1.3.  Borg’s semantic minimalism 
Borg (2004, 2012) provides a thorough defence of the semantic minimalist claim that 
‘there is a level of propositional or truth-evaluable content, namely sentence meaning, 
which can be delivered through interpretation of the formal features of the expressions 
in play’ (Borg 2004, p.74). In adopting this view, Borg rejects contextualist claims that 
utterance interpretation involves taking into account various pieces of information about 
contexts of utterance (i.e. information about, say, speakers’ intentions) that are not 
encoded in the lexico-syntactic features of linguistic expressions.  
An important motivation for Borg’s defence of semantic minimalism is the idea that 
there are good reasons for thinking that our semantic competence, i.e. the competence 
that underpins our ability to interpret the semantic contents of utterances, is modular (in 
the sense of Fodor (1983)). That is, the kinds of processes involved in recovering the 
semantic contents expressed by linguistic utterances exhibit all the hallmarks of modular 
processes; e.g. they are fast, unconscious, automatic process that are informationally 
encapsulated in that they operate over a highly select set of domain specific inputs (for 
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an extensive defence of this, see Borg 2007, pp.86-106). Borg emphasises that if we 
accept the claim that semantic competence is modular, we must thereby accept that the 
recovery of semantic content proceeds via the implementation of a range of purely 
deductive, computational operations over the formal, lexico-syntactic features of 
sentences. A semantic theory aimed at giving an adequate account of semantic 
competence will thus take the form of something like a Tarski-style truth theory that 
specifies the semantic contents of sentences exclusively in terms of their lexico-
syntactic features. 
Importantly, however, what we cannot expect from any such theory is that it pair 
sentences with the contents speakers intuitively take them to express at particular 
occasions of use, since figuring out the intuitive speech act contents of utterances 
typically involves implementing rich abductive, extra-linguistic processes (yielding 
inferences from various kinds of contextual information, such as speakers intentions, to 
what is said) (Borg 2012, p.12). So, assuming ‘a Fodorian, modular story about our 
semantic competence’, we should endorse the minimalist claim that our linguistic 
understanding can be accounted for ‘in terms of discrete, deductive, syntax driven 
reasoning processes, rather  than via the murky world of content-driven inference to the 
best explanation’ (Borg 2012, p.13). 
According to Borg, then, the processes involved in determining semantic content cannot 
‘look beyond’ the formal features of sentences, as this would conflict with the claim that 
such processes are modular, and so informationally encapsulated.  
Borg further argues that we can maintain this view even when it comes to explaining 
how speakers determine the semantic contents of sentences containing standard 
indexical and demonstrative expressions, despite the fact that identifying the referents of 
such expressions often appears to involve taking into account extra-linguistic perceptual 
information, information about speakers’ intentions, and so on. To show how, Borg 
begins with an appeal to Higginbotham’s (1994) idea that we can specify the truth-
conditions of sentences in which, say, demonstratives occur by using conditionalized T-
sentences of the following form: 
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If the speaker of ‘this is red’ refers with the utterance of ‘this’ therein to x and to 
nothing else, then that utterance is true iff x is red. (Higginbotham 1994, p.93) 
As we have seen, the antecedent of such conditionals specifies a condition for 
identifying the referent of the demonstrative expression in terms of its character, 
whereas the consequent specifies the truth-conditions of the sentence for a referent thus 
identified at some context. The information pertaining to the character of the 
demonstrative forms part of our knowledge of the lexical entry for ‘that’, placing 
constraints on how we identify its referent, but it makes no appearance in the truth-
conditions of the utterance, which are specified in the standard way.  
Developing this, Borg proposes that when one encounters an utterance of, say, ‘That is 
mine’, a formal representation of the semantic content of the sentence uttered is 
generated purely on the basis of the lexico-syntactic properties of the sentence. The 
representation is of the form α is β’s, where α and β are syntactically generated singular 
concepts that are created for the expressions ‘that’ and ‘mine’ respectively, and whose 
semantic contents are the objects to which they refer. At this point, someone who knows 
the language knows what conditions would have to obtain for the utterance to be true, 
and it follows that an utterance of ‘That is mine’ is thus true iff the object referred to by 
the singular concept α created for ‘that’ belongs to the object referred to by the singular 
concept β created for ‘mine’.  
That said, one still has to identify the objects to which α and β refer in order to 
determine whether the sentence is true. Doing this involves utilising one’s antecedent 
knowledge of the characters of the relevant expressions, so as to fix what types of 
objects to which the singular concepts α and β refer, as well as, e.g., one’s perceptual 
knowledge of the surroundings at which the utterance takes place. Again, the conditions 
for identifying the referents of α and β are not specified as part of the sentence’s truth-
conditions:  
If t is a token of ‘that is mine’ uttered by β, and the token of ‘that’ therein refers 
to α then t is true iff α is β’s. (Borg 2004, p.206) 
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On Borg’s view, then, we can specify the truth-conditions sentences containing standard 
indexicals and demonstratives exclusively in terms of their lexico-syntactic features 
despite the fact that identifying the referents of such expressions involves implementing 
process that are strictly speaking extra-semantic. She goes on to emphasise the 
following: 
The important point here is that there is a difference between grasping the truth 
condition for an utterance and being able to verify whether or not that condition 
is met. In the case of novel uses of demonstratives and indexicals, given 
linguistic information alone, an agent is capable of grasping the truth conditions 
of utterances containing the terms, though she is not yet in a position to see that 
they are satisfied (she knows what it would be for the utterance to be true but she 
doesn’t yet know that it is true). Now it seems to me that this should be sufficient 
for counting as grasping the literal meaning of the sentence produced (that is, as 
grasping genuinely semantic content), so I reject the idea that our minimal 
semantics for demonstratives and indexicals is too minimal to count as truly 
semantic. (Borg 2004, p.165) 
Another interesting aspect of Borg’s approach that will be relevant in what follows is 
that she deviates from C&L’s view that minimal propositions can always be specified 
purely disquotationally. For Borg, maintaining a modular, hence minimalist, conception 
of semantic content does not necessarily involve ruling out speakers’ intuitions about 
incompleteness. So, to return to our earlier example, semantic minimalism can 
accommodate speakers’ intuitions to the effect that in order for utterances of the 
sentence ‘John is ready’ to be true, it must be the case that John is ready for something.38 
The important point is that this claim does not depend on intuitions about ‘one-off’ 
effects particular contexts have on the content expressed by utterances of the sentence, 
but ‘type-level’ intuitions about the context-independent meaning of ‘ready’.  
                                                 
38
 This conflicts with C&L’s view that  utterances of ‘John is ready’ do not express the 
proposition that John is ready for something or other, but rather that they all express the 
proposition that John is ready…’ (C&L 2005, p.97). 
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Borg (2012, pp.100-102) argues that we can accept that there is something about the 
semantics of ‘ready’ that gives rise to the intuition that all utterances of ‘Bill is ready’ 
express the minimal proposition that Bill is ready for something. This does not belie the 
modular approach as it involves an appeal to lexically encoded information that forms 
part of our semantic competence. So, whilst our semantic competence alone does not 
enable us to determine the speech act content we associate with utterances of the 
pertinent sentence, e.g. that Bill is ready for an evening out, it does enable us to 
determine what Borg (2004) refers to as the liberal truth-conditions of the sentence, 
which are somewhat richer than its purely disquotational truth-conditions. Borg goes on 
to present an analysis of why it is that certain expressions bring about incompleteness 
effects, but I shall reserve further discussion of her views on that matter for the moment. 
For now, I take it enough has been said to show why Borg thinks we should defend 
semantic minimalism, why semantic minimalism takes itself to succeed in defending the 
prospects of developing truth-conditional semantic theories, and what kinds of factors 
enter into the determination of minimal propositions.  
2. Objections to semantic minimalism 
Before looking in detail at the potential problems facing the two individual accounts of 
semantic minimalism analysed above, some observations on the overall argument form 
and strategy deployed by the semantic minimalists generally are in order.  
First, the semantic minimalists polarise the situation in the following way. They readily 
acknowledge the potentially serious destabilising consequences of context, and regard 
the attempts of the mild contextualists to minimise its effect as a vain attempt to halt the 
inevitable. They also claim that such radical disruption, were it to apply to semantic 
content, would necessarily lead to the loss of the systematicity that they consider 
essential in preventing our success in communication from being simply mysterious. 
These factors licence, in their view, the separation of speech act content from semantic 
content, in the way that we have seen. 
The argument thus appears to hinge on the idea that the effects radical contextualism 
inevitably lead to a lack of systematicity, whereas an equally valid interpretation of their 
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words is that what is at stake is, in fact, the issue of tractability. That is, it may be the 
case that the method speakers use to interpret sentences relative to contexts of utterance 
is systematic even though it operates on information pertaining to the formal features of 
sentences and information pertaining to the contexts in which those sentences are used. 
Assuming that this, admittedly speculative, proposal is at least plausible, it follows that 
that what minimalist arguments actually show is that a method of interpretation that 
operates with contextual information will not be tractable from the perspective of a 
standard truth-conditional semantic theory. 
Put somewhat differently, if the problem minimalists raise ultimately comes down to a 
problem of tractability, it leaves open the thought that, although radical, contextual 
effects might nevertheless be systematic, either in terms of the operation of the wider 
cognitive processes or, to some degree at least, those within the language faculty (the 
latter approach is discussed in the next chapter). To be sure, such systematicity may be 
extremely complicated (although see shortly) and, perhaps, currently intractable to 
human enquiry, but its very possibility undermines the minimalists’ warrant for the 
necessity of the radical reduction in the scope of semantic content that they propose 
unless the theoretical objects of linguistic analysis are to be determined by what is 
convenient to theorists. Of course, tractability difficulties might argue for a restricted 
focus on methodological grounds, but not in and of themselves for the positing of 
radically different notions of content. 
Second, and following from the above, as part of the way in which they set up the 
argument, the semantic minimalists seem to offer an exhaustive disjunction in 
describing the phenomenon of communication: it is either ideal, systematic, and 
explicable, or it is ideal, unsystematic and mysterious, and we are invited, as we have 
seen somewhat rhetorically, to choose the former, there being no other options. 
However, it is entirely plausible that communication might just be ‘good enough’, rather 
than ideal. Although the process appears very impressive in operation, and the 
exhibition of such proficiency invites us to infer some kind of idealised underlying 
mechanism (this is a familiar notion in prominent evolutionary psychology arguments 
(e.g. Cosmides and Tooby 1995), the actual system that delivers the function may be 
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relatively simple and so well adapted to the environment in which it is deployed that its 
success rate is extremely high. For instance, the mechanism subserving communication 
might, in part at least, be driven by heuristics in the way that Giggerenzer (2000) and 
others propose for other key components of our cognitive repertoire. Adopting such an 
approach would offer the potentially interesting consequence of denying that 
communication needs to be as precise as we might presume, and might also gesture at an 
account of how we seem initially to quickly assume particular contexts, and therefore 
interpretations, and are then occasionally proved wrong. I will further contrast the 
properties of such systems with Fodor’s (and Borg’s) characterisation of abductive 
inference in analysing problems with Borg’s specific account shortly.  
However, for present purposes, the key consequence of this possibility is to weaken the 
pressure on us to accept the element of the disjunction that the minimalists wish us to 
choose, the above offering the further option (with some evolutionary precedent and 
cognitive plausibility) that communication may be tractable to enquiry without our 
having to make the move the minimalists urge. Thus, whilst the minimalists’ argument 
is strictly an empirical and rhetorical one (we are invited to choose one element of the 
disjunction because the other is painted as preposterous), their strategy of neglecting 
other plausible alternatives gives the impression that their argumentation has greater 
modal force than it actually warrants. Seeing the ‘first move in the conjuring trick’ as 
questionable is key because, as they set it up, once one has chosen the minimalists’ 
‘systematic and explicable’ branch, some brand of minimalism seems to follow almost 
deductively. However, recognising that there are, in fact, a number of other alternatives 
available radically reduces the force of this core argument, and again raises questions 
regarding the support for their radical postulations regarding semantic content. 
I will return to generic objections to the minimalist position at the end of the chapter, but 
in the next two subsections I will examine the key arguments of their two main 
proponents, C&L, and Borg. 
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2.1.  Objections to C&L 
I shall raise two main objections that apply specifically to C&L’s version of semantic 
minimalism. First, I shall raise some problems for their claim that disquotational tests 
serve to delimit the set of context sensitive expressions and to identify minimal semantic 
content. Second, I look in more detail at some issues pertaining to the claim that the 
appeal to disquotational reportage provides good evidence for the claim that sentences 
express minimal propositions. 
Do C&L’s disquotational tests show that contextualists have made an empirical error 
about the extent to which natural languages are context sensitive? I think there are good 
reasons for arguing that, in and of themselves, they do not. One initial problem for the 
idea that disquotational tests serve adequately to delimit the range of context sensitive 
expressions is that numerous expressions ranging beyond C&L’s basic set actually pass 
the tests that C&L say they fail. For example, to use an argument from Szabó (2006, 
pp.35-6), imagine that Mary utters (7) in the context of a discussion about Sesame Street 
characters: 
(7) Ernie lives on Sesame Street 
Let us then imagine that the following IDIR is produced for (7) in the context of a 
discussion about the philosopher, Ernie Lepore: 
 IDIR(7) Mary said Ernie lives on Sesame Street 
This report of what Mary said is obviously false, so the proper name ‘Ernie’ passes the 
test for context sensitive expressions, as well as the other tests C&L set forth. 
Similar observations have been raised for predicates such as ‘ready’ (Recanati 2006), 
‘weighs 80kg’ (Bezuidenhout, 2006), ‘grunts’ (Travis, 2006), and so on. To take just the 
first of these examples, one may well argue that an IDIR of the form ‘Mary said that Bill 
is ready’ can be false, as it might fail to report what Mary said when she uttered the 
relevant sentence in the relevant target context. In other words, although Mary might 
have uttered the original sentence in the context of a discussion about whether Bill is 
ready to be promoted, the report might be made in the context of a discussion about 
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whether it is time for Bill to retire, and so this would then be considered a false report of 
what Mary actually said. 
The above points seem to show that disquotational tests, in and of themselves, do not 
effectively resolve the kinds of issues raised by CSAs, and a committed contextualist 
will argue that CSAs can be employed in such a way as to influence speakers’ intuitive 
judgments about what it is such tests actually show.  
As a result, if one is committed to the view that determining the truth-conditional 
content of an utterance of ‘Bill is ready’ will involve taking into account what Bill 
activity Bill is ready to perform or engage in at a given context, then this will influence 
one’s judgments about whether a disquotational report of an utterance of the sentence is 
a true report of what a given speaker said by performing such an utterance. 
Consequently, disquotational tests only serve to delimit the set of context sensitive 
expressions if one is already sceptical about the import of CSAs. 
One might nevertheless argue that there is something particularly striking about the 
kinds of effects that occurrences of standard indexical expressions have on 
disquotational reportage. Indeed, it may well be that such expressions fail disquotational 
tests in a particularly transparent, obvious manner. However, this would seem merely to 
show that there is a qualitative difference between the semantic behaviour intuitively 
exhibited by standard indexicals and the semantic behaviour of other expressions. Such 
a result would be insufficient to establish the claim that standard indexicality is the only 
legitimate variety of context sensitivity, and so would not support the conclusion that the 
distinction C&L’s tests establish is the only distinction to be made between context 
sensitive and context insensitive expressions. As Recanati writes:  
I do not want to deny that there are differences between expressions in the Basic 
Set and other (alleged) context-sensitive expressions, such as ‘ready’; nor that 
some of those differences may have to do with the availability of homophonic 
reports, collective descriptions, etc. But the conclusion should not be that 
expressions like ‘ready’ are not really context sensitive. Rather, one should be 
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prepared to acknowledge differences within the class of context-sensitive 
expressions: they don’t all behave similarly. (Recanati, 2006, p.29) 
Even within the basic set, Recanati continues, there are differences between the way that 
C&L’s so-called genuinely context sensitive expressions behave. For example, ‘now’ 
(as opposed to, say, ‘here’) can refer to the same time it was originally used to refer to 
even when disquotationally reported at a later time (and so does not always block the 
IDIR test). That is: 
I can report John’s utterance of ‘Now I am hungry’ by uttering, much later, ‘He 
said that now he was hungry’. One should look at all this in much more detail 
than C&L themselves are willing to do. The more we extend the list of context-
sensitive expressions, the more we should be disposed to register, and explore, 
fine differences within the class. (ibid) 
The points raised here have serious consequences for C&L’s claim that disquotational 
tests serve to delimit the class of context sensitive expressions. What is more, in 
showing that disquotational tests in and of themselves do not provide an absolute 
distinction between the context sensitive and the context insensitive expressions of a 
language, the points made here raise questions for the view that any sentence that passes 
these tests expresses a context invariant minimal proposition. 
In response to such attacks on their tests for context sensitivity, C&L adopt the 
following line:  
[In IS] we never claim passing these tests is either necessary or sufficient for 
context sensitivity: We describe the tests as providing ‘evidence’ that sentences 
or expressions are context sensitive. (C&L, 2006, p.51) 
The first problem here is that the above statement conflicts with C&L’s earlier claims. 
Recall that C&L explicitly state that ‘[n]o semantic theory should classify as context 
sensitive any expression that does not pass these tests’ (C&L 2005, p.151). Second, even 
if we set aside this inconsistency and take C&L to be here opting for a more modest 
view of their tests’ effectiveness, there remains the problem that without a definitive 
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method for identifying context sensitivity (which also demonstrates that it is severely 
limited), they appear to have little warrant either for assuming that one can rule out the 
presence of genuinely context sensitive expressions in most sentences, or for claiming 
that most sentences thus express minimal propositions. I take it then that the objections 
raised here thus present a real problem for C&L’s brand of semantic minimalism.  
Moving on to the second point, C&L argue that the fact that we are able to produce true 
disquotational reports of utterances of sentences across diverse contexts ensures that 
such sentences semantically express a minimal proposition. That is, our ability to 
produce an accurate disquotational report of an utterance is taken to depend on our 
ability to grasp the proposition semantically expressed by that utterance. In short, 
reported content is semantic content (C&L 2005, p.152).  
Adopting this line of argument, C&L claim that even if we have no intuitive grasp of 
what would need to be the case in order for it to be true that an individual is ready – i.e. 
even if we intuitively take it that ‘ready’ does not denote a property – the fact that we 
can produce a disquotational report of a sentence such as (8) is enough to ensure that the 
sentence has a minimal semantic content: 
(8) Bill is ready 
The problem with this kind of argument, though, is that it can effectively be reproduced 
for (9): 
(9) The borogoves did gyre and gimble 
Of course, speakers of English have no intuitive grasp of the kinds of conditions that 
would have to obtain in order for it to be true that the borogoves did gyre and gimble. 
That said, though, there is nothing to stop one from producing an indirect disquotational 
report of (9); i.e. one could say, ‘Mary said the borogoves did gyre and gimble’. The 
problem is that no one would take it that, in this case, the mere fact that we can produce 
an indirect disquotational report for (9) ensures that the sentence expresses a minimal 
proposition.   
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Now, one immediate response to this objection is simply to make a distinction between 
use and mention. That is, one might argue that we do not actually use (9) when we 
report what a person who uttered that particular string of sounds said. Rather, we merely 
mention (9), and so what we actually produce when we report utterances of the sentence 
are direct rather than indirect reports of those utterances. The question, though, is why 
the same cannot be said for (8). That is, if we have no intuitive grasp of what it would be 
for an individual to be ready simpliciter, then why do we assume that the mere fact that 
we can produce a report of (8) ensures that ‘ready’ makes a determinate contribution to 
the truth-conditional content of the sentence? The only explanation seems to be that we 
are simply assuming that ‘ready’, unlike the nonsense words that make up (9), makes a 
determinate contribution to truth-conditional content. But this is precisely the issue that 
the appeal to disquotational reportage was supposed to settle.  
Ultimately, the point is that the reason we reject the claim that we can produce 
disquotational reports of utterances of (9) is that (9) does not express anything like a 
complete proposition or determinate set of truth-conditions. But then this shows that we 
simply fall back on our intuitive grasp of which sentences do and which sentences do 
not express truth-conditional content when we come to decide which sentences we can 
and which sentences we cannot produce disquotational reports for. So, it seems that the 
possibility of disquotational reportage is not, in and of itself, a good indicator of whether 
sentences express determinate sets of truth-conditions. 
2.2.  Objections to Borg 
In this section I will question Borg’s account from two perspectives. The first will focus 
on Borg’s presumption is regarding mental architecture, and build on issues raised 
earlier concerning the way in which minimalists couch the problem of the apparent 
systematicity in communication. The second will look at the possible nature of minimal 
content, making some comparisons with the narrow content of Fodor. 
In the earlier analysis of Borg’s position, we saw that two inputs were key to her 
strategy. The first was a somewhat rhetorical argument based on an exhaustive 
disjunction, which invited us to accept semantic minimalism and its attendant changes in 
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semantic content on pain of mystery. The second was the adoption of a Fodorian 
conception of the architecture of cognition, along with his idea of the way which 
abductive reasoning works, and the associated arguments that he deploys. From these 
ingredients we were intended to conclude, with Borg, that only an extremely restricted 
sense of content was plausible, given the modular nature of the language faculty and the 
constraints on its operation in virtue of its domain specificity and informational 
encapsulation.  
I discussed the problems associated with the first of these inputs at the start of this 
section, highlighting the confusion between systematicity and tractability, along with at 
least one addition to the list of options proposed by the exhaustive disjunction. These 
considerations, I argued, materially weakened Borg’s case. I now want to look in more 
detail at her architectural assumptions for cognition and the language faculty, as well as 
her reliance on Fodor’s argumentation. 
Borg’s invitation us to assume that the mechanism subserving the process of recovery of 
semantic information exhibits the hallmarks of modular systems is intended to show that 
the scope of semantic content must be restricted. There are two main reasons offered for 
presuming modularity, both of them are based on Fodor’s architecture, and both are 
somewhat consonant with the semantic minimalists’ more general picture portrayed by 
the exhaustive disjunction discussed earlier. In other words, both minimalists and Fodor 
view pragmatic, abductive processes as both mysterious and potentially unbounded, 
whereas modular processes are strictly controlled and clearly systematic.  
The attractions of the Fodorian system for Borg are therefore obvious. However, the 
presumption of a modular architecture for cognition more generally is contentious, even 
if it is more generally accepted that modularity for the language faculty is plausible. 
Many evolutionary psychologists, computational biologists and philosophers of mind 
(Pinker, Gallistel, Cosmides and Toobey, Carruthers, etc.) broadly advance a competing 
theory: namely, the idea that the mind is almost completely (or massively) massively 
modular. If this architecture were presumed rather than Fodor’s extremely restrictive 
deployment of modules, the argument from modularity to semantic minimalism would 
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not go through – evidence of modularity would not restrict the possible domain of 
operation for semantic recovery to a single module (the language faculty). 
In fact, Borg does consider the case for massive modularity (2004, pp. 78-80), but 
rejects it, yet again following Fodor’s line of argumentation, or almost, concluding that 
massive modularity cannot cope with global and abductive processes. It is interesting, 
however, that Fodor considers the case of massive modularity specifically because he 
entertains the idea that it might actually offer a solution to the inherent and well-known 
problem associated with thought more generally and global abductive reasoning in 
particularly: namely, the frame problem. He considers how heuristics, as modular 
processes, might work, but concludes against their deployment on the grounds that he 
cannot see how the appropriate heuristic could be selected without some sort of 
homuncular supervisor. He dubs his a priori argument to this end ‘the input problem’.  
The problem for Borg is that this argument bears all the weight in Fodor’s (2000) 
exposition, and it is easily defeated. Consideration of the ‘production’ architectures, for 
example, reveals a possible way in which selection could be achieved bottom-up rather 
than top-down, and, this being, importantly, an a priori argument, the mere possibility is 
sufficient to undermine Fodor’s (and therefore Borg’s) position. 
A further criticism levelled at Fodor in this context is that he somewhat idealises the 
capability of human abductive reasoning in practical circumstances. Pinker (2005, p.10) 
points out that when Fodor talks about human abduction, he spends most of his time 
discussing examples from the history of science. He, Fodor, alludes, for example, to the 
arguments of Quine and Duhem concerning entire systems of belief, as if such examples 
were representative of the everyday abductive processes human beings are actually 
involved in. Once the disparity between scientific reasoning on the one hand, and 
everyday reasoning on the other, is recognised, the very way in which he has framed the 
abduction problem is called into question. As a result, the credentials of the alternative, 
highly restricted processes for accomplishing such evidence, such as “fast and frugal” 
heuristics (Giggerenzer et al. 1999, p.20) appear more plausible.  
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These specific findings concerning Fodor’s (and Borg’s) conceptions of human 
reasoning processes, and their associated architecture, serve further to undermine the 
reasons posited by Borg for the proposed radical change in semantic content. It turns out 
that pragmatic processes may well indeed be systematic, albeit heuristic, exhibiting the 
very advantages (fast, automatic, systematic) that Borg presumed based on her adoption 
of Fodor’s theories of cognitive architecture were exclusive to the language faculty. 
Whilst this may not be fatal to her cause, given the strength of her reliance on this 
cognitive picture it surely represents a severe weakening of her stance. 
I now examine the nature of minimal content postulated by Borg in an attempt to 
articulate what such content might consist in, and whether its postulation is consistent 
with an explicitly externalist semantics. The locus of this analysis is Borg’s claim 
examined earlier that there is something about the semantics of ‘ready’ that gives rise to 
the intuition that all utterances of ‘Bill is ready’ express the minimal proposition that 
Bill is ready for something. This is a weaker claim than C&L, but nevertheless I think 
there are criticisms that can be levelled against it.  
The principal concern is that the content involved is vacuous. If this charge were upheld, 
it would deprive minimal content of any participation in externalist semantic 
determination. The chief problem is that the property of ‘being ready for something’ 
seems to be one that all objects always possess. Dogs, for instance, are always ready to 
be one of, and perhaps all of, the following: walked, put to bed, cooled or heated, fed, 
destroyed in a nuclear blast, eaten by an indiscriminate wild animal etc. Even atoms are 
constantly ready to be bound, observed and split. If we therefore say that ‘Bill is ready’, 
and in doing so express the proposition that Bill is ready for something, we appear to 
have said something that is always true in some sense. We also appear to have said 
something that does not distinguish Bill’s state from that of any other object. Clearly, 
the application of a particular context would create conditions under which the 
proposition could be false, and Bill’s state could be distinguished from that of other 
objects, but merely knowing that Bill is ready for something does neither, and this 
would seem to be fatal for the employment of minimal content in truth conditional 
semantics. 
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The above would seem to argue that pragmatics, or at least some process of wider 
cognition, is necessary for the determination of content. Given our earlier discussion of 
the possible nature of wider cognitive processes (contra Fodor and Borg), this need not 
give cause for concern, unless one happens to be a semantic minimalist. Nevertheless, it 
does also open up the possibility that what the analysis of Borg’s position exposes is that 
the conceptual system outside the language faculty may possess resources that are finer 
grained than that of the lexicon. In other words, whilst it is presumed that ‘readiness’ as 
a lexical item is taken to have a mirroring counterpart in the conceptual system, this 
might well be false. Instead, the individuation of the conceptual system may be far more 
fine-grained, thereby distinguishing, for instance, between cases where the subject is 
psychologically ready to initiate an action, and those where he or she (or it) is simply in 
an appropriate physical state to enable the actions of others. This is clearly speculation, 
but such a system would enable a more fine-grained, unsystematic, distinction between 
cases of readiness and demonstrate how the building blocks of an externalist theory of 
content might be formed. Such a possibility would, of course, be of no comfort to Borg. 
One last comment is perhaps in order on the notion of minimalist content, and this 
reintroduces Fodor’s theories. Given Borg’s reliance on Fodor in other areas, it is 
striking how close his account of narrow content is to hers of minimal content. I do not 
intend to contribute a ‘blow-by-blow’ comparison, and Fodor is talking about mental 
states where is Borg is talking about sentences, but it is illustrative of the similarities 
between the two positions that for Fodor, narrow content represents ‘a notion of same 
mental state that generalises over the environments relative to which mental states are 
semantically evaluable’ (Fodor 1991, p.300). In other words, narrow content is the 
consistent core that remains when a particular mental state is abstracted from any of its 
possible contexts. And in a similar way to Borg’s ‘Bill is ready for something’, narrow 
content is waiting to be anchored in a particular context where its truth evaluable content 
will be settled.  
Fodor is clear however, that narrow content itself is not truth evaluable, and that if one 
requires content to have this property, then the intrinsic content that these mental states 
share is not, strictly, content at all, since the mental states only possess this type of 
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content ‘potentially’. Whilst the parallel with Borg is clearly not exact, it is interesting 
that Fodor considers context to be necessary for broad content. 
3. Summary 
It seems, then, that there are a number of powerful arguments against the minimalist 
position, based on their argument form, assumptions and conclusions.  
First, we have seen that the way in which the minimalists set up the argument are largely 
rhetorical and based on a particular, and disputable, conception of the way in which 
cognition operates outside the language faculty. In the case of Borg, reliance on Fodor’s 
position to establish modularity for the language faculty and some form of mysterious 
abductive reasoning processes for the rest of cognition will only be as strong as Fodor’s 
arguments for his position. These turn out to be relatively weak, and we are left with the 
possibility that Borg’s inability to conceive of systematicity occurring in cognition 
outside the language faculty has forced to adopt an unnecessarily restrictive notion of 
semantic content, that may, in fact, be no content at all.  
Second, it turns out that the cross contextual claim, that funds much of C&L’s position 
is not all that it seems. In particular, the crucial direct/indirect distinction simply fails to 
establish their claims, as we have seen – it turns out that there are no grounds that are 
not question begging for determining whether a direct or indirect communication is 
being received. This is a substantial problem as it undermines a significant element of 
the cross contextual claim. 
Now an important point to conclude on is that I am not at all opposed to the basic 
notion, which provides much of the motivation for semantic minimalism, that when we 
come to investigate how the formal properties of sentences contribute to interpretation, 
we should be very wary of the idea that extra-linguistic effects will have anything more 
than a very minimal bearing on that investigation. That is, I too think we should adopt a 
minimalist perspective on the extent to which extra-linguistic factors are relevant to the 
interpretation of language. That said, though, what I hope to have shown in this chapter 
is that the cost of going minimalist may well be that we no longer get to assume that 
interpretations of sentences will be interpretations of truth-conditions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE APHONIC APPROACH 
 
The purpose of the chapter is to provide a critical assessment of the aphonic approach 
set forth by Stanley (2007).
39
 The approach is predicated on the claim that ‘all truth 
conditional effects of extra-linguistic context can be traced back to logical form’ 
(Stanley, 2007, p.30). Stanley’s chief aim is to show that the logical forms of various 
sentences partly comprise aphonic pronominal elements, which are phonologically null 
constituents of sentential structure that have their semantic values assigned to them 
relative to contexts. In adopting this view, Stanley rejects the minimalist claim that all 
genuine contextual effects on content can be traced back to occurrences of standard 
indexical expressions. What is more, in arguing that there is a variety of elements 
situated in the logical forms of sentences whose semantic values are assigned relative to 
certain specific features of the contexts in which those sentence are used, Stanley is led 
to argue that ‘there is no gap between the linguistically determined content of a sentence, 
relative to a context, and the proposition it intuitively seems to express’ (Stanley 2007, 
p.5).  
The chapter proceeds as follows, and is in two parts. First, I offer an exposition of the 
aphonic approach, focusing on the arguments Stanley sets forth in order to defend the 
claim that there are aphonic pronominal elements situated in the logical forms of 
sentences. Second, I raise a number of challenges for these arguments, and offer an 
alternative analysis of some of the more compelling examples Stanley relies on in order 
to justify the postulation of aphonic structure. I conclude that it is difficult to see why 
the appeal to aphonic elements would help explain why context sensitive expressions 
appear to be systematically associated with certain gaps in truth-conditional content.  
 
                                                 
39
 The term aphonic approach comes from Pupa and Troseth (2011). 
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1. The argument from binding40 
In order to defend the claim that there are aphonic elements situated in the logical forms 
of sentences, Stanley sets forth the argument from binding. The argument proceeds in 
three stages: first, a variety of examples are provided to establish the claim that the 
‘gaps’ or ‘slots’ that speakers intuitively associate with occurrences of context sensitive 
expressions, which are typically saturated relative to context, can actually be bound 
when those expressions occur in the domain of a binding operator; second, it is shown 
that contextualist accounts, which Stanley refers to as pragmatic approaches, cannot 
account for the relevant instances of binding; third, it is argued that instances of 
semantic binding only occur when there is a corresponding instance of syntactic 
binding. This final point is taken to provide support for the claim that the gaps speakers 
intuitively associate with context sensitive expressions actually correspond to aphonic 
elements that are located in the syntactic structures of those sentences.  
To assess the aphonic approach, I begin by examining the binding examples Stanley sets 
out. I then look at the arguments Stanley presents in order to show that pragmatic 
approaches are unable to account for the relevant examples. Finally, I give an outline of 
Stanley’s attempt to account for the kinds of interpretive phenomena binding examples 
serve to reveal.  
1.1. Context sensitivity and binding 
We have seen that when a context sensitive expression occurs in a sentence, its presence 
gives rise to an intuitive gap in truth-conditional or propositional content. Speakers 
saturate such gaps by taking into account certain specific pieces of information gleaned 
from contexts of utterance. So, in the case of (1a), we have a gap that is filled by 
                                                 
40
 In order to keep things focused, I will limit my attention to Stanley’s argument from 
binding, which I take to be his primary argument for the presence of aphonic elements at 
LF. Stanley also sets forth an argument from weak crossover effects, and an argument 
from strict-sloppy readings. Pupa and Troseth (2011) set forth a highly detailed, and 
highly critical analysis of these arguments.  
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information pertaining to the contextually salient domain to which the quantifier ‘three 
students’ is restricted (as in (1b)); and in the case of (1c), we get a gap that is filled by 
information pertaining to a contextually salient location (as in (1d)): 
(1) a.  John failed three students 
b. John failed three students <in John’s class> 
c. It is raining 
d. It is raining <in Paris> 
Stanley describes a range of binding examples that serve to show that the kinds of gaps 
that arise in instances of context sensitivity need not always be filled from context. That 
is, when such gaps occur within the domain of an appropriate binding operator (e.g. a 
quantifier phrase), speakers are able to get bound readings of the relevant gaps. In order 
to construct such examples for (1a) and (1c), all we need to do is embed each of those 
sentences within a more complex linguistic setting where the gaps associated with the 
context sensitive expressions ‘three students’ and ‘rain’ fall within the domain of, and 
are bound by, a quantifier phrase that occupies a position higher up in sentential 
structure. Modifying the original sentence slightly in order to do this, the resulting 
sentences we are left with are (2a) and (2c), whose interpretations are paraphrased in 
(2b) and (2d):  
(2) a. In most of John’s classes, he fails three students 
b. In [most x: x is a class of John’s] he fails three students <in x> 
c. Everywhere I go, it rains 
d. [Every x: x is where I go], it rains <in x> 
Similar effects occur in relation to the following sentences: 
(3) a. Most species have members that are small 
b. [Most x: x is a species] x has members that are small <for x> 
c. Every student answered every question 
d. [Every x: x is a student] x answered every question <x was asked> 
  
90 
Stanley takes it that these examples serve to reveal certain semantically relevant facts 
about the way speakers interpret utterance of sentences that contain context sensitive 
expressions. Hence, they are facts that a semantic theory ought to attempt to account for. 
Before going on to look at how different approaches fare when it comes to the task of 
accounting for the relevant facts, I want to point out an important difference in the way 
these examples operate.  
I shall refer to the examples listed in (2) as strong binding examples. Such examples 
reveal particularly striking constraints on the ways speakers are able to interpret 
utterances of the relevant sentences. That is, it seems that the interpretations of (2a) and 
(2c) that were offered in (2b) and (2d) are the only interpretations of truth-conditional 
content that speakers are able to intuitively associate with utterances of those sentences. 
In short, then, speakers must interpret (2a) and (2c) as involving some form of binding 
over an implicit gap in truth-conditional content. The reason for this is that it seems that 
if we do not interpret these sentences as involving binding over the implicit gaps, then 
we effectively end up with instances of vacuous binding, which occurs when a binding 
operator, such as a quantifier phrase, does not actually bind any variable. Stanley quite 
right argues that instances of vacuous binding signal a failure of interpretation (see 
Stanley 2007, p.195). 
I refer to the examples of (3) as weak binding examples. In each of these cases, it 
appears that speakers can interpret utterances of the relevant sentences in a way that 
does not involve any instance of binding over the implicit gaps associated with the 
context sensitive expressions that occur in the sentences. That is, one might take it that 
(3a) and (3c) could be assigned the interpretations paraphrased in (4) relative to some 
context: 
(4) a. [Most x: x is a species] x has members that are small <compared to an 
elephant>41 
                                                 
41
 To help clarify this reading, imagine that Bill is talking to his child who has not yet 
seen any of the other animals at the zoo. The child is amazed by the size of the 
elephants, and asks “Are all animals that big?”. Bill replies: “No. Most species have 
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b. [Every x: x is a student] x answered every question <the contestants were 
asked on tonight’s game show> 
The difference between these cases and the cases of (2) is that the quantifier phrases that 
occur higher up in sentential structure already bind positions in the sentences they range 
over. That is, at LF, the quantifier ‘Most species’ quantifies over the subject position of 
the embedded open sentence ‘x has members that are small’. That said, there is no 
danger of these sentences giving rise to any form of vacuous binding, which means that 
speakers are free to fill those implicit gaps with information from context.  
Ultimately, it will become clear in what follows that when we come to assess what kinds 
of semantic facts Stanley’s examples serve to reveal, it is important to keep in mind the 
distinction between strong binding examples, where binding of an implicit gap is 
mandatory for the purposes of successful interpretation, and weak binding examples, 
where binding over an implicit gap is optional.  
1.2. Pragmatic approaches 
Pragmatic approaches are approaches that account for instances of context sensitivity by 
appealing to the pragmatic competence of speakers. That is, advocates of such 
approaches argue that the reasons we sometimes incorporate certain pieces of contextual 
information into our interpretations of the truth-conditional contents of sentences are 
ultimately pragmatic ones. Recanati, for example, proposes that the reason speakers take 
it that they need to identify the location of the rain event a speaker refers to by uttering 
(1c) (‘It is raining’) has to do with the pragmatic fact that we ‘we care about 
meteorological events to the extent that we care about the locations where they take 
place’ (Recanati 2010, p.86). So, when a speaker utters (1c), the only way to make sense 
of what they are saying is to assume that their purpose is to tell us about something that 
is taking place at a particular location. As a consequence of this, we tend to take it that 
the location of the raining event is part of the information a speaker aims to convey 
                                                                                                                                               
members that are small”, which is true just in case most species have members that are 
smaller than the average elephant. 
  
92 
when uttering the sentence, and so we take it that such utterances are true iff it is raining 
at a contextually salient location.  
Stanley refers to such explanations of the kinds of processes speakers utilise to 
determine the truth-conditions of utterances as unarticulated constituent analyses 
(UCAs). An unarticulated constituent is an element of truth-conditional or propositional 
content that has no linguistic correlate at any level of linguistic representation. On 
Stanley’s characterisation of these kinds of analyses, unarticulated constituents are not 
incorporated into interpretation to satisfy any linguistic requirements (such as the 
requirement that each sentential constituent must be assigned a semantic value), but 
instead enter into interpretation via the implementation of pragmatic processes that are 
not answerable to linguistic constraints.  
On Stanley’s view, once we allow that genuine elements of truth-conditional content can 
be incorporated into interpretation via the implementation of such unconstrained 
processes, we effectively have to give up on the idea that a semantic theory will be able 
to provide explanatory predictions of speakers’ intuitive judgments about the truth-
conditional contents that utterances of sentences express. Indeed, taken to an extreme, 
UCAs appear to undermine the notion that there are any necessary linguistic constraints 
on utterance interpretation (Stanley 2002a, p.161-7). That said, though, Stanley argues 
that UCAs can in fact be shown to be inadequate when it comes to accounting for some 
of his binding examples, so this gives us reason to reject accounts that appeal to UCAs.  
In order to get a sense of exactly where UCAs go wrong, let us first consider how 
pragmatic approaches fare when they come to account for weak binding examples: 
(5) Most species have members that are small 
A UCA for (5) would offer the following analysis of the sentence’s semantic content 
relative to contexts of utterance, c:  
(6) [Most x: x is a species] x has members that are small <relative to the salient 
comparison class at c> 
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For reasons already discussed, such an analysis of (5) seems to make adequate 
predictions of the truth-conditional content speakers are able to associate with utterances 
of (5). That is, the advocate of the pragmatic approach will effectively take it that the 
comparison class for ‘small’ is always fixed relative to a context of utterance. So, cases 
where we interpret the implicit gap associated with ‘small’ as if it were free (i.e. not 
bound) are simply cases in which the contextually salient comparison class is not the set 
of individuals denoted by the NP embedded in the higher quantifier phrase (i.e. 
‘species’); whereas cases where we interpret the implicit gap as if it were bound by the 
higher quantifier phrase are cases where the contextually salient comparison class 
happens to be the very set of individuals denoted by the embedded NP.
42
 
However, pragmatic approaches face real problems when it comes to accounting for 
strong binding examples. For example, consider (7): 
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 Stanley ultimately rejects the view that pragmatic approaches can account for weak 
binding examples. His argument rests on the claim that, in order to account for the so-
called bound reading of (5), the advocate of the pragmatic approach is essentially 
arguing that ‘pragmatic processes can supply variables’ (Stanley 2007, p.194). This 
certainly fits well with Recanati’s suggestion that we might account for instances of 
what I have called semantic expansion by arguing that such instances involve the 
implementation of an expansive variadic operator, which effectively serves to increase 
the adicity of the predicate to which it is applied, thus producing an extra variable in the 
argument structure of that predicate. Recanati is hardly committed to this thesis though. 
Without going into the reasons why Stanley thinks all this is a bad thing, the problem 
with his claim is that it seems to be false of pragmatic approaches as he describes them. 
That is, it seems to me that the advocate of the pragmatic approach need not take it that 
the so-called bound reading is due to binding at all. Instead, it could simply be said that 
in cases such as (5), the contextually determined comparison class just happens to 
coincide with the class of individuals picked out by the NP (i.e. ‘species’) embedded in 
the quantifier phrase (i.e. ‘most species’). 
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(7) In every room in John’s house, he keeps every bottle in the corner 
According to Stanley, a UCA for (7) will predict the following interpretation of the 
sentence relative to contexts of utterance c: 
(8) In [every x: x is a room in John’s house], he keeps every bottle <in the 
domain that is salient at c> in the corner 
Stanley argues that this is an absurd interpretation of (7) (Stanley 2007, p.56). Not only 
does (8) give the wrong interpretation for any utterance of (7), but it also results in a 
pretty striking grammaticality violation due to the fact that it involves an instance of 
vacuous binding. That is, ‘in the case of [(7)], the quantifier ‘every room’ must bind a 
variable in the syntactic structure of the sentence ‘every bottle is in the corner’, on pain 
of ungrammaticality’ (Stanley 2007, p.214). Ultimately, then, Stanley takes it that UCAs 
fail to provide plausible accounts of the way speakers are able to interpret utterances of 
a significant range of sentences. His verdict is that we should abandon approaches that 
appeal to UCAs, and seek alternative ways of accounting for contextual effects on 
utterance interpretation.  
1.3. Logical form, the binding assumption, and aphonic elements 
Having shown that pragmatic approaches provide inadequate accounts of the ways 
speakers actually interpret utterances of various sentences, Stanley argues that we need 
to reject the idea that contextual information can be incorporated into interpretation via 
the implementation of unconstrained pragmatic processes. Accordingly, Stanley is led to 
argue that there must be aphonic pronominal elements that are apt for binding situated in 
the logical forms of sentences that contain context sensitive expressions.   
The logical form of a sentence, as Stanley uses the term, is its LF; i.e. a phrase marker 
that provides a description of the ‘real structure’ of that sentence (Stanley and Szabó 
2000a, p.247). In postulating that there are aphonic elements situated in the logical 
forms of sentences, then, Stanley is committing to a syntactic thesis about the actual 
structural arrangement of natural language sentences. As Stanley himself points out, 
though, ‘syntactic structure cannot be postulated on semantic grounds’ (Stanley 2002b, 
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p.368); so in order to support his thesis, Stanley needs to provide syntactic evidence for 
the presence of aphonic elements at LF. In order to provide such evidence, Stanley 
deploys the argument from binding. 
The argument from binding is predicated on the binding assumption (BA): 
If α and β are within the same clause, and α semantically binds β, then α either 
is, or introduces, a variable-binding operator which is co-indexed with, and 
stands in a certain specified structural relation to, a variable which is either 
identical to, or is a constituent of β. (Stanley 2000, p.412) 
What the binding assumption essentially states is that every instance of semantic binding 
corresponds to an instance of syntactic binding.
43
 So, given that the binding examples 
are cases where some form of semantic binding occurs, binding must also occur in the 
underlying syntax of the relevant sentences: i.e. at LF. Consequently, if we accept the 
binding assumption, we must conclude that in order for semantic binding to occur in the 
binding examples considered, there must be elements located in the syntactic structures 
of the relevant sentences that are apt for binding. Since such elements can either be 
bound (when they occur in the domain of a binding operator) or free (when they do not), 
they essentially behave like pronominal elements such as ‘his’, which can be bound 
when it occurs in the domain of a binding operator – e.g. ‘Every man has his enemies’ – 
but can be free when it does not – e.g. ‘He laughed at every man’. Hence, Stanley takes 
the relevant aphonic elements to be pronominal aphonic elements.  
Let us look at some of the details of Stanley’s approach in relation to an example. 
Stanley’s binding argument essentially shows that there is an aphonic element situated 
in the syntactic structure of (9a), which is then bound when that sentence is embedded in 
the more complex (9b): 
                                                 
43
 For further argument to the effect that there is this close association between instances 
of semantic and syntactic binding, see Heim and Kratzer 1998, p.260. Note that their 
account varies somewhat from Stanley’s.  
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(9) a.  He fails three students 
b. In most of John’s classes, he fails three students 
One question to ask is what position the relevant aphonic element occupies in syntax. 
Stanley speaks of aphonic elements as being ‘associated’ with context sensitive 
expressions. In earlier accounts, he claimed that ‘a variable is associated with a syntactic 
element…just in case it co-habits a node with it’ (Stanley, p.101). However, Stanley 
later rejects this claim. The reason for this is that if aphonic elements are taken to ‘co-
habit’ nodes occupied by their associated lexical items, then they do not occupy 
independent positions in syntactic structure, but are instead conceived of as ‘sub-
syntactic’ elements, which cannot participate in the kinds of structural relations that 
obtain between positions in syntactic structure, such as binding relations (see Stanley 
2007, p.222, n.15). Consequently, Stanley is led to the view that aphonic elements are 
adjoined elements that occupy their own terminal nodes in syntactic structure. Hence, 
we can take the following to provide accurate representations of the LFs of (9a) and (9b): 
 
SD(9a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He 
DP  V 
  fails NP   D 
   three 
  N 
    students 
   X 
<f(x)> 
N 
VP  NP 
S 
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SD(9b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As we see here, the aphonic element is represented as ‘f(x)’ (Stanley represents this as 
‘f(i)’, but for the sake of clarity, I shall represent the aphonic element as being partly 
comprised of a variable element that can be bound by a quantifier phrase). In its free 
occurrence in (9a), the value of the aphonic variable x relative to a context is some or 
other contextually salient object (e.g. ‘John’s class’) and the value of f, again relative to 
context, is a function from objects x to the set of objects that satisfy the contextually 
salient property, such as being in John’s class. In its bound occurrence in (9b), of course, 
x is bound by the quantifier denoted by the DP complement of the PP ‘In most of John’s 
classes’. For the sake of clarity, I have marked the phrase formed by the aphonic 
element as ‘XP’. That said, there is good reason to treat this as a PP adjunct, whose 
prepositional head is occupied by f, and whose complement NP is occupied by x.  
Ultimately, then, Stanley not only provides an explanation for the kinds of semantic 
facts revealed by strong binding examples, but he also provides reasons for accepting 
the claim that such facts can be accounted for on the basis of the linguistically 
determined features of sentences. What is more, he provides an appealing account of 
how aphonic pronominal element might be represented at LF. The resulting view is that 
     he          
He 
DP
DP 
  V     
V 
  fails NP
NP 
  D        
D 
    three      
three 
  N 
    students 
  XP 
<f(x)> 
  N   
N 
 S  
VP
VP 
 NP   
NP 
   In 
 PP 
 S 
 P     DP 
    most x: x is John’s class 
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contextual effects on truth-conditional content can be traced back to occurrences of 
aphonic pronominal elements situated in the logical forms/LFs of sentences.  
Whilst Stanley’s position is thus certainly worthy of consideration, there are several 
concerns that nevertheless arise in relation to the feasibility of the approach he adopts. 
First of all, aphonic elements are unlike the other implicit elements linguists tend to 
attribute to the syntactic structures of sentences (e.g. PRO elements, traces, null 
operators, and so on). We therefore need to ask whether Stanley has really provided 
adequate grounds for extending the class of such empty category items. Second, there 
are questions to be asked regarding how aphonic elements actually come to occupy a 
role in syntactic structure. As we saw, Stanley argues that such elements occupy 
terminal nodes that are adjoined to context sensitive expressions, but this in itself raises 
questions that require further investigation. In the following section, I shall pursue some 
of these concerns in order to assess the aphonic approach.  
2. Assessing the aphonic approach 
My aim here is to raise several questions for Stanley’s aphonic approach. First, I ask 
whether Stanley’s treatment of the binding examples is the only possible way of 
accounting for these cases. In response to this question, I shall develop my own 
alternative analysis of the examples, and attempt to show that there are certain 
advantages for preferring my treatment to that offered by Stanley. I shall then go on to 
look in more detail at Stanley’s claim that aphonic elements occupy adjoined terminal 
nodes. The question I want to ask here is whether any good explanation can be provided 
of why these elements accompany context sensitive expressions in syntax. 
2.1. An alternative account 
There are good reasons for wanting to develop an alternative account of Stanley’s strong 
binding examples. Many of these reasons stem from the observation that Stanley’s 
aphonic elements are in many ways anomalous when compared to the covert items we 
usually encounter in syntactic theory. As Collins (2007) emphasises, empty category 
items such as PRO are posited by linguists so as to satisfy certain general requirements 
of syntactic theory that are quite independent of our semantic intuitions about particular 
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sentences. For example, the reason the sentence The ship sank to collect the insurance is 
thought to contain a PRO item is because of the general requirement that all sentences 
must have a subject; i.e. all grammatically acceptable sentences must satisfy the 
extended projection principle (EPP).
44
 The problem is that no comparable independent 
syntactic requirement can be given for the presence of the aphonic elements Stanley 
proposes. One way to put this point is to say that Stanley’s examples do not raise any 
well-formedness considerations. That is, the question of whether or not aphonic 
elements are situated at LF has no bearing on the syntactic well-formedness of sentences 
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 See Stanley (2002a, pp.152-3) and Collins (2007, pp.834-37) for two opposing 
treatments of this example. Ultimately, there are various kinds of syntactic 
considerations that motivate the postulation of PRO elements that do not seem to apply 
to Stanley’s aphonic elements. One such consideration stems from the theta-criterion, 
which states that every lexical item must assign each of its θ-roles to one, and only one, 
argument, and that every argument must be assigned one, and only one, θ-role (see 
Haegeman 1994 for further discussion of the theta-criterion). Now, in the case of the 
sentence ‘Bill decided to leave’, the verb ‘decide’ and the verb ‘leave’ both need to 
assign an AGENT θ-role to an external argument. That said, if we take it that the 
sentence does not contain a PRO element, it becomes very difficult to see how the 
sentence would satisfy the theta-criterion. One might argue that the subject NP ‘John’ 
actually occupies the external argument position of the infinitive VP at an earlier point 
in the syntactic derivation by which the sentence is generated, and so would have been 
assigned the AGENT θ-role of ‘leave’ before then undergoing movement to the 
sentence’s subject position. The problem, though, is that this would violate the theta-
criterion, as ‘John’ would effectively be assigned more than one θ-role (i.e. it would be 
assigned the AGENT θ-role of ‘leave’ and ‘decide’). So, if we want to maintain the 
theta-criterion, and also maintain that ‘Bill decided to leave’ is a grammatically 
acceptable sentence (in that it does not violate syntactic principles), we need to accept 
the suggestion that there is an implicit PRO element situated in the subject position of 
the embedded infinitival clause.  
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such as (10). So there is no obvious syntactic constraint that hangs on the question of 
whether an aphonic element is present or not; i.e. the absence of such an element would 
not lead to violations of any independent syntactic principles. As Pupa and Troseth 
write: 
From a syntactic perspective, we find the binding argument peculiar. It never 
invokes any well-formedness considerations at all. And while the syntactic 
analysis of a sentence may ultimately have interpretational effects, one shouldn’t 
resolve interpretational puzzles by positing syntactic constituents without 
developing a well-formedness argument in their favor. The binding argument, 
however, makes no such gestures. As such, it’s difficult to imagine the binding 
argument grounding any syntactic thesis. This we note as a theoretical challenge 
for the binding argument. (Pupa and Troseth 2011, p.194) 
As Pupa and Troseth go on to argue, the postulation of aphonic elements does not seem 
to be licensed by any independent syntactic principles. This is one reason for thinking 
that it would be preferable not to have to appeal to such elements, and so to look for 
alternative ways of accounting for the binding examples. 
Now of course, Stanley’s claim is that a sentence such as (10) would be semantically 
anomalous if we did not postulate the presence of an aphonic element at LF:  
(10) In most of John’s classes, he fails three students 
That is, Stanley thinks that if we assume that the quantifier ‘three students’ is merely 
restricted to whatever happens to be the salient domain at any given context, the 
resultant reading would be ‘one on which the second part of the sentence is completely 
unrelated to the first part of the sentence. Indeed, it is not clear, on a pragmatic 
approach, that sentences such as [(10)] express coherent propositions at all’ (Stanley and 
Szabó 2000a, p.243). Ultimately, then, even if the absence of the aphonic element would 
not lead to any grammaticality violations, the sentence would nevertheless be 
uninterpretable if we were to reject the claim that there is an aphonic element situated in 
its LF. Now, it certainly does appear that when we come to interpret (10), we cannot 
help but understand the sentence in such a way that the PP must be related to – in that it 
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in some way modifies – the second part of the sentence. What is questionable, however, 
is that the relation the PP bears to the embedded sentence must be one on which it 
restricts the domain of the quantifier phrase ‘three students’.  
We can conceive of a case, for instance, where John the teacher has been asked to attend 
evening classes designed exclusively for teachers in order to make sure that their 
knowledge of recent teaching methods is up to date. Finding these mandatory classes 
very dull, John takes with him a bunch of papers from his day job and sits marking them 
instead of properly participating in the class. It just so happens that John fails three of 
his daytime students in most of these evening classes. In this scenario the domain 
occupied by the three students is not restricted to the domain of students present in most 
of John’s classes. Instead, it is the act of failing three students that occurs in most of 
John’s classes a reading that can be represented somewhat simplistically as follows: 
(11) In [most x: x is John’s class], [S he [VP fails three students] [PP <in x>]] 
One might complain that it would be highly misleading to utter (10) in order to describe 
the above scenario, since Stanley’s interpretation is the one we would all tend to arrive 
at on hearing such an utterance. This, however, would depend heavily on how familiar 
we are with the relevant context, and besides, the purpose of this (strong) example was 
not to say that we are most likely to interpret the sentence in a way that demands the 
presence of a covert domain variable, but that we can only interpret the sentence in this 
way. What is more, a change of verb could perhaps make the interpretation I am 
offering here seem the more natural one; e.g. In most of John’s classes, he emailed three 
students. It seems to me peculiar that we would restrict the set of students emailed to the 
set of students present in most of John’s classes. Again, though, this is not to say that 
such an interpretation of this sentence is unavailable – exchanging the verb simply 
serves to make the other interpretation more palatable.
45
 
Taking the interpretation offered above to be sound, the question is how we account for 
the fact that the quantifier complement of the PP ‘In most of John’s classes’ seems to be 
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 This argument was, to the best of my knowledge, first set forth in Davies (2010).   
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able to restrict both the location in which the act of failing three students took place in 
one instance, and the location of the three students failed in another. One possibility 
here is to posit another domain variable in the logical form of (10) whose value restricts 
the VP rather than the quantified NP. However, partly for the reasons mentioned above 
regarding the syntactically odd nature of Stanley’s variables, and partly because Stanley 
only ever mentions cases of domain restriction associated with quantified NPs, it may 
still be worth considering whether there might not be another way to account for the 
multiple possibilities for domain restriction here.  
One option is to propose that the PP is a preposed adjunct, and that there are alternative 
positions it could have moved from.
46
 The following structural descriptions depict these 
alternatives: 
SD1(10)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 Apparently Kent Bach has made this suggestion to Stanley, and whilst Stanley himself 
characterises it as ‘initially promising’, he immediately rejects it for reason I discuss 
shortly (Stanley and Szabó 2000a, p.245). 
  S 
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DP   V 
   fails 
  N 
VP  NP 
NP   D 
    three 
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    students 
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    most of John’s classes 
  PP 
 P     DP 
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SD2(10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These structural descriptions do not represent two competing LF representations of (10), 
but rather they represent some earlier point in the sentence’s derivational history, prior 
to the movement of the PP. Following certain assumptions from GB theory (Chomsky 
1981), we can thus treat the above representations as D-structure representations of (10). 
The movement of the PP occurs between D-structure and S-structure, which according 
to GB, is that level of representation at which the derivation ‘splits’, with further 
operations applying in order to attain LF and a PF representations.
47
 If it is the case that 
our being competent in understanding (10) involves our being able to recognise that the 
sentence could have resulted from either movement, and that the PP occupied either of 
these positions in the underlying structure of (10), then the PP itself is what does the job 
of restricting either the domain of students or the location of the act of failing. This kind 
of account deals with both interpretations of (10) and, what is more, does so in 
conventional syntactic terms.
48
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 At LF, both quantifiers would both undergo a further movement to the front of the 
sentence leaving behind traces in order to capture the appropriate scope relations 
between the two. 
48
 Of course, the notions I am appealing to here may be somewhat dated and 
developments in syntax have come a long way since GB theory. However, what I’m 
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One might wonder why the treatment of the sentence I have offered does not result in 
vacuous binding. I agree with Stanley that vacuous binding leads to uninterpretability, 
but, since the reading I have offered for (10) is perfectly coherent, I take it that no 
vacuous binding occurs on this reading. I think that this can be explained as follows. As 
has been noted, when the PP is preposed to the front of the sentence, its complement 
quantifier phrase is still not done moving. So, let us assume that in the transition to LF, 
this phrase will raise into a still higher position. Hence, simplifying somewhat, what we 
end up with at LF is something like the following: 
 SD(10) [S′′ Most x: x is John’s class [S′ in x [S he fails three students]]]  
Clearly, there is no instance of vacuous binding here, as we should expect given the 
coherence of the interpretation of the sentence I have offered. 
According to Stanley, however, there is a striking problem with the approach I have 
adopted. As we read (10), it is unquestionable that ‘John’ and ‘he’ can be co-referential, 
but in SD1(10) and SD2(10), the possibility of co-reference is ruled out. That is, we cannot 
understand ‘John’ as being co-referential with ‘he’ if ‘John’ does not occupy a position 
that dominates ‘he’ (see chapter 1 for a definition of the dominance relation). This 
reflects a general feature of binding, encapsulated by Condition C of binding theory, 
which states that an R-expression cannot be bound.
49
 This, it seems, forces a kind of 
dislocation between (10), and SD1(10) or SD2(10). According to Stanley, then, there is no 
way the former could have been derived from either of the latter via movement (Stanley 
2000, p.420). 
                                                                                                                                               
essentially trying to do is offer a treatment of examples like (10) that is not at odds with 
the conventional notions employed in syntactic theory.  
49
 R-expressions, such as proper names, are free in the sense that they refer 
independently without having to be associated with any antecedent expression in the 
sentence in order to do so. They are distinguishable from pronominal expressions, which 
can be interpreted as free or bound, and anaphoric expressions, which are always bound 
(see Chomsky 1986, p.164). 
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I am not sure that this should deter us from pursuing what is otherwise a plausible 
approach to the above examples. Indeed, the traditional take on Condition C is that the 
only levels at which it must hold are S-structure and LF (Chomsky 1986, pp.164-86; for 
a classic textbook treatment of this issue, see Haegeman 1994, pp.341-45). If this is 
correct, there is no reason to reject SD1(10) and SD2(10) as likely D-structure 
representations for (10). There are, though, numerous questions about the status of the 
binding principles, about the level at which they should be thought to apply, about how 
to deal with various sentences that seem to violate them (e.g., Though he was a coward, 
Tom fought on anyway), and so on.
50
 Until Stanley says more about these issues, it will 
remain unclear whether his appeal to binding violations rules out the treatment of his 
examples offered here.
51
  
                                                 
50
 The questions mentioned here multiply when one considers recent developments in 
syntactic theory. For instance, if the notion that indices are actually parts of syntactic 
objects is abandoned (see Chomsky 1995, p.228), this has deep repercussions for how to 
best characterise binding conditions, crossover effects, and so on. See Hornstein, Nunes 
and Grohmann (2005, pp.248-85) and Lasnik and Uriagereka (2005, pp.210-17) for 
further discussion of these problems in a contemporary light. 
51
 In the case of the sentence ‘In every room in John’s house, he keeps every bottle in 
the corner’, I am again not convinced that Stanley’s construal of the sentence is the only 
possible interpretation. Imagine that Bill and Mary, both of whom are enthusiastic bottle 
collectors, are talking about John’s impressive collection of Coca-Cola bottles. In the 
context of their discussion, Bill might utter the above sentence, and so say something 
that is true iff in every room of John’s house, he keeps every bottle ever manufactured 
by the Coca-Cola company in the corner of that room. I shall not go into details of how 
to account for this interpretation of the sentence here, but taking it that this would be an 
intelligible interpretation of an utterance of the sentence, it once again appears that 
Stanley’s account is effectively committed to the existence of an interpretive constraint 
where there in fact is not one.  
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Now, having said all this, whether my analysis of these examples is correct or not, the 
point the above discussion has served to establish is that the intuitive gap associated 
with the quantifier phrase ‘three students’ in (10) can be saturated relative to context 
after all. So it no longer seems as if pragmatic approaches have any real problem 
accounting for strong binding examples, despite initial appearances. That said, if 
Stanley’s main argument against appeals to UCAs is that such appeals fail to count for 
strong binding examples, we are now left asking for further reasons to reject such 
analyses of truth-conditional content. In fact, I think that the readings I have offered for 
Stanley’s binding examples actually speak in favour of the idea that the kinds of gaps in 
content brought about by context sensitive expressions are saturated by means of the 
implementation of pragmatic processes.  
One last thing we might consider is whether weak binding examples alone give 
sufficient cause to posit aphonic elements in logical form. The problem is that it is hard 
to see how these examples demonstrate syntactic grounds for doing so. We can account 
for the syntactic well-formedness of the sentence Every student answered every question 
with no mention of aphonic elements, and so it seems the only reason for positing such 
variables in this case would be to make our conception of syntactic structure square with 
our intuitions about the truth-conditional contents of particular utterances of the 
sentence. This hardly counts as giving evidence for the presence of such elements.  
Of course, one could argue that weak binding examples are effective as long as we 
accept Stanley’s binding assumption. This, though, indicates that these examples only 
serve to demonstrate how the assumption might be applied, and it remains entirely open 
whether the assumption itself is to be accepted. Ultimately, the positive argument 
Stanley provides in support of accepting the binding assumption comes from 
demonstrating the indispensability of aphonic elements when accounting for the 
interpretability of certain sentences; i.e. those that give rise to strong binding examples. 
If this is so, and if the above argument shows that the strong binding examples are 
flawed, then we have reason to question Stanley’s view that logical form, conceived of 
as syntactic structure, is answerable to our intuitions about semantic content as he 
suggests. 
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To summarise this section, then, I have argued that we should be critical of the idea that 
Stanley’s treatment of the strong binding examples is the correct one. In particular, I 
identified the syntactically anomalous character of Stanley’s aphonic elements as a 
reason to avoid postulating their presence at LF, and demonstrated an alternative way of 
dealing with the examples that makes no recourse to such elements but instead relies 
purely on the notion of movement, common to syntactic theory. If this alternative 
treatment works, as I think it does, Stanley needs to provide new support for his claim 
that that the truth-conditional effects of quantifier domain restriction can be traced back 
to elements in logical form.  
It is important to note that whereas the arguments I have produced here pertain only to 
instances of the strong binding examples that involve quantifier domain restriction, there 
are other examples Stanley discusses that are perhaps not amenable to the kind of 
treatment I have applied to the cases discussed here.  
I now want to turn to one final of Stanley’s binding examples. In doing so, I want to 
raise some concerns for Stanley’s notion that aphonic elements occupy adjoined 
terminal nodes in syntax.  
2.2. ‘Rain’ again 
The final binding example I want to consider in this section is (12): 
(12) Everywhere I go it rains 
Again, in the case of (12), Stanley claims that the only available interpretation of the 
sentence is as follows: 
(13) [Every x: x is where I go] it rains <at x> 
It seems to me that (12) is not a good candidate for to the alternative treatment of some 
of Stanley’s examples that was offered in the previous subsection. That is, I think it 
would be at least questionable to suggest that the DP ‘Everywhere I go’ has moved from 
a lower position at which it modifies ‘rain’. On the other hand, I am not convinced that 
  
108 
this particular binding example is as strong as Stanley thinks it is. The following 
example should serve to illustrate the point.  
Imagine that John has been sent on a long pilgrimage by his tribe who believe that his 
journey will put a stop the endless downpour of rain in their village. John might travel to 
various holy relics, believing all the while that if he travels long and far enough, and 
visits enough of these relics, the gods will smile on him and end the rain in his village. 
Having visited the final relic, though, John receives news that it is still raining in his 
village. At this point, he looks up into the skies and shouts: “I give up. Everywhere I go, 
it rains!”. It seems to me that it is possible to get an interpretation of the truth-
conditional content of John’s utterance such that what he says is true iff everywhere 
John goes, it rains in the village (i.e. at the contextually salient location). Note also, that 
if John shouted instead – “Everywhere I go, it rains in the village!” – we certainly do not 
seem to end up with an instance of vacuous binding, so the example is not strong if we 
take the threat of vacuous binding to be what sets apart strong binding examples.  So, I 
think there are at least reasons to reject the claim that the only way to interpret (12) is as 
involving some form of binding. 
Setting that point aside, then, I now want to raise questions for the claim that ‘rain’ is 
always accompanied by an adjoined aphonic locative element that occupies a terminal 
node in syntax. I want to show that there are various problems for this idea, and that, 
ultimately, it is very hard to explain why it is that aphonic elements accompany context 
sensitive expressions in syntax. 
The basic problem is this: adjuncts are typically taken to be optional elements that are 
not specified in the lexical entries of expressions. That is, there are good reasons to 
believe that adjuncts do not form part of the entourage of lexically specified elements 
that must accompany lexical items in syntactic structure. Rather, adjuncts are optional 
elements, which can be freely added to sentences in order to modify phrases, but which 
are not required in order to satisfy any of the grammatically relevant requirements 
lexical items project onto the syntactic configurations in which they occur. Hence, once 
we adopt the view that aphonic elements are best construed as adjuncts (as opposed to 
arguments), I think it becomes difficult to explain why such elements systematically 
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accompany context sensitive expressions in syntax. But Stanley’s appeal to aphonic 
elements is precisely meant to account for the systematicity of extra-linguistic 
contextual effects on content; i.e. he wants to explain why speakers always take context 
sensitive expressions to be accompanied by certain intuitive gaps, gaps for restrictor 
domains in the case of quantifier phrases, gaps for locations in the case of weather verbs, 
gaps for comparison classes in the case of comparative adjectives, and so on. The 
problem, then, is that aphonic elements, qua optional adjuncts, do not seem to be good 
candidates for explaining seemingly mandatory, systematic contextual effects on 
interpretation.  
What the above observations seem to indicate is that in order for aphonic elements to 
play the kind of explanatory role they are meant to play, they had best be conceived of 
as mandatory elements specified in the lexical entries of context sensitive expressions. 
That is, it seems that we need to fall back on the notion that aphonic elements are 
arguments (as opposed to adjuncts) that are associated with context sensitive 
expressions in the sentence that they are specified in the lexical entries for those 
expressions. However, I think the view that aphonic elements are adjuncts is 
unavoidable.  
In order to make this point more concrete, let us begin by making the simple observation 
that when a locative PP appears in the explicit surface form, or PF, of a sentence such as 
‘It is raining’, it seems to exhibit the kind of behaviour typically associated with 
adjuncts rather than arguments. To illustrate this point, consider the following examples: 
(14) a.   It is raining in Paris 
b. It is raining again/on Tuesday in Paris 
c. Bill loves Mary 
d. *Bill loves again/on Tuesday Mary  
e. Bill broke the vase 
f. *Bill broke again/on Tuesday the vase 
What these examples show is that when we insert an adjunct, i.e. the adverbial modifier 
‘again’, or the PP ‘on Tuesday’, between ‘rain’ and the locative PP that it combines with 
  
110 
in (14a), the result is the perfectly acceptable sentence (14b). That said, though, when 
we try to insert such items between ‘love’ and its internal argument ‘Mary’, as in (14d), 
or between ‘break’ and its internal argument ‘the vase’, as in (14f), the resulting 
sentences are clearly unacceptable.  
In order to understand why this happens, we need to look in more detail at the structural 
organisation of phrases. It is generally agreed that phrases must be configured in the 
following way (see Hornstein et al. 2005, pp.184-189 for discussion): 
  
 
 
 
 
The first projection of the expression that heads the phrase is marked X, which stands 
for the syntactic category of the head (e.g. V for verb, N for noun, D for determiner, 
etc.). The intermediate projection is marked X´ (or X-bar), which is that point at which 
the head combines with its complement (i.e. Comp). The maximal projection is marked 
XP, which is the point at which the head-comp configuration combines with the 
specifier (i.e. Spec) to form a complete phrase. A standard assumption in contemporary 
linguistics is that the lexically specified arguments of heads are mapped onto positions 
within the spec-head-comp configuration. That is, according to the conception of phrase 
structure adopted here, there are substantial constraints on what positions arguments can 
occupy. So, in the case of (14c) (‘Bill loves Mary’), the verbal head maps its internal 
argument (e.g. ‘Mary’) onto its sister node, and maps its external argument (i.e. ‘Bill’) 
onto the sister node of its intermediate projection. The result is as follows:
52
 
                                                 
52
 Here, in order to simplify things, I represent ‘love’ as having already combined with 
its suffix, so as to give ‘loves’, within the VP.  
    X´  
     X  
   Head 
 Comp 
  Spec 
  XP 
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 SD(14c) 
 
 
 
 
There are two important points about this kind representation that ought to be briefly 
mentioned. First, according to SD(14c) (which is not a complete LF, but a partial 
representation that represents a certain point in the derivational history of (14c)), the 
subject of ‘Bill loves Mary’ is generated within the VP configuration. This is out of line 
with our earlier somewhat simplified representations of sentential structure. However, I 
make this move in accordance with the predicate-internal subject hypothesis (see 
Hornstein et al. 2005, p.81). According to this hypothesis, external arguments enter into 
syntactic derivations at SPEC-XP (the specifier position of the phrase). Such arguments 
then undergo movement to the subject position of the sentence. Second, having adopted 
X-bar representations of phrases, we now come to treat sentences as a certain sort of 
phrase – viz. a tense phrase (TP) – which has the same kind of structural configuration 
as all other phrases. So, a closer approximation to a proper LF representation of (14c) 
would be as follows:
53
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 The T head of TP carries inflectional features, which are realised on the V head of 
VP. I shall not go into the processes that ensure agreement of tense features between 
these elements in the syntax. Note that the triangular brackets around ‘Bill’ at SPEC-VP 
indicates that that item has been copied and moved to SPEC-TP (see Adger 2003 for 
detailed discussion on tense features and the copy operation). 
    V´  
     V  
   loves 
    NP 
NP 
  VP 
 N 
 Bill  N 
 Mary 
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 SD(14c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having introduced some of the relevant linguistic notions, the important point to bear in 
mind is that, on this conception of the organisational principles that govern phrase 
structure configurations, arguments are only able to occupy very specific positions in 
phrasal configurations. That is, there are significant constraints on the kinds of positions 
arguments are able to occupy in syntax. Now, what about adjuncts? The crucial point to 
note about adjuncts is that they do not adjoin to phrases within the spec-head-comp 
configuration, but instead adjoin at a higher intermediate node. So, we can modify our 
representation of the structure of phrases so as to show how adjuncts adjoin to phrases 
as follows: 
 
  
 
 
 
We are now in a position to state what gives rise to the kinds of interpretive effects that 
were listed in (14). In the case of (14c), the NP ‘Mary’, as an internal argument of 
    X´  
     X´   
   Head 
 Adjunct 
  Spec 
  XP 
 Comp    X   
NP T´ 
TP 
T 
   N 
 Bill     V´  
     V  
   loves 
    NP 
NP 
  VP 
 N 
  <Bill>  N 
 Mary 
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‘love’, must occupy the complement position in the VP’s phrase structure. That said, in 
order to attain (14d), we effectively insert an adjunct between the verbal head and its 
complement. As we have seen, though, only the verb’s arguments can occupy the sister 
node of the verbal head, so (14d) is not licensed on this conception of phrase structure. 
We can now ask why it is that adjuncts can intervene between ‘rain’ and the locative PP 
in (14a). Effectively, the only explanation for this is that the locative PP is an adjunct, 
and so can freely swap positions with adjuncts that occupy higher intermediate nodes. 
Bringing all this together, we can take it that the following structural description 
accurately represents the LF of (14b) 
SD(14b)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are three things to note here: first, ‘rain’ does not take an external argument, so 
there is no SPEC-VP. The expletive ‘it’ is thus inserted directly into SPEC-TP (so as to 
satisfy EPP); second, since we have argued that the locative PP ‘in London’ is an 
adjunct, ‘rain’ does not select an internal argument, so there is no complement in the VP 
configuration; third, as adjuncts, the adverbial modifier ‘again’ and the locative PP ‘in 
London’ can be freely swapped around; i.e. it is fine to say ‘It is raining again in 
London’ and ‘It is raining in London again’.  
  NP    
 T´ 
TP 
  T    N 
  It      V´  
in London 
 V´ 
  VP 
  PP 
is 
  AP 
again 
 V´ 
 V 
 raining 
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It seems to me, then, that since the explicit locative PP that modifies ‘rain’ in (14a) must 
be construed as an adjunct, there is then good reason for thinking that Stanley’s locative 
aphonic elements would also be an adjunct. But then, to repeat the point made earlier, 
aphonic elements, qua optional adjuncts, do not seem to play the kind of explanatory 
role Stanley wants them to play.  
With all this in mind, though, it might be argued that there are certain verbs that appear 
to select obligatory adjuncts. That is, there can be items that occupy adjunct positions in 
sentences, but which can nevertheless be taken to be specified in the lexical entries for 
the verbal heads with which they combine. For example, Baker (2003) argues that in 
(15a), the PP ‘on the table’ that directly follows the direct object ‘the plate’ is an 
obligatory adjunct. The same can also be said for the adverb ‘carefully’ in (15b):  
(15) a. Bill put the plate on the table 
b. Bill worded the letter carefully 
Now, if the pertinent elements really are adjuncts, it should be possible freely to insert 
an adverbial modifier between them and the verbs that select them: 
(16) a. ?Bill put the plate again on the table 
b. Bill worded the letter again carefully 
It seems to me that (16a) is awkward (hence the question mark), but it is not altogether 
unacceptable. (16b), on the other hand, seems absolutely fine. The question, then, is this: 
if these verbs can select for adjuncts, then why is it that the same cannot be said for 
‘rain’? That is, perhaps Stanley could argue that his aphonic pronominals are actually 
lexically represented adjuncts (which would give substance to the idea that context 
sensitive elements are ‘associated’ with aphonic elements, even though these elements 
seem to be adjuncts). The problem with this kind of response, though, is that obligatory 
adjuncts are, not to put too fine a point on it, obligatory, which is just to say that they 
must be explicitly represented at PF in order for the sentences in which they occur to be 
grammatically acceptable. This is clear from in the following (see Baker 2003, p.318): 
(17) a. *Bill put the plate 
  
115 
b. *Bill worded the letter 
To sum up, then, it seems to me that the best way of making sense of Stanley’s claim 
that context sensitive expressions, like ‘rain’, are associated with aphonic elements is if 
it could be shown that those elements are either implicit arguments of some sort. All the 
evidence I have adduced above, however, would seem to suggest that they are aphonic 
elements are optional adjuncts. The problem, though, is that optional adjuncts are the 
last kind of thing we would expect to find listed in the lexical entries of expressions. So 
ultimately, it seems too hard to see why the appeal to aphonic elements would help 
explain why context sensitive expressions appear to be systematically associated with 
certain gaps in truth-conditional content.  
Ultimately, having taken all this into account, all we are left with in order to justify the 
claim that ‘rain’ is in some yet to be specified way associated with an aphonic locative 
element is the felt need for a location that comes with occurrences of the expression in 
sentences. As we saw right at the outset, though, there are ways to account for this that 
do not appeal to linguistic constraints. That is, the above observations may lead us to re-
examine Recanati’s claim that we can offer purely pragmatic reasons for this felt need.  
3. Summary 
This chapter has provided a thorough analysis of Stanley’s aphonic approach. In 
focusing on Stanley’s argument from binding, and by questioning the force of the 
examples that he uses to support this argument, I have attempted to show that the 
argument does not suffice to support the claim that all genuine instances of context 
sensitivity can be traced back to aphonic elements situated in the logical forms (or LFs) 
of sentences. Indeed, my analysis of Stanley’s strong binding examples has shown that 
pragmatic approaches, which appeal to the pragmatic competence of speakers in order to 
explain certain contextual effects on interpretation, offer a viable treatment of the 
relevant examples, pace Stanley’s arguments to the contrary.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE UNARTICULATED CONSTITUENT ANALYSIS 
 
The two main approaches considered thus far can be looked upon as attempts to retain 
the view that for any given sentence there must be a one-to-one correspondence between 
the items that constitute its structure and the elements that comprise the set the truth-
conditional or propositional content it expresses on an occasion of use. As we saw, 
advocates of semantic minimalism argue that putative mismatches between sentential 
structure and content can be resolved by paring down our intuitive conception of what 
constitutes the proposition expressed by a sentence, whereas advocates of the aphonic 
approach argue that the best approach is rather to expand our conception of what 
constitutes sentential structure so that it squares with a more intuitive conception of 
content.  
Either way, the aim is to ensure a good fit between sentential structure and content. 
Having raised a number of objections to these positions, I now want to look at an 
approach that attempts to show that we need not assume such a strict correspondence 
between sentential structure and propositional content in order to maintain the idea that 
there is a systematic link between sentences and the content they can be used to express 
on different occasions.  
1. Unarticulated constituents 
The aim of this section is to assess the unarticulated constituent analysis (UCA), 
originally set forth by Perry (e.g. 1986, 1998). My aim is to chart the development of 
UCA from its earlier presentation in the work of Perry, to its more recent presentation in 
the work of Taylor (e.g. 2001, 2007). I shall take it that both versions of UCA are 
committed to the following claim: the meaning of any context sensitive expression fixes 
what type of contextual information must be taken into account in order to determine the 
truth-conditional content of any sentence in which that expression occurs. What I am 
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interested in clarifying is how the meanings of context sensitive expressions serve this 
function.  
In order to answer this, I begin by considering Perry’s account of the way in which 
contextual effects on content are fixed by the meanings of context sensitive expressions. 
I shall show that Perry’s account is ultimately based on an appeal to metaphysical 
considerations. I then consider some problems for Perry’s reliance on metaphysical 
consideration that have been raised by Taylor (2007), before finishing the section by 
outlining Taylor’s alternative version of UCA, which effectively rejects the 
metaphysical considerations Perry’s approach relies on and focuses instead on purely 
lexical considerations.   
1.1. Perry’s proposal  
Perry (e.g. 1986, 1998) has argued that we can explain the systematic correspondence 
between sentences and the propositions they are apt to express on different occasions 
even if we forgo the assumption that all propositional elements have correlates in 
sentential structure. On this view, the propositions expressed by uses of certain 
sentences in part comprise unarticulated constituents; i.e. proper elements of 
propositional content that do not have any correlates at any level of linguistic 
representation, but whose incorporation into content exhibits systematicity across 
contexts. Standard cases include the following: 
(1) a. It’s raining 
b. It’s raining <in London> 
(2) a. It’s 8 a.m. 
b. It’s 8 a.m. <GMT> 
(3) a. The mayor is drunk 
b. The mayor <of Reykjavik> is drunk 
(4) a. Every teacher went on strike 
b. Every teacher <in the UK> went on strike 
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When the above (a)-sentences are uttered, a speaker’s interlocutors automatically 
recognise that interpretation calls for extra information from context; they know the type 
of information required and how it is to be integrated into propositional content; and 
they are (in general) familiar enough with the context to retrieve the very information 
the speaker intended to convey.
54
 According to UCA, none of this requires that the 
implicit information be traceable to discrete constituents located in the syntax of the 
sentences uttered (e.g. aphonic elements at LF). Instead, the UCA theorist maintains 
that, under the right conditions, speakers can rely on their interlocutors to identify 
certain elements of the propositions they wish to express without their having to 
‘belabour those elements in syntax’, or to articulate them at some level of linguistic 
representation (Crimmins and Perry 1989, p.700). In arguing that the constituents of 
sentences and the elements of the propositions that they are used to express need not 
stand in a one-to-one correspondence to each other, the UCA theorist rejects what Perry 
(1986) calls the principle of homomorphic representation (PHR), or what Crimmins 
(1992) calls full articulation:
55
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 I say ‘in general’ because certain factors can militate against the retrieval of the 
apposite information; mistakes can occur, and speakers are sometimes required to make 
explicit what they initially left implicit. The same margin for error is permitted whether 
the relevant elements in propositional content are construed as the context relative 
denotations of aphonic indexicals or genuine unarticulated constituents in Perry’s sense 
of the term. That is, even if there is (say) an aphonic indexical for locations associated 
with the verb ‘rain’, one can still make a mistake in figuring out which location the 
speaker had in mind when he or she uttered the sentence ‘It is raining’.  
 
55
 PHR is associated with a strict version of the compositionality requirement, according 
to which the semantic content of a sentence is a syntactic function of the contents of its 
constituents. Unarticulated constituents are not denoted by sentential constituents, and 
so their presence in propositional content violates this traditional notion of 
compositionality.  
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The question to ask is how unarticulated constituents come to occupy a stable role in 
utterance interpretation. More specifically, we need to ask how it is that when speakers 
encounter utterances of certain sentences, they automatically recognise the need to 
incorporate specific pieces of information from context into their interpretation of 
propositional content even though none of the constituents of the sentences uttered 
stands for those pieces of information. Put this way, it appears as if the UCA theorist 
needs to explain why a very particular set of interpretive effects routinely accompany 
uses of sentences despite not being controlled by the formal, context-independent 
features of those sentences.  
Advocates of UCA, however, do not deny that the introduction of unarticulated 
constituents into propositional content is triggered in part by the stable linguistic 
features of sentences. That is, whilst the UCA theorist denies that unarticulated 
constituents correspond to discrete sentential constituents, he does not thereby commit 
to the view that the identification of such elements is due solely to unconstrained, or 
free, pragmatic processes. Rather, it is argued that unarticulated constituents are 
incorporated into content via content-supplemental uses of context (Perry 1998, 2001), 
which operate under constraints imposed by the interaction of linguistic and contextual 
factors:
56
 
[T]he unarticulated constituent is not designated by any part of the statement, but 
it is identified by the statement as a whole. The statement is about the 
unarticulated constituent, as well as the articulated ones. (Perry 1986, p.209) 
                                                                                                                                               
 
56
 Perry (2001, pp.45-46) suggests a more accurate phrase to describe what her refers to 
as post-semantic uses of context would be post-meaning but pre-content uses of context. 
To avoid the misleading connotations of the former term and the awkwardness of the 
latter, I’ll use the phrase content-supplemental uses of context, or simply content 
supplemental processes (CSPs). 
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It would be misleading…to say that, in the case of unarticulated constituents, the 
context alone does the job. The whole utterance – the context and the words 
uttered – is relevant to identifying the unarticulated constituent. Thus, a change 
in wording can affect the unarticulated constituent, even though it is not a change 
in an expression that designates that constituent…The important principle to be 
learned is that a change in wording can precipitate a change in propositional 
constituents, even when the words do not stand for the constituents. (Crimmins 
and Perry 1989, p.700) 
The idea, then, is that the identification of unarticulated constituents is driven in part by 
features of the sentences we use and in part by features of the contexts we use them in. 
So, to reiterate the initial question, we need to ask how utterances of particular sentences 
call for propositional elements none of their constituents stand for (Crimmins and Perry 
1989, p.701). 
Perry’s (1986) proposal is as follows. The kind of information stored in the lexical 
entries for simple expressions is split into two distinct components; viz. the syntactic and 
the semantic. The syntactic component specifies the structurally relevant properties of 
expressions, such as which argument positions (if any) they project into syntactic 
structure. These argument positions must be filled by items present in syntax to satisfy 
grammaticality requirements. The semantic component specifies semantic rules for 
assigning denotations to expressions relative to contexts, where potential denotation 
types include the usual range of individuals, times, locations, and n-place relations. 
Expressions that denote relations are associated with a fixed number of argument roles, 
which are determined on the basis of the adicities of the relations denoted.
57
 The 
argument roles associated with the expressions that form a given sentence must either be 
saturated by elements denoted by other expressions in the sentence, or by elements 
identified from context, in order to attain a complete propositional content. Hence, 
                                                 
57
 I shall say that an expression is associated with a given set of argument roles iff it 
denotes a relation that takes the relevant set of arguments.  
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expressions that denote relations have both a lexical adicity, which specifies how many 
syntactic argument positions the expression projects, and a conceptual adicity, which 
specifies how many argument roles are associated the expression.
58
 
The reason one must sometimes look to context in order to saturate argument roles is 
that the lexical and conceptual adicities associated with relational expressions (e.g. 
verbs, adjectives, and so on) are not always equal. Hence, in some cases, composition of 
the denotations of the expressions that form a grammatically acceptable declarative 
sentence will not yield a complete proposition, since filling all argument positions 
projected by the expressions present in a sentence does not ensure the saturation of all 
the argument roles associated with its constituent expressions. When this occurs, we 
have to utilise our knowledge of context in order to fulfil the requirement that argument 
roles must undergo saturation, and so attain a complete proposition: 
On the way I look at things, relations have argument roles or parameters. These 
are to be distinguished from the argument places or variables that predicates that 
express the relations may have. My picture of unarticulated constituents is that 
there are argument roles that are not represented by explicit argument places. We 
fill the argument role which is filled from context. (Perry 2001, p.47) 
This leaves us with the following view of utterance interpretation: the meanings of 
expressions are encoded in lexical rules whose application (relative to contexts) results 
in the assignment of denotations to uses of those items. When the semantic phase of 
                                                 
58
 The argument positions lexical items induce in syntactic structure constitute their 
argument structure. A lexical item’s argument structure specifies the arguments it takes 
by syntactic category. Perry’s argument roles are presumably specified in a manner that 
makes explicit what types of propositional elements can saturate the relevant roles in 
propositional content. Hence, the verb ‘hit’ encodes two argument positions for DPs 
(assuming that argument structure encodes external arguments), and denotes a relation 
with two argument roles for individuals. 
 
  
122 
interpretation (Perry 1989), which involves implementing lexical rules so as to assign 
semantic values to expressions, results in the assignment of an n-place relation to some 
constituent of the sentence uttered, but none of the sentence’s other constituents are 
assigned denotations fit for saturating one or more of the argument roles of that relation, 
content remains incomplete. Interpreters must then proceed to the content-supplemental 
phase of interpretation, utilising their knowledge of context to saturate empty argument 
roles and so attain a complete content. 
The type and number of propositional elements identified from context at this stage is 
determined by the type and number of argument roles that stand in need of saturation. 
On some occasions, a speaker’s interlocutors might identify the wrong element from 
context, and so misinterpret the speaker’s utterance. 59  On others, they may fail to 
identify any element of the appropriate kind, and so fail to interpret the utterance 
altogether. When the correct element is identified from context, however, the 
proposition that the speaker intended to convey is determined, and successful 
communication achieved. It is in this way that the interaction of the words we use and 
our ability to derive information from the contexts in which we use them brings about 
the systematic incorporation of unarticulated constituents into propositional content. The 
relevant interpretive phenomena are thus accounted for without assuming the strict 
                                                 
59
When one identifies the wrong element from context, one fails to identify an 
unarticulated constituent of the proposition the speaker intended to express. A 
proposition is still determined, however, so perhaps one might still speak of the element 
identified as an unarticulated constituent, albeit one of a proposition the speaker did not 
intend to express. Perhaps Perry would find such talk infelicitous, but we can let that 
pass. The point is that the conditions that must be in place in order for an unarticulated 
constituent to be identified during interpretation, i.e. the conditions that speakers and 
interpreters alike exploit in order to communicate in lieu of full articulation, allow for 
some degree of slippage between the proposition one intended to express and the 
proposition grasped by one’s interlocutors. 
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compositionality requirement associated with PHR (Neale 2007; Crimmins and Perry 
1989). 
1.2. The lexical and conceptual adicity of ‘rain’ 
Perry’s UCA approach has been taken to provide a particularly convincing explanation 
of what gives rise to the requirement that the interpretation of weather reports involves 
the identification of locations from contexts. Consider (5): 
(5) It is raining 
On Perry’s (1986, 2001) analysis of (5): ‘it’ is a non-referring expression required for 
purely grammatical reasons; ‘is’ refers to the time of utterance; and ‘rain’, which 
projects one argument position for tense, denotes a dyadic relation between times and 
locations – it being the nature of raining events that they occur at particular times at 
particular places. Syntactically speaking, combining these expressions as in (5) yields a 
well-formed sentence, yet, semantically, composition of the denotations of the relevant 
expressions fails to yield a complete proposition, since the rain relation requires an 
argument that is not supplied (denoted) by any of the constituents of which the sentence 
is comprised.  
Put another way, the predicate ‘rain’ has just one syntactic argument position, filled here 
by the appropriate tense morphemes (‘is’/‘-ing’), but denotes a relation with two 
argument roles, one of which is here left empty. So, although ‘we have the syntax of the 
sentence “It is raining” and the meanings of each of the component words, we still don’t 
have the content’ (Perry 2001, p. 45). A location must thus be identified from context to 
saturate the empty argument role and attain a complete proposition (note: this need not 
be the utterance location (Perry 1986, pp.210-211)). 
Now, there is no doubt that such an analysis provides an intelligible explanation of why 
it is that the interpretation of weather reports calls for the identification of locations from 
contexts, and thus serves to demonstrate ‘the theoretical possibility and coherence of 
truly unarticulated constituents’ (Perry 1998, fn.4). The question, though, is whether 
there are good reasons to accept the claim, upon which the analysis is predicated, that 
  
124 
there is a discrepancy between the number of argument positions enumerated in the 
lexical adicity of ‘rain’ and the number of argument roles enumerated in its conceptual 
adicity. In order to assess this, we need to examine whether the analysis offered provides 
a plausible characterisation of the lexical and conceptual adicities of ‘rain’.  
Focussing initially on the syntactic aspect of Perry’s analysis, he is quite right to say that 
the expletive subject of the sentence is not a syntactic argument of the predicate. Indeed, 
expletives do not fill argument positions projected by predicates, but are required to 
satisfy the structural requirement that clauses must have subjects; i.e. the extended 
projection principle (EPP) (Chomsky 1981).
60
 As we saw in the previous chapter, 
expletives are thus inserted into syntactic structure outside of VP configurations within 
which the syntactically relevant argument taking requirements of verbs are resolved. To 
this extent, Perry’s analysis gets the lexical adicity of ‘rain’ right.  
Having said that, though, current thinking in linguistics militates against Perry’s further 
claim that ‘rain’ encodes an argument position for tense. It has already been shown that, 
according to the consensus view on such matters, what we normally think of as 
sentences are actually tense phrases (TPs), whose (functional) heads take VP 
complements. So, again, on the assumption that verbs combine with all of their 
arguments within the VP configuration, tense heads (which carry inflectional 
morphology) combine with verbs only after the argument taking requirements of the 
latter have already been satisfied (i.e. after the verb’s argument positions have been 
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 Neale says that in the case of (6), there is ‘exactly one argument role occupant ([e.g.] 
Reykjavik) with no corresponding argument position occupant, and exactly one 
argument position occupant (‘it’) with no corresponding argument role occupant’ (Neale 
2007, p.322). This is fine as long as we bear in mind that the argument position 
mentioned here is not one listed in the lexical adicity of ‘rain’. 
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filled).
61
 This is one way of showing that the lexical entry for ‘rain’ does not list an 
argument position for tense, which means that we can take ‘rain’ to have a lexical 
adicity of zero. I take it that although this indicates that there is a greater discrepancy 
between the lexical and conceptual adicities of ‘rain’ than Perry suggests, it does 
nothing to detract from the remainder of his analysis.  
Moving on to the semantic aspect of Perry’s analysis, we need to consider what grounds 
there are for the idea that ‘rain’ has the conceptual adicity attributed to it. This leads to 
more general questions regarding what determines the conceptual adicities of lexical 
items. Intuitively, one might well assume that knowledge as to which argument roles are 
associated with which expressions stems from knowledge of the lexicon; i.e. that the 
conceptual adicities of expressions are lexically specified. However, according to the 
UCA approach, although lexical entries specify which relations expressions denote, they 
specify no information pertaining to the adicities of those relations. Instead, such things 
are determined on the basis of extra-linguistic, essentially metaphysical, considerations 
pertaining to the way the world must be in order for a given relation to obtain. So, on 
this view, conceptual adicity is determined on the basis of metaphysical considerations. 
In the case of ‘rain’, then, although the expression’s lexical entry specifies a specific 
relation as its denotation, knowledge of the adicity of that relation does not derive from 
knowledge of the lexical item per se, but from knowledge of the fact that raining events 
must occur at particular times at particular places.
62
 If this is right, our knowledge of 
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 Recall that according to the VP internal subject hypothesis (PISH; see Koopman and 
Sportiche 1991), the subjects of verbs are actually taken to combine with their verbs 
within the VP configuration, at SPEC-VP, before moving to SPEC-TP. In order to 
preserve PISH in the face of complications regarding ditransitive constructions, it has 
been proposed that VP configurations are dominated by the functional projections of 
light verb (v) heads (see Larson 1988, Chomsky 1995, Hornstein 2005).    
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 Perry is quite explicit that his approach relies on such a distinction between the role 
grammatical and metaphysical considerations play in interpretation. For example, in 
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which argument roles are listed in the conceptual adicities of expressions stems from 
aspects of our general world knowledge that are not encapsulated in the lexicon. 
1.3. Rejecting metaphysical considerations 
The notion that the number of argument roles associated with a given lexical item is 
established on the basis of metaphysical considerations is generally rejected by 
contemporary attempts to defend the UCA approach (e.g. Taylor 2001; Neale 2007; 
Korta and Perry 2011). A chief problem for Perry’s earlier account is set out by Taylor 
(2001, 2007).  
According to Taylor, in the case of weather reports, it does indeed seem to be the case 
that in order to attain a truth evaluable content, one needs to identify a location from the 
relevant context. Consequently, it seems safe to say that that the propositions expressed 
by such utterances partly unarticulated constituents. However, if the only reason for 
thinking this is that raining events must occur at particular locations, then it ought to 
follow that interpreting utterances of the following sentences also requires the 
identification of specific locations from contexts, since events like dancing, eating, and 
giving must also take place at locations: 
(6) a.  Mary danced 
b. Bill ate five apples 
c. Mary gave the book to Bill 
The problem for Perry’s account is that there is simply no reason to think that 
interpreting utterances of the sentences of (6) involves identifying locations from 
                                                                                                                                               
discussing the difference between the verbs ‘beat’ and ‘win’ he points out the following: 
‘The metaphysics of winning requires a victor and a vanquished, but the grammar of 
‘won’ does not require we identify the vanquished’ (Perry 2001, p.48). That is to say 
that ‘won’ has just one argument position for a victor, but has argument roles for both 
the victor and the vanquished, unlike ‘beat’, which has two argument positions and 
denotes a relation with two argument roles. 
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contexts. As Taylor quite rightly points out, ‘[o]ne can say something fully determinate, 
something fully truth evaluable, by uttering [(6a)] even if context provides no place as 
the place where the dancing took place’ (Taylor 2001, p.54). 
That said, since one can determine the proposition expressed by ‘Mary danced’ without 
needing to know where she did her dancing, the proposition expressed does not contain 
an unarticulated locative element. So, it seems we must conclude that the metaphysical 
fact that dancing, like raining, must happen at a place does not ensure that there is an 
argument role for locations present in the conceptual adicity of ‘dance’. Put more 
generally, the arguments of a given relation need not all be listed in the conceptual 
adicity of the lexical item we use to denote that relation.  
What is it, then, that makes ‘rain’ behave differently from ‘dance’ in the relevant 
respect? Taylor’s answer is as follows: 
On the view that I favor, the verb ‘to rain’ has a lexically specified argument 
place that is theta-marked THEME that takes places as values. My claim is that, in 
the lexicon, rainings are explicitly marked as a kind of change that places 
undergo. But from the point of view of sentence-level syntax, such lexically 
specified parameters are what I call subconstituents rather than constituents. No 
constituent of the sentence (3) need serve as an argument place for the verb 
‘rain’. Yet, despite the fact that this lexically specified argument place need not 
be expressed as a sentence-level constituent, it makes its presence felt by 
‘‘demanding,’’ on pain of semantic incompleteness, to be assigned a 
contextually supplied value. (Taylor 2007, p.225)
63
 
Taylor, following Recanati (1993), dubs the position outlined parametric minimalism 
(PM). Inasmuch as the approach has been widely endorsed by advocates of UCA, it 
requires further attention. In particular, the following three claims, which are all 
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 As Neale (2007, p.321) points out, Taylor’s talk of argument places here is probably 
best avoided, since Perry often uses the term argument place to talk of argument 
positions. 
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endorsed by Taylor, need to be assessed: (i) that subsyntactic parameters (i.e. argument 
roles that do not correspond to syntactic argument positions) are lexically specified and 
assigned θ-roles; (ii) that argument roles are subsumed in lexical entries in virtue of their 
inherent thematic relevance; and (iii) that argument roles can be syntactically inert 
despite being lexically specified. I now want to explore these claims in further detail.  
1.4. Taylor’s proposal 
In order to assess PM as a modified version of the UCA approach, I start by focussing 
on the claim that the conceptual adicities of expressions are specified as part of their 
lexical entries. This marks an important adjustment to Perry’s initial proposal that 
argument roles are associated with lexical items on the basis of metaphysical 
considerations. As Taylor argues: 
Perry’s mistake, I think, is to suppose that the bare mismatch between predicate 
and relation itself somehow explains why some argument roles must be 
contextually supplied, on pain of semantic incompleteness, while others need not 
be. My alternative hypothesis is that it is typically the lexical structure of the 
verb itself, and not language independent facts about the relation or even facts 
about the mismatch between predicate and relation, that determine[s] what must 
be supplied and what need not be supplied by context. The verb itself directs its 
own semantic completion by, as it were, demanding that occupants of certain 
argument roles, but not others, be supplied in context, sometimes, perhaps, as the 
value of sentence-level constituents, but not always. (Taylor 2007, p.228) 
According to PM, then, knowledge of which argument roles are associated with which 
context sensitive expressions stems entirely from our knowledge of the lexicon. Hence, 
the semantic component of a lexical entry does not only indicate which relation an 
expression denotes (as per Perry’s earlier view), but also lists a set of argument roles 
that are pertinent for the interpretation of the relevant expression, and thus must undergo 
saturation during interpretation ‘on pain of semantic incompleteness’.  
Now, an interesting aspect of Taylor’s approach is that the argument roles enumerated in 
an expression’s conceptual adicity are taken to undergo theta-assignment. Indeed, as 
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Taylor proceeds to elaborate PM, he comes to characterise the conceptual adicity of 
‘rain’ in terms of the verb’s ‘lexically specified thematic structure’: 
The verb [‘rain’] itself – in particular, its lexically specified thematic structure – 
is the source of the felt need for the contextual provision of a place or range of 
places where a raining happens. (Taylor 2007, p.226) 
On this view, the component of a lexical entry that specifies argument roles, and the 
component that specifies θ-roles (i.e. its theta-grid), come to be seen as one and the 
same. Just as some argument roles – i.e. subsyntactic parameters – do not correspond to 
argument positions, we now adopt the view that some θ-roles do not correspond to 
argument positions. It thus follows that we can equate subsyntactic parameters with 
unassigned θ-roles, and, consequently, that we can equate the requirement that 
subsyntactic parameters must undergo saturation (or be assigned values from context) 
with the requirement that expressions must assign all their θ-roles. By equating 
argument roles with θ-roles in this way, we retain a certain economy to our 
characterisation of the kind of information stored in lexical entries, since, given that θ-
roles must be lexically specified anyway and argument roles are assigned θ-roles, there 
seems little use in duplicating the relevant aspect of lexical content.  
These observations lead us to the second claim behind PM; viz. that argument roles are 
subsumed into lexical content in virtue of their exhibiting a certain thematic relevance. 
More fully, Taylor (2007) argues that idiosyncratic differences between the kinds of 
argument roles that are associated with expressions can be accounted for in terms of 
differences in the way the relations denoted by those expressions are lexicalised (see 
also Korta and Perry 2011). Lexicalisation involves a more or less fulsome incorporation 
of relations into lexical content. So, while the relations denoted by ‘rain’ and ‘dance’ 
both (metaphysically speaking) occur relative to locations, the former undergoes a more 
fulsome lexicalisation in that its locative aspect is subsumed in lexical content as an 
argument role.  
Taylor’s idea seems to be that the reason why the rain relation undergoes a more 
fulsome lexicalisation in the relevant sense is that we conceptualise raining events as 
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events that happen to locations; i.e. we think of locations as undergoing raining events 
(which is not the case for dancing events).
64
 Hence, since the notion of that which 
undergoes an event has long been taken to define a category of θ-role (i.e. THEME), the 
locations of raining events are apt for inclusion in thematic structure. If this is on the 
right track, it further supports, and perhaps explains to some extent, the close link 
between notions of conceptual adicity and thematic structure. Argument roles 
enumerated in the conceptual adicities of expressions still have their source in the 
metaphysical features of the relations those expressions denote, but such features only 
make their way into lexical content in virtue of the fact that they participate in the 
relation denoted by the expression in a thematically relevant way. 
The view we have come to is this: a lexical entry for an expression specifies a number of 
argument positions, and a number of θ-roles. Some θ-roles are assigned to argument 
positions. When a θ-role is not assigned to any argument position, it makes its presence 
felt by demanding that a certain piece of contextual information – i.e. an unarticulated 
constituent – be incorporated into interpretation. Once unarticulated constituents are 
identified for all unassigned θ-roles, interpretation is complete. Those θ-roles that do not 
correspond to argument positions specified in the lexical adicity of a given expression 
are taken to be ‘locked’ in the subsyntactic basement.  
Ultimately, I take Taylor’s approach to be more appealing than Perry’s, largely because 
it abandons the unattractive notion that appeals to metaphysical considerations can play 
an explanatory role in accounting for the kinds of factors that give rise to constraints on 
interpretation.  That said, I think there are certain problems for Taylor’s proposal, to 
which I now turn. 
                                                 
64
 I take it that, on this view, the conceptual adicity of ‘dance’ does not encode a 
location parameter just because our understanding of the way dancings relate to their 
locations cannot be classified under any common category of θ-role. Of course, if one 
counts LOCATION as a category of θ-role, this explanation runs aground. However, as 
we shall see, there may be good reasons for limiting the range of θ-roles specified in 
lexical entries.  
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2. Objections to parametric minimalism 
I want to offer just one main objection to Taylor’s approach. Though the objection can 
be stated simply, I think it severely undermines the explanatory value of PM. Basically, 
I do not think that the appeal to ‘understood participants’ helps to account for the very 
cases Taylor is aiming to explain.  
2.1. Understood participants 
Does the claim that locations participate in raining events, in the sense that they 
undergo, and so are the understood THEMES of, such events, really serve to explain 
why speakers take it that they must identify a particular location from context to 
interpret utterances of sentences containing ‘rain’? Taylor thinks that it does, but I think 
there are reasons to question this.  
We saw that Perry argued that the reason speakers incorporate locations into their 
interpretation of utterances of sentences containing ‘rain’ is that raining events must 
happen at a location. Taylor then pointed out that dancing events also happen at 
locations, but this does not lead speakers to incorporate locations when they come to 
interpreting utterances of sentences containing ‘dance’. Taylor then argues that the 
difference between ‘rain’ and ‘dance’ is that whilst dancings simply happen at locations, 
rainings happen to locations. That is, locations are understood participants of raining 
events. This then leads Taylor to argue that there is a location specified in the conceptual 
adicity of ‘rain’. What we want to know is whether Taylor’s appeal to understood 
participants is really an improvement on Perry’s appeal to metaphysical considerations.  
Consider the following cases: 
(7) a. The key opened the door 
b. Bill bought flowers for Mary 
c. Mary ate 
The verbs in each of these sentences stand for events or activities that are understood to 
involve participants that are not mentioned in the sentence. That is, in the case of (7a), 
we know that someone used the key to open the door. In the case of (7b), we know that 
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Bill bought flowers from someone, for some amount (otherwise, he simply did not buy 
flowers for Mary). And in the case of (7c), we know that there is some food that Mary is 
eating. What is more, all of these understood (but ‘off-stage’) participants participate in 
the event in some thematically relevant way. So for example, the person who used the 
key would be the understood AGENT who used the key as an INSTRUMENT to open 
the door, which is the THEME in the event. So, on Taylor’s account, there will be θ-
roles for these understood participants specified in the thematic structures of the relevant 
verbs.   
Perhaps (7a) is the weakest of the cases here, as one can conceive of cases where we do 
not need a further AGENT participant. For instance, it may be the case that we can 
construe the key as the AGENT of the event, which militates again the necessity for a 
missing participant. I think that this is absolutely right. The key in question may be an 
enchanted key that acts under its own volition. That said, though, the same response 
cannot be given in relation to (7b) or (7c). That is, we simply cannot conceive of a 
buying event that does not involve a buyer, seller, amount paid, and thing bought. All of 
the participants of ‘buy’ are thus conceptually necessary. Similarly, if Mary ate, then 
there has to be something she ate.  
Setting the quibble aside, then, the problem here is that when we come to interpret the 
truth-conditional content expressed by utterances of the sentences of (7), we do not feel 
the need to identify the individual, say, from whom Bill bought the flowers. Nor do we 
feel the need to identify who used the key to open the door. Nor do we feel the need to 
find out what it is Mary is eating. At best, we understand that there must have been 
someone who sold the flowers to Bill, someone who used the key to open the door, and 
some food Mary ate.  
This signals an important distinction raised by Fillmore (1986). He writes: 
It has occasionally been pointed out that a distinction is needed between what I 
will call indefinite null complements (INC) and definite null complements 
(DNC). With definite null complements the missing element must be retrieved 
from something given in the context; with indefinite null complements the 
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referent’s identity is unknown or a matter of indifference. One test for the 
INC/DNC distinction has to do with determining whether it would sound odd for 
a speaker to admit ignorance of the identity of the referent of the missing phrase. 
It’s not odd to say things like, “He was eating; I wonder what he was eating”; but 
it is odd to say things like, “They found out; I wonder what they found out.” The 
missing object of the surface-intransitive verb EAT is indefinite; the missing 
object of the surface-intransitive verb FIND OUT is definite. The point is that 
one does not wonder about what one already knows. (Fillmore 1986, p.96) 
In line with this, we can take it that we get indefinite, as opposed to definite readings, of 
the missing elements in the sentences of (7). What Taylor’s approach is essentially 
meant to account for, though, is why we get a definite, as opposed to an indefinite, 
reading of the missing element associated with the ‘rain’ predicate. The problem is that 
Taylor’s appeal to understood participation as the key explanatory notion here does not 
serve to explain why we get a definite rather than an indefinite reading.  
What is more, the above observations suggest that we can question whether our ability 
to recognise that there are certain indefinitely construed event participants is really an 
ability that arises from our knowledge of the lexicon. To clarify, we know that ‘Bill 
bought Mary flowers’ is true iff Bill bought Mary flowers. We also know that Bill 
bought Mary flowers iff he paid someone (or perhaps something, say if he used a 
vending machine) a certain amount for those flowers. But does our knowledge of this 
latter fact really stem from our knowledge of the lexicon? It seems to me that it is at 
least possible that we can think of such knowledge as arising from our general 
conceptual competence, or world knowledge, rather than from some aspect of our 
linguistic competence. Hence, even though we can understand the indefinite participants 
as participating in the buying event in a thematically relevant way, this does not 
guarantee that the lexically specified thematic structure of the verb encodes θ-roles for 
those participants. This raises questions for Taylor’s assumption that lexical entries for 
expressions encode information pertaining to the understood participants in the events 
those expressions encode.  
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Once we begin to question the connection between that which is lexically encoded, say 
in thematic structure, and that which is encoded in conceptual adicity, we then have to 
question whether our knowledge of the fact that raining events appear to have locations 
as participants is something that stems from information encoded in the meaning of 
‘rain’, or from information encoded in the concept RAIN. It seems to me that the only 
real reason Taylor has for arguing that such information is lexically represented in some 
way is that we have that felt need to identify locations from contexts when it comes to 
interpreting the truth-conditional content of utterances of sentences in which the ‘rain’ 
predicate occurs. But again, this was the very fact Taylor’s proposal was supposed to 
explain.  
3. Summary 
In this chapter, I have given an extensive overview of the development of UCA, from its 
origins in Perry, to its more recent manifestation in the form of Taylor’s PM.  I have 
shown that advocates of UCA aim to give an explanation of certain systematic 
contextual effects on utterance interpretation by tracing the relevant effects back to 
certain aspects of the meanings of expressions that are subsyntactic, in the sense that 
they have no structural signature (unlike the arguments encoded in an expression’s 
lexical adicity). I showed that the main line of continuity between these approaches lies 
in the idea that the lexical and conceptual adicities of expressions need not be equal, but 
that both impose constraints on interpretation. 
The argumentative component of the chapter has proceeded as follows. First, I outlined 
and agreed with Taylor’s arguments against Perry’s claim that we can determine an 
expression’s conceptual adicity on the basis of purely metaphysical considerations. I 
then showed that, on Taylor’s alternative outlook, we can determine an expression’s 
conceptual adicity on the basis of an appeal to the notion of understood participation. I 
then showed that Taylor’s appeal to the notion of understood participation does not 
succeed as an explanation of the kinds of interpretive effects his modified version of 
UCA, i.e. PM, was meant to explain. Ultimately, I take it that Taylor’s approach does 
not provide an answer to the question of why it is that when certain expressions appear 
  
135 
in a sentence, speakers have to look to context in order to determine the truth-
conditional content of utterances of that sentence.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The approaches assessed in the last three chapters of this thesis all share the assumption 
that the truth-conditional contents of declarative sentences are compositionally 
determined by their lexico-syntactic properties. That is, sentences have truth-conditions, 
or express propositions, relative to contexts purely in virtue of the context-invariant 
meanings of their constituent lexical items and their syntax. Each approach thus adopts 
the standard view that the role of a semantic theory is to generate pairings of sentences 
with their content by providing: (i) context-independent specifications of the meanings 
of lexical items in terms of the contributions those items make (relative to contexts) to 
the contents of all sentences in which they occur; and (ii) context-independent 
specifications of the semantic effects brought about by combining lexical items in 
different syntactic configurations.  
Accordingly, if the content of a sentence is apt to vary on different occasions of use, the 
relevant variation must be reflected in our specification of its lexico-syntactic properties. 
Of course, there are restrictions on how much context-dependence can be specified in 
advance. So, as we saw, each approach aims to set a principled limit on the extent to 
which we need to attribute context-dependence to the lexico-syntactic properties of 
sentences in order to account for the contribution such properties make in determining 
truth-conditional content. More fully, semantic minimalists argue that we need only 
attribute context-dependence to standard indexicals in order to achieve adequate pairings 
of sentences with their content; aphonic theorists argue that we need only attribute 
context-dependence to standard indexicals and aphonic pronominals (at LF); and UCA 
theorists argue that we need only attribute context-dependence to standard indexicals 
and expressions whose meanings encode subsyntactic parameters. 
Now whilst the approaches discussed clearly succeed in attaining some form of pairing 
between sentences and their content, each ends up with a different notion of what gets 
paired. For instance, the semantic minimalist ends up adopting a distinctly ‘thin’ 
conception of what constitutes truth-conditional content, whilst the aphonic theorist and 
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the UCA theorist both make substantial revisions to prior conceptions of what 
constitutes lexico-syntactic structure. I have argued that in order to assess the adequacy 
of the pairings achieved by each of these approaches, we have to ask whether there are 
good independent reasons to accept the proposed revisions to our conceptions of lexico-
syntactic structure and truth-conditional content.  
The arguments I have set forth have indicated that it is at least questionable whether the 
approaches provide such motivation. In general, the conclusions reached in the 
preceding discussion all point to the idea that we should seriously question whether it 
makes sense to sacrifice our independently motivated conceptions of what constitutes 
lexico-syntactic structure and truth-conditional content in order to develop a 
compositional semantics for natural language along the lines proposed by the relevant 
approaches. That is, we are faced with a choice: either we accept the approaches offered 
at the cost of sacrificing certain intuitively and theoretically appealing notions about 
what constitutes linguistic structure and truth-conditional content, or we preserve the 
relevant notions at the cost of potentially having to sacrifice the idea that we can 
construct compositional semantic theories for natural languages.  
Advocates of the positions discussed argue that the problem with going down the latter 
route is that once we abandon compositionality, we appear to abandon all hope of 
explaining the evidently systematic link between sentences and the interpretations they 
receive on occasions of use. That is, once we allow that our ability to interpret a 
sentence depends on something other than our ability to understand its compositionally 
determined linguistic content, it becomes difficult for the standard semantic theorist to 
imagine what else could possibly serve to forge the systematic link between sentential 
structure and truth-conditional content.  
One might appeal to broadly pragmatic considerations here – i.e. considerations 
pertaining to particular kinds of background knowledge, interests, and practices that 
jointly motivate speakers to interpret sentences in the way they do on particular 
occasions of utterance. However, the standard semantic theorist will insist that the 
problem with this approach is that there is no obvious reason to think that such 
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considerations are answerable to the various constraints that appear to govern what 
interpretations speakers actually associate with sentences.  
That is, they argue that whilst one can appeal to all sorts of reasons why one would want 
to interpret a sentence in a given way on a particular occasion of use, there are clearly 
limits on the ways speakers actually do interpret sentences that cannot be overruled by 
such pragmatic considerations. Ultimately, the standard semantic theorist is therefore led 
back to the view that the only plausible place to situate the relevant constraints on 
interpretation is in our understanding of the lexico-syntactic features of sentences 
themselves. Consequently, they cleave to the view that the truth-conditional contents of 
sentences are determined exclusively by their lexico-syntactic features, even if that 
means giving up certain independently plausible assumptions about what constitutes 
lexico-syntactic structure and/or truth-conditional content.  
The findings in the thesis are clearly detailed in the relevant chapters. However, what 
they seem to demonstrate is that all of the accounts examined lack, in some way, the 
resources to explain how a standard semantic theory could fully support a truth-
conditional externalist semantic theory. Each of the analyses appears to demonstrate 
that, in a number of cases, appeals to our linguistic competence alone may be 
insufficient to account for the interpretive phenomena. As we have seen, the standard 
semanticist is reluctant to appeal to resources outside of purely linguistic competence, 
principally because of fears of loss of systematicity. However, particularly in the context 
of discussions of the minimalist accounts, I have shown that that fear is unwarranted, at 
least in its extreme form, and an appeal to wider cognitive faculties need not involve a 
necessary loss of systematicity.  
Of course, in one sense, this is a negative finding in that my analysis has shown gaps in 
the current prominent accounts, however, as just stated, the presence of such gaps and 
the reorientation of thinking about wider cognitive facilities expands the potential 
domain of inquiry. Indeed, it may be the case for those that wish to maintain and 
externalist, truth-conditional semantics, there is little choice but to look outside 
linguistic competence, as determined by the language faculty, for the explanation of the 
sorts of phenomena that I have examined.  
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The idea that we sometimes have to look beyond the capability of the language faculty 
in order to account for the relevant interpretive phenomena is not alien to all linguists. 
Pietroski is clear that we should not be surprised if fully accounting for truth takes us 
beyond the capabilities of linguistically determined meaning (Pietroski 2005b, p.254). 
None of this is to deny the value of the vast majority of standard semantic theorising. 
However, what I think we wish to avoid is the dogmatic effect that adherence to an 
exclusively linguocentric approach may cause. In particular, I think it is really important 
that researchers feel able to look beyond linguistic competence when the relevant 
phenomena warrant it, and do not feel, because of the inherent presuppositions of most 
standard semantic approaches, that they must account for all phenomena in the standard 
way.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
